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SUMMARY
Existinl economics literature. especially empirical. on the role of advenisinl in
the diffusion process is sparse. In this thesis. explicit attention was given to the pan
played by advertising in the diffusion of new consumer durables. both at a theoretical and
empirical level The two competing epidemic and probit demand diffusion models were
used and two period models established. Advertising was incorporated into each
framework. becoming endogenous once a supply side was added. The resulting profit
maximising advertising sales ratio within each model was compared and contrasted to the
standard Dorfman-Steiner and Nerlove-Arrow COnditiODIfound in the literature. The
special features of the models did impinge upon these ratios. Alternative supply
stlUcture5 (defmed in terms of number of firms) were considered and the resultinl effects
on the industry advertisinl sales ratio within each demand framework explored. The
results could not be rigorously shown. however the essence of each of the demand
frameworks had potentially different impUcations for the monopoly u compared to
oligopoly outcome. The existence of a positive leneric information extemality in the
epidemic model. reducing the advertisinl intensity once the monopoly assumption was
relaxed. whilst the negative eady extraction effect and intertemporal price discrimination
opportunities in the probit model could increase the advertisinl sales ratio in an oUgopoly
industry.
Two new consumer durables were chosen for the empirical investigation. the
video cassette recorder and the colour television receiver. Bodl demand diffusion models
were appUed to the data for each product using OLS estimadon procedures. It was found
that the epidemic model performed relatively better to the probit model for the video
cassette recorder. indicating a positive and statistically sipificant role for advertisinl.
when entering indirectly through the social contad coefftcient. Thus the information
variables took precedence for this panicular pl'OCiud. However there was some question
over the predictive ability of the model and no ICCOUIIt w. taken of any possible
simultaneous equation biu that would arise if advenistna w. endopnous. u suggested
in the theoretical chapt.en. In corurast. the probit model performed relatively bener for
the colour tv receiver. showinl the importance of the economic variabla such as relative
price. hire purchase restrictions and total advenisina meaqes, in addition to the existinl
ownen to IDl ownen explanalory variable. 1biI conclusion was reached after
recognition of the possible exis&ence of simultaneoul equadon btu. The information
about the advertiJiDa dec:ision contained in the Iheoredcal cbaplell was used to identify
the insUumerual variables to include in the TSLS esdmadon procedure. However.
restrictinl the sample period to the first 11 yean of the diffusion procesI cast some doubt
upon the probit model specification. This mi&hl indicate that future wort should consider
incorporatina information variables into the probit stnIC1We in a more satisfyinl manner.
ABBREVIATIONS
AS I Advertising sales ratio in period 1.
AS2 Advertising sales ratio in period 2.
AR2 Adjusted R2.
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation.
BREMA The British Radio and Electronic Equipment Manufacturers Association.
CHOW Claw test for stability of the regression coefficients.
CUSUM Cumulative Sum of Recursive Residuals.
CUSUMSQ Cumulative Sum of Squares of Recunive ResidualJ.
D-S Dorfman Steiner.
OW Dwbin-Watson statistic for 1st order serial correlation.
H& S Honky and Simon.
HET HetelOlCedudcity test based on regression of squared
residuall on squared fitted values.
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ITV Independent Television.
LHS Left Hand Side.
I..qranp Multiplier test for residual auroc:orrelation up to order 4.
MAD Mean Ablolute Deviatic:n
MINTEL Market Intelligence.
MSE Mean Square Error.
N-A Nerlove Arrow.
NLS Non Linear Least Squares.
NOB Number of observations.
NORM luque-Sera test for nonnality.
OLS Ordinary Least Squares.
PRED Predictive Failure Test. le, (bow's second test of
adequacy of predictions.
R cl D Research and development.
RHS RigIU Hand Side.
RPI Retail Price Inflation.
RSET Ramsey Reset test using the square of me fitted values.
RSS Residual Sum of Squares of the equation.
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1CHAPTERl
INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND
The traditional comparative static approach of economic analysis. although
infonnative and useful. can tend to obscure some imporwu impUcadons for an economy
that in reality is in a continual process of change. The focus of attendon in the stadc
approach is the comparison of equilibrium positions. Little if any knowledge is gained
about the process of transition between the two stadc equilibrium points. Writers
working outside of mainstream economics. such as those belongin. to the Austrian school
of thought. have always challenged this view and for them the process itself is the
essential subject of enquiry. More recently. inlerest in the phenomenon of disequilibrium
at the macro level of an economy has led to the development of temporary equilibrium
models. Of course empirical research has also had to conc:em itself with the process of
transition between two equilibrium swes. an example beina the use of an adjustment
mechanism in investment equations.
1.1 TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
The equilibrium concept is fundamental to neoclassical economics and
consequently technological change has almost been releaated to the periphery because of
the difficulty of its incorporation into the neoclusical approach. As a result.
tectmologica1 progress has often been treated as an exoaeuous event. Yet technological
change is one of the major factors affectina economic activity and welfare. Just how
considerable the benefits can be, was demonstrated in the weD known study by Solow
(1957). He concluded that approximately 7/8 of the incJaSe in labour productivity in the
US over the period 1909 to 1949 was attributable ID technical chanp. Of c:owse, this was
a rather narrow view of the benefits of innovation. concentradnl as it did on the cose
decreasin. aspectI of new proceu technololies. The potential increase in consumer
2welfare due to product innovations was not addressed. Nonetheless, the considerable
impact of technological change is unquestionable, so it is gratifying to note its re-
emergence as an area of interest for economists in recent yean.
1.3 DIFFUSION
However, some issues of technological change have received more attention
than others. Schwnpet.er (1934) sugested 3 stages in the proc:eu of technological change
which have remained popular: invention, imovation and diffusion. A considerable
amount of work has focused on innovation, with R cl D being adopted as the variable
most associated with this stage. Obviously this aspect is imponant but the overall
economy wide benefits of technological change occur as diffusion of the innovation takes
place, that is, as its use or acquisition spreads through the economy. These benefits can
be considerable. Just taking the period since the second World War, many consumer
durables have eme'led which at the outset were confined to a small and privileged group
of consumers. However within a relatively shon space of time, the innovation has come
to be enjoyed by the mass of the population in the economy. The monochrome television
receiver is a good eumple (quoted in the appendix to Chapcer 6). Within about 20 years
of its initial commercial appearance, at leal 86.. of UK households had acquired the
product.
1.4 PRODUCT INNOVATION; THE EXTENT OF NEWNESS
The total effect of the inuoduction of the monochrome tv on consumer welfare
as its use spread, must have been considerable. Of course the magnitude of the benefit
may depend upon the eJttent of newness of the innovation. If the product is revolutionary
in the sense that no similar good previously eJtisted, the newneu may be fwldamental (eg.
the video cassette recorder, investigaled in Olapter S). On the ocher hand, the innovation
may be incremental as a similar althouah inferior product already eJtis:...J l the colour
television receiver, investigated in Chapcer 6).
31bere is an altemative view suggesting that much of the 'newness' of product
innovations has been 'fraudulent or related trivially' (Baron & Sweezy 1966). Whilst
there may be some examples in which the extent of newness is debatable, the welfare
increasing aspects from new major consumer durables, such as the video cassette recorder
and colour tv, seem less coneoversiat.! In any case, the diffusion process itself, which is
so imponant to the realisation of the economic and welfare benefits arising from
tectmological change (whatever their magnitude), warrants considerable attention within
its own right.
In fact this has been recognised in the literature and the study of the diffusion
process itself has been growing (Stoneman 198.5). Much of the wort by economists
within this field has been directed towards the analysis of new process technologies,
although consumer product irmovations have not been completely ignored and. in any
case, many of the underlying concepts can be easily uansferred from the analysis of one
to the analysis of the other, merely necessitating a change in terminology.
1.5 THE ROLE OF ADVERTISING IN THE DIFFUSION PROCESS
1.5.1 Expansionary VI Re-distributive
One consequence of the preoccupadon with process innovations has been the
relative neglect of advertising in the diffusion process, pemaps because it is generally
agreed that advertising has a far more promine .. role to play in consumer as opposed to
intermediate martets. However even in those diffusion studies specifically devoted to
consumer products, advertising has been more or less ignored. This is surprising, for
potentially, there is a wide role for advertising to play in I world of product imovation.
The diffusion process is, by its nature, a dynamic phenomenon. thus the effects of
advertising both at a point in time and over time need to be addressed.
Diffusion models can be appUed at a variety of levels of aggregati ·":.l. Generally
with product imovations, the focus of attention is II the economy wide vel, the models
1. Unlike for ea.mp'" I new IOO~ whlre 1M innDYatina fealan ia • red llripe runnina Ihroup iL
4being used to describe the spread of ownership of the generic product through a
population. Consequently, the illlegration of advertising into such diffusion models
means that the approach is similar to previous studies of advertising which have looked
specifically at its effect on total martet demand (in a static framework), i.e, the
investigation of the effect of total advertising by all finns on the demand for a particular
product. Such modelling ignores how demand is distributed between rival brands.
This approach contrasts with the generally accepted belief that the predominant
effect of advertising is distributive between competitors and thus the more disaggregative
the level of analysis, the greater will be the elasticity of demand with respect to
advertising.2 Such procedures effectively assume a COnstanl total level of demand in
order to examine the effect of advertising on martet share, in other words, expenditures
on advertising are seen as a zero sum game. Of course there has been some consideration
given to the opposite approach, whereby the interbrand competitive effects of advertising
are ignored so that its effect on total industry demand can be identified (or even at a
higher level of aggregation, ignore the inter industry effects to establish advertising's
impact on aggregate consumption). Empirical results are c:onflicting (Schmalensee 1972,
Comanor and Wilson 1974) but it is generally agreed that the higher the level of
aggregation, the lower is the elasticity of demand with respect to advertising.
Theoretically of course, both expansionary and distributive effects are encompassed in the
first order conditio .. for profit maximisation derived from the economic theory of
advertising expenditwe derennination (Lambin 1976). Even so, the major emphasis in
the literature tends to be on the market share effects of advertising expenditures.
1.5.1 New Products. Advertlsinl and Information
However, most of the literature about the relative importance of advertising
ignores the distinction between existing products and new products. It seems reasonable
to expect that advertising will have a ~ater role to play in these d)'lW!lJc:circumstances.
2. Ac:ccpcmce of IhiI .iew ~ reaal&a flam ... undIIrlyina beUIf of clulical ecanamiall lhallhe
economy IendI towll'dl fuU employment equilibrium.
To see this. it must be remembered that mainstream microeconomic theory assumes full
infonnation and given consumer preferences. But the introduction of a new product will
by definition immediately render existing knowledge incomplete; since consumer
preferences for existing products are given. then as new goods appear either these
preferences must be altered or a more resUictive initial assumption must be made that
preferences are given for all existing and future goods (Lancaster 1966). So, lack of
infonnation will be one of the major characteristics of an environment in which new
products are being introduced. This gives advertising an important role to play in
providing infonnation and establiShing consumer preferences for new products.
Potentially then. in a world of product irmovations, advertising has a wide role
to play and this can raise imponant questions about its effect on consumer welfare. In the
diffusion process (especially the epidemic model), advertising has been nominated a
mostly infonnative role. However no judgement is made regarding the truthfulness and
reliability of this infonnation. Whether its presence is increasing or decreasing to
consumer welfare and the resulting policy implications are beyond the scope of this
thesis.
Of course the effect of advertising may still only be re-distributive in an
intencmporal sense, affecting the timing as opposed to the total dynamic demand for the
new product. Also. even if one acceptS that overall demand for the new product is
increased by advertising. the increase in demand may be at the expense of another generic
product. with no overall change to aggregate consumption. Such a view would not
envisage any significant impact of advertising on aggregate consumption. 3
1.5.3 Advertlsina, Diffusion and the Existlnl Uterature
The number of actual studies that have directly addressed the role of advertising
in the diffusion process are few. There are some notable theoretical contributions
3. Du.enberry lUll'" &hII ... ~ inlroduc:tiona .. NIpOIIIibII for IIIOYina Iht. dJnaunption
function upwarda ov. am.. but ora .,ain. tmpiricaI .. idaa IIdie economy Inll itconcrldiclDry (...
Cowline et all975.0ihbana 1915)
6(discussed in the following chapter) recognising the endogenity of advertising to the
diffusion path. However these studies can be criticised for their narrow use of an
epidemic demand based model (for shen notation this model will be simply referred to as
'epidemic' and is discussed in more detail in the following chapters). Richer, theoretical
diffusion models have been derived and applied (for sbon notation such models will be
referred to as 'probit' and are discussed in more detail in the following chapters), but no
such model has yet incorporated the role of advertising.
Given the neglect on the theoretical side it is perhaps not surprising that the
same state of affairs is reflected in the empirical applications. TIle writer is not aware of
any study in the empirical economics literature which explicitly investigates the
significance of advertising in a diffusion model, other than an empirical model developed
in Cowling et al (1975). This investigation looked at the effect of advenising both on the
coffee and tea drinks martet as a whole and the substitution of coffee for tea over the
period 1960-68.
Some examples are available from marketing researchers. however in additim
to their narrow use of an epidemic equation and their failure to incorporate a supply side,
such studies generally suffer from their use of relatively unsophisticated statistical
techniques, keeping diagnostic testing (if done at all) to its bare minimum. Consequently
the robustness of the findings, especially with regard to the size and significance of the
advertising coefficient must be called into question. At best their results are tentative,
merely hinting at a positive role for advertising in the diffusion of new consumer durables
and funber rigorous investigation is required before any definite conclusions can be
reached.
1.6 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
1.6.1 AdvertJslnl and Dlf'fusion;A Theoretical Analysi.
TIle aim of this study is to rectify these deficiencies by focusing explicitly upon
the pan played by advertisinl in the diffusion of new consumer durables. both at a
7theoretical and empirical level. After reviewing the current literature in Chapter 2,
advertising will be incorporated into each of the competing demand side diffusion
models, becoming endogenous once a supply side is added (01aptcrs 3 and 4). For
simplicity in the theoretical sections, models with only two periods arc analysed. This
has the advantage of clearly indicating the dynamic implications in period I, without the
added complications of a fully dynamic model. If the model is interpreted in terms of
'today and tomorrow', then what is of interest is the today results given there is always a
tomorrow. Hence the first period results can be viewed as I simple approximation to
those that would obtain from a fully dynamic model. This interpretation is used to shift
from two period theoretical models to multi period econometric analysis.
The analytical approach adopled in Chapters 3 and 4 is shown diagrammatically
below:-
'Ol1aopolJ'
D > 1
D - 1
t - 1Time
Period
t-2
DIFFUSION KODEL
EPmEllIC PROBIT
(1)
8Within each diffusion model the resulting profit maximisinl advertising sales
ratios over time are compared and contrasted with the standard Dorfman-Steiner (1954)
and Nerlove-Arrow (1962) expressions found in the industrial economics literature. This
comparison over time within each diffusion model is indicated by the arrow labelled (i) in
the diagram above.
Alternative supply stmctures (defined in terms of number of firms) are
considered and the resulting effects on the advertising sales ratio. within each demand
frarnewort are explored. Thus within each demand diffusion frameworlc. the effect of
moving from a monopoly to oligopoly supply structure is analysed, as indicated by the
arrow labelled (ii) in the diagram. Previously in the literature, the effect of concentration
on the advertising sales ratio has been considered but not explicitly for new products in a
dynamic framewort (Cable 1972, Comanor and Wilson 1974).
Finally, holding the supply StnIcture constant. the different implicatio .. for the
advertising sales ratios of each demand side diffusion equation are investigated. So given
the same supply conditio .. the two competing demand diffusion models are compared, as
indicated by the arrow labelled (iii) in the diagram. These issues are addressed at a
theoretical level only. No attempt is made to verify the hypotheses made about the
advertising sales ratio equations in an eConometric investigation. However the
infonnation contained in the advenising sales ratios derived for each of the demand
diffusion equations will be exploited in the empirical wort in OIapIen 5 and 6.
1.6.% Advertlslnl and Diffusion; An Empirical Analy.
Having looked at these theoretical issues, the thesis proceeds to the empirical
validation and examination of the significance of advertising in the diffusion process.
Two products have been chosen for detailed investigation. Video Cassette Recorders
(Chapter 5), and Colour Television Receivers (Olapler 6). These products are interesting
for a number of reasons. The nature of these product inooYadOlll is very different and
this may have implications for the relative suitability of the competina demand diffusion
models used. Colour tv receiven are a lood example of III incremental innovation, ie. a
9superior substitute product compared to the existing monochrome technology.4 On the
other hand. the introduction of the video cassette recorder presents a special case of a
product for which no close substitute (inferior or otherwise) previously existed. le, a
radically new product (and of course. it is a complementary product to the colour tv
receiver). For this latter good. the importance of infonnation may dominate.
consequently a model in which the spread of information is the essential feature (eg the
epidemic framework) may be more applicable. 1be choice of the colour tv receiver is
interesting because the existing empirical literature contains some evidence of the
diffusion process for the television receiver (although mostly confined to the
monochrome teclmology and ignoring advertising) thus enabling some comparison of
results. Finally, both products meet an obviously essential criteria for empirical work.
namely, an adequate data set could be assembled.
Initially, the standard approach in the literature towards advertising in the
diffusion process (ie. integrating advertising into an epidemic demand based diffusion
model) will be repeated, to see whether or not the positive results found by previous
researchers hold when the econometric model is subjected to a more thorough and
intensive diagnostic testing procedure. Given the lack of economic rationale underlying
the epidemic specification, it is unlikely that the resulting empirical model will prove
statistically reliable. Consequently an alternative empirical model will be established,
derived from the richer probit theoretical base, in the expecwion of superior econometric
results.
The estimation stages in Olapters S and 6 call upon the theoretical demand
diffusion models presented in Chapters 3 and 4. Observations for the diffusion process
will obviously be the combined outcome of demand and supply factors. Supply factors
are given limited prominence in the empirical chapters, primarily due to data restrictions.
Some attempt is made to correct the estimated structural demand diffusion equations for
4. Of c:our. • new poducl may be ~ ror whidllbn ia no .......... __ OIl ill relilive
luperiarity ID the ailtina redInoloo. The queltion of vertical milharizal&aI dilfawnlillion ia c::onIidered in
CJupc.2.
10
possible simultaneous equation bias arising from the cndogenity of the advertising
variable. The advenisin, decision equations derived in O1apters 3 and 4 will provide
infonnation about the appropriate variables to include in the Two Stage Least Squares
estimation procedures. Whilst the explicit consideration of the supply side equations (in
tenns of the advertising decision variable) themselves would also be valuable, in view of
the relative lack of existing empirical research on advertising in the diffusion process,
estimation of the structural demand diffusion equations is still wonbwhiJe within itself.
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CHAPTER2
LITERATURE SURVEY
2.1 NEW PRODUCTS AND ECONOMICS
2.1.1 Introduction
Product irmovation and the role of advenising in it. whilst receiving scant
attention from economists. has been SUbject to relatively greater enquiry by other social
sctennsts, notably in the management literature (discussed below). However the ultimale
objective of their investigations tends to be different (being primarily to forecast sales of
the new product) than those of the economist. Thus it is imponaru that economists apply
their particular tools of analysis to the subject and witness the resulting outcomes.
Recognition that the economy is in a state of a continual process of change can
cause problems for economists. This can be demonstrated most clearly in the economic
approach to new products. with them being either ignored or analysed using a frameWOrk
dominated by onhodox demand theory, which relics upon consumers having full
infonnation and given preferences. The traditional analytical framework has proved a
very powerful and useful tool in economics. However. in many cases the framework has
been derived given the twin assumptions of full information and constant consumer
preferences. These two assumptions must be highly questionable in the real world of
continual product irmovation.
2.1.2 Dirrerentlation
Product innovation has been largely ignored in economics in comparison to
process irmovation. Indeed product differentiation. although introduced into the literature
by Ownberlain (1933) and Hotelling (1929) has received relatively little attention but
recently interest has begun once again to focus on the implications of addressing this
issue explicitly ( see for example Spence 1976; Dixit and Stiglitz 1977; Salop 1979).
Once standard analysis is modified to incorporate non homopneoul products. this opens
up the possibility of ita application to product innovatiOIlI which ~ not radically
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different to established goods. Abbott (19SS) criticised the preoccupation of onhodox
economists with price~utput relationships to the detriment of product or quality
variation, concluding that product heterogeneity was the norm in modem economies. His
quality variation analysis ~fers broadly to product diffe~ntiation between existing goods
and new products. He did not explicitly refer to the diffusion of new products but hinted
at the subject area when discussing how the incentive to create new products was inherent
in the economic system. In his world, advertising plays a mainly informative role about
the existence of these new products to the imperfectly informed consumer.
Abbott, like later writers on product differentiation. was concerned with
discussing the nature of equilibrium in martets for producers of heterogeneous goods.
Thus some classification of the type of possible quality changes is needed for analytical
convenience. He distinguishes three typeS of quality diffe~nces, vertical (an upward
improvement in quality), horizontal (a sideways movement so that only some individuals
will consider it an improvemenl), and innovational (a forward movement in quality that
results in improved or more emcieN quality). He only presentS more formalised models
for horizontal and vertical quality competition and being an equilibrium analysis, ignores
the process of product innovation where consumers have limited information. However
his analytical product differentiation classifications do contain the origins of the
definitions put forward by Shaked and Sutton (1982) which are used in chapter 3. Two
distinct products _ said to be,
veniciJlly difftrt1tlilJJtd, if when offeml at the same price, all consumers would
choose the same one, which is then defined u the higher quality one.
IIOrizOltltJlly di§tre1tlilJJtd, if when offered at the same price, each product would
have a stticlly positive market shale.
In the lite~, separate models have been developed for vertical and
horizontal product competition. although receNly SQlDealtem", hu been made to present
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models which iruegraae both horizontal and vertical differentiated products (Ireland;
1985).
It will be argued that these product differentiation classification are of some
applicability in the following analysis since product innovations do not diffuse in a
vacuum. 1beir relationship to existing products can impinge upon the process of
diffusion. Completely new and radically different goods are relatively rare. It is much
more likely thai a new good is some derivative of an existing one. Consequently, some
distinction must be drawn about the degree of differentiation of the new product and the
verticallhorizontal distinction may be of some use in this. More recently, Stoneman
(1989a and b) has given explicit consideration to the effect of product differentiation on
the emerging diffusion path under different supply conditions (II these papers employ a
probit based demand diffusion equation, discussion will be reserved until the appropriate
section later in this chapter).
2.1.3 New ProducU and the ExistJnl Uterature
Lancaster (19661 cl b) presents a formal model of consumer behaviour which
can readily take account of product heterogeneity and product innovation. In his
framework, a good consists of a bundle of characteristics and consumers have preferences
for the combination of these attributes rather than for the good itself. On the Whole, new
products can be considered to possess the same characteristics II an existing substitute,
but in different proportions. In this way, new goods are seen II a variant of an existing
product rather than a new good. Of course, radical innoVaDORIwill still be difficult to
incorporate, but II argued above, such products are relatively rare willi the majority of
new products performing functions similar to those of existin. goods. Examples will
include monochrome and colour television receivers, microwave and conventional ovens
and so on.
In this 'New Approach to Consumer Theory', characteristics ~ seen u intrinsic
and objective properties of consumption activities. Each consumption activity is defmed
by its input (ie. unit of the good) and by the vector of characteristics which forms its
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OUtpuL Lancaster assumes that psychological aspects such as a consumers ~lative
interest in the different characteristics make their appearance in the preference ordering of
the characteristics vectors and not in the relationship between the goods and
characteristics.1 1bc set of all possible consumption activities forms the consumption
technology, which relates the goods to the characteristiCs. Thus a new product merely
adds a new activity to the consumption technology. Like Abbott, Lancaster then views
the function of advertising as informing individuals about the existence of a product and
the characteristics embodied in it (or maybe price) but this is the full extent to which
diffusion of new products and advenising arc mentioned.
Ironmonger's (1972) primary concern is with new products and he recognises
that goods can have several uses since they arc capable of satisfying many wants.
Consumers evaluate the want satisfying powers of a commodity which arc panly
determined by the objective characteristics of the commodity and panly by the
consumer's subjective evaluation of its characteristics. Consumers arc initially ignorant
of the characteristics. Diffusion proceeds as individuals re~aluate the want satisfying
powers of the new COmmodity. 1bis re-evaluation takes place because conswners arc
gaining knowledge of the characteristics of the new product either di~tly by advertising
or indirectly through display or usage or by individual contact with a user.
Ironmonger sees this upward ~vision of consumer estimates of the good's want
satisfying powers as the major determinant of growth. although recognising that falling
relative prices and rising real incomes also stimulaae growth but considering these as
relatively incidental to the process. Ironmonger sugcstS that the successive ~-evaluation
of the want satisfying powers of the new commodity can be modelled by the simple
epidemic equation (described in the next section). Although he mentions advertising as
one of the factors underlyinl the diffusion process, he does not explicitly include it in his
theoretical model Neither does he include this variable in his empirical analysis, which
1. Thia CCIIlIrUU wi&b ChImodel prIMIlfIId by bonmana. lm m:l imptiIIa cliff.. I'OUfII by which
advatiairla CIft .... 1hI framewart.
consists of the simple linear regression of annual consumption per head of various
products on their lagged consumption, price and income.
The wort of Abbott (195S), Lancaster (1966) and Ironmonger (1972) makes it
clear that new products can cause serious conceptual difficulties for the economist Their
wort shows some of the attempts that have been made to overcome the problems and
some hints as to the role of advenising in a world of product irmovation have been
provided. These hints were confinned to some extent in the empirical model of per capita
coffee consumption developed in Cowling et al (1975), although the statistical results
were not totally satisfactory due to technical problems encountered. However, only when
the diffusion process itself becomes the focus of attention. will it be possible to pursue a
much wider role for advertising.
2.2 THE DIFFUSION PROCESS; THE EPIDEMIC MODEL
It quickly becomes obvious thal the study of the diffusion process is not unique
to the economics literature. Researchen from disciplines u diverse as Ulthropology,
medicine and marketing have found the area of interest. applyina it to phenomena such as
the spread of water boiling in Peruvian villages, the WJe of new drugs and the ownenhip
of a new product (ROlen 1962).
Even within the nanow confanes of the economics literature the amouru of wort
undertaken on diffusion is vlSl It is not intended to provide a complete survey of the
material. A thorough account of the theoretical developments from an economist's view
is provided by Stoneman (1985). Only those theoretical deve10pmentJ relevant to the
establishment of the models presented in chapten 3 and 4 are rmewed.2
2, For example. P"1MconcenIrllion in thiJ thaiJ on COItIUIIW cb..... cbe pme .......ac ~ of
RcinallWlll 1911 iInot releYlnI. it abancll from diff-.c. betweIa indiyiduala _ diffuaiaft ...... u
• ~ of 1InIep: behaviow.
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Also, in this thesis a great deal of emphasis is given to the empirical validation
of the role and significance of advenising in diffusion models, so more auention will be
directed to past literature where estimation has been undenaken. Due to the subjea
matter of the investigation, studies undertaken by marketing researchers will need special
consideration and so 1separate section devoted to this literature has been included in this
chapter.
AltOOugh crossing many fields, an underlying common factor to much of the
diverse literature on diffusion has been the employment of a simple mathematical model
used by medical scientists to explain the spread of 1contagious disease. This epidemic
model is often used as theoretical justification for the underlying behaviour (especially in
the management and early economics literature) so it is worthwhile exploring this
framework in more detail at the outset The model can be simply expressed by the
following equation:-
2.1
where
Xl = the number of individuals having contracted the infectious disease in time t
N == the number of individuals in the fixed population
~ = the social contact coefficient
t == time
If the period t-I to t is very small then this equation can be wriaen as,
2.11
and the solution to this differential equation results in aloalstic time curve:-
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xtfN = {I + exp(-a - p.t)}-I
2.2
where a is a constant of integration and one of the main features of this logistic time
curve is its symmetrical S shape.
The basic hypolhesis underlying this process is that the contagious disease is
spread through the population as infected individuals come into contact with those
individuals yet to contract the disease. By using this analogy to explain the spread of
use/ownership of a new process or product the term infected individual is replaced by
adopter or owner and hence the diffusion model becomes operational.3
However as pointed out by Davies (1979) the simplicity and analytical
convenience of the model has often led to its indiscriminate usc. The strict underlying
assumptions to equation 2.1 ate often inappropriate to the behavioural situation being
modelled. Also the consequent properties of the resulting logistic diffusion curve may
not actually be bome out by the data, thus casting doubt on the suitability of the implicit
underlying assumptions of the model.4
2.2.1 Implldt Unclerlylnl Assumptions
One of the questionable fundamental assumptions to equation 2.1. is that of a
homogeneous population with a constant and equaI propensity to adopt the innovation as
a result of social contact with an existing user. Not only may this contact ooefficient be
variable over time (see Glaister 1974 for a theoretical extension or Wtlliams 1972 for an
empirical example) but also the population N may be segmented such that each sub group
varies in its response to the social contact.
3. Slricdy the procaa will MY. ~ unIea dwn uta lliNl& OM0... 11.... 0UIaet.
4. Evidaa Ihat proclIct innovaaiona do not follow. limple Ioplic pori paIh iaP"" by 8ain (1962),
(1963) who rlftda • poeWvely IDwed cUalribubon pr.fnble in chi CIII of TV ill ....UIt Alao DUon (1982)
in IIIupdIIe of work byOrilich. Oft hybrid corn. danonacr .. that .... ..umpIiaD of • ~ Ioplic
pori CUVI ia inIppupiatII far Ibou& 213 of .... cilia ...
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Sain (1963) considers that ~ may in fact vary across social groups,
consequently a symmetric logistic aggregale growth curve would not be applicable.
Instead the growth path will consist of a series of segments of cumulative lognormal
curves wbere the parameten depend upon social and economic variables. Using data on
mooochrome TV ownership in the UK, grouped according to social class, household size
and geographical ~gion Sain investigates whether or not the parameters of the growth
curve vary with respect to these classifications. He finds that the speed of growth
parameter does vary considerably such that the smaller the household size and the lower
the social class the slower the growth.
The method of using a sigmoid ~nd curve to summarise the data. whe~ the
estimated parameters become the dependent variables explained in a second cross section
stage by economic factors, has often been adopted in the economics literature. Usually no
attempt is made to justify why a panicular trend curve is mo~ appropriate than others,
hence the long running dispute concerning the merits of a symmetric or skewed
mathematical specification. Mansfield's (1968) investigation of the diffusion of
innovations in an industry is a classic example, except he arrives at the logistic growth
equation after much mathematical manipulation and assumption. Both the theo~tical
content and empirical nature of his wort has been extensively criticised (for example see
Davies 1979).
An earlier example of the approach is Griliches (19S7) wort on explaining the
sp~ of hybrid com between geographical ~gions in the US. He begins by using a
logistic curve to summarise the data. generatina for each geographical ~gion 3
parameters; the origin (dale of first use), slope (rate of aa:eptance), and ceiling or
asymptote (long run equilibrium use) of the logistic curve. The author admits that the
choice of a logistic function is rather arbitrary but IIJUCS that it is merely used on grounds
of simplicity and convenience. The estimated parameters are then explained primarily in
terms of profit variables. Commonly in the literature the ceilina parameter is assumed
unity t so eveMlllly the entire population will adopt the innovation. However Griliches
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chooses the ultimate proportion by visual inspection such that the best lOgistic curve is
obtained. S Differences in the ceiling parameter of the geographical regions are then
explained by the profitability variables. The standard of the empirics is simple (which is
not surprising given the year) and the work has since been updated by Dixon (1982) using
more sophisticated econometric estimating techniques.
The original paper is important as it draws attention to the importance of
economic variables (even if limited to profitability). Also, this is one of the earliest
papers that mentions, even if only in passing. a role for advertising. asserting that the
advertising activities of the seed companies could affect the rate of acceptance parameter
in the diffusion curve. However due to data availability the author was unable to
empirically validate this hypothesis.
Unfortunalely the work still leaves unanswered the explanation of the shape of
the trend curve. Indeed in a reply to Dixon. the author (Grilichel 1980) reiterates that in
no way is the chosen fonn a representation of an underlying law of diffusion behaviour.
It is interesting that in his discussion about the ceiling panmeter. Grillches considen it to
be variable over time but because of statistical difficulties has to ignore the question of
adjustment towards a shifting equilibrium value. Later, in a reply to Dixon, he again
questions the Validity of using a model with a constant ceiling parameter, especially given
the improved state of the econometric an.
In faa. BaiD (1962) in his investigation of mono television receiver ownership
in the UK inoorporatel economic variables to explain the ultimate ownership proportion
of the population. Specifically the variables included are hire purchase resUictions.
average income levels and the availability of ITV. However he continues to use the
simple epidemic equation to represent the influence of social emulation. Thus by
allowing the ceiling to be endogenous and shifting over time u the economic variables
altered, so the growth path consists of a series of segments of logistic curves. His
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analysis suggested that the availability of lTV and changes in credit restrictions had
considerable positive and negative effects respectively on the ultimate level of TV
ownership. However the income variable did not perform well and in some instances a
perverse relationship was found for the availability of lTV variable. Also, a price
variable had to be excluded at an early stage as a result of statistical problems.
This paper by 8ain is of particular interest due to its specific focus on a new
consumer durable (and is referred to again in Olapter 6 when the raulta for colour
television ownership are presented). The extent of fonnal diagnostic testing in the paper
is limited, however the author notes thal the precise magnitudes of the estimates need to
be treated with caution, given some of the statistical problems encoUNered. Moreover,
the hypothesized logistic curve did not appear adequate at the extremes of the growth
process. The model basically being derived from an epidemic equation, is also open to
the above noted criticisms of the underlying behavioural foundations inherent in the
framework.
The poor statistical pcrfonnance of the income term and failure to include a
price variable would seem to cast doubt on the basic stNcture chosen Surprisingly, given
the use of a consumer durable. no attention is directed towards advertising. It could have
been included as one of the explanatory variables describing the ownership ceiling.
Presumably, this omission was due to the belief. as already mentioned. that advertising
has a relatively minor role to play on total market demand.
2.1.1 Stock AcUustment Models
The growth curve postulated by Bain looks very similar to that derived from a
stock adjustment model, although he did not specifically refer to thia concept Chow
(1967) begins directly with such an equation in explaininl the growth of computer
ownership in the US. He justifies the adjustment process with the usual epidemic
reasoninl of lap in leaming about the innovation. This endogenous adjustment can be
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modelled in both levels and logarithmic transfonnations, thereby resulting in I logistic6
or Gompertz specification.
Chow prefers the Gompcnz fonnulation for two a priori reasons. Firstly, citing
the work of Bain (1964) as justification, I non symmetric growth curve appeared more
appropriate (although as Olow is investigating a very different type of irmovation any
such assumption must be tenuous) and se<:ondly on grounds of analytical convenience.
Consequently the shape of the growth curve is not fully explained although Olow does
allow for an endogenous and shifting ceiling with the quality adjusted relative price and
GNP variables used to explain the equilibrium stock.
Initially Chow uses the price variable solely and obtains I negative and
statistically significant coefficient at the S% level. The author concludes that the Durbin
Watson statistic indicates no serial correlation but unfortunately this diagnostic test is not
appropriate given the existence of a lagged dependent variable on the right hand side of
the equation. 'This is potentially serious because if serial correlation is present. then the
estimated coefficient will be biased and inconsistent.
Chow then re-estimaleS the equation including GNP as onc of the explanatory
variables. However the variable did not perform well and resulted in an insignificant and
smaller (in absolute terms) price coefficient In fact most of the explanatory power seems
to be coming from the lagged dependent variable.7 Olow puts this down to
multicollinearity of the explanatory variables and using the estimated relationship from
the coefficients on price and GNP, transforms the equation and re-estimates subject to this
restriction. The magnitude (in absolute terms) of the price variable is reduced and is only
just statistically significant at the S% level. No further diagnostic testing of the
specification is undertaken yet the author concludes that the Oompertz stock adjustment
equation with I moving equilibrium level dependent on price can explain the rate of
growth of computen in the US. Given the reservations expressed reaardlna the potential
6, It iInoI.cricdy ......... s........ (1983).
7. The MIne reaulla .. obcained in Ihe tmpirical modeIa de8cribed inChIpt. , IIId 6 or dUI tt.ia.
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consequences of serial correlation in the statistical model and the obvious sensitivity of
the estimated parameters, the magnitude and significance of the effects of the economic
variables must be treated with some caution.
Extra evidence of the need for caution is provided by Stoneman (1976), who
adopting a similar approach to Chow, investigates the growth of computers in the UK.
The statistical results are disappointing and once again it is the lagged dependent variable
which seems to be of most Significance. Various refinements are made to the basic
variables to ensure that the actual measurement more closely proxy the theoretical
variables required by the underlying behavioural hypothesis. This includes modifying the
adjustment parameter to be dependent upon relevant economic variables (eg growth in
output. profits, costs). Unfortunately increasing the sophistication of the estimating
equation in this way did not produce better results.
The wort of both Chow (1967) and Stoneman (1976) is not specifically aimed
at product innovations used by household consumers. However the stock adjustment
model has been used by economisu to estimate market demand for consumer durables
rather than the diffusion curve of a new product per se. For example Stone and Rowe
(1957) used this type of specification in the estimation of US family consumption
expermture on household durables. Such a variable is very agregative and will include
expermtures on replacement and multiple purchases. The theoretical model employed by
the authors accounted for replacement demand and so is consistenl with the data used.
The equilibrium desired stock is explained in terms of income and price variables,
advenising expenditures are not considered.
Williams (1972) uses a stock adjustment equation to model the growth of new
consumer durables in the UK. The looa run equilibrium level of stock is hypothesised to
be a function of price and income (he neglects the possible influence of advenising). The
adjusunert parameter is positively related to the stock of the durable c:unently in
existence, justified on the usual epidemic: pounds that know1edae of the new good is
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gained through conlaCt with existing owners. So his basic estimating equation is as
follows.
2.3
s·t= f(price, income) 2.4
s·t= long run equilibrium stock of a new consumer durable at t
S'-1 = stock of consumer durable at the end of period t-I
1be constant, is included in the adjustment function to allow for the possibility
of a positively skewed growth process.8
.Williams then adds richness to the model by allowing the parameter a to be
subject to shon term fluctuations such as alterations or expectation of alterations in
purchase tax, hire purchase regulation, changes in consumer attitude and seasonal
variation. all of which obviously affect the timing of the purchase decision. In the
empirical investigation, applied to television receivers and refrigerators, changes in
consumer attitudes are proxied by the rate of change of income, whereas the problem of
measuring expectations on the other variables is effectively ignored with current levels of
the relevant variables themselves used.
The resulting equation is complex, containing non linear restrictions, so a
maximum likelihood estimation procedure is used. The results for the television growth
equation will be consideR:d in more detail in Chapcer 6. Generally the econometric
results are mixed. The performance of the parameters in the desired stock equation was
better than that of the shan run fluctuation parameters in the adjustment function. This
laner function was in fact dominated by the existing stock variable (like previous writers
and the results presemed in Olapter S and 6) with the hire purchase term being the only
8. In dUI form if S· t illINned COIIIUnI. dw eqUIlion iIobMrYlIiDnIUy limilir IDdill of t.etvlll ad
WahIbin (1973) or lUi (1969) (boch dIIIcribed .... ).Illhouah dw __ Iyina behavioural upllnMion
diff ... WaUiamI doeI not \1M 1Mepidemic mocW inIerpntuioa upliciaIy. anly • .,...ay impIyina IhilIOIt of
behav_ in juatifyiq 1M incluaion of St-l in 1M ..tjulcmeaa funcIian.
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shan term variable to affect significantly the rate of adjustment for TV receivers but
conversely being the only shan term influence not to be significant for refrigeraton.
This is a very interesting application of the stock adjustment model to the
growth of consumer durable ownenhip with more richness added to the basic equation
due to a variable adjustment fimction. However. in so doing. the fmal estimating
equation becomes very complex. Moreover some doubt must be cast upon the
correctness of the specification for a likelihood ratio test of the non linear restrictions was
substantially rejecte4l.
Autocorrelation was found to be a problem and the model was transformed to
account for first order serial correlation only. Autocorrelation could in fact be an
indication of a mis-specified model and simply transforming the equation might not
really be appropriate. Also as quan.erly data is being used. investigating higher order
serial correlation might be more pertinem. Fmally no attention was given to the
possibility of including advertising in the model either in explaining the equilibrium
desired stock or as a factor affecting the timing of the purchase decision.
2.2.3 Ditruslon, Information and Advertising
The simple epidemic behavioural process has proved very popular in describing
the spread of owoenhip or use of an iMOvation. eilher through the use of the simple
epidemic equation itself or when used indirectly to rationalise the existence of the lagged
stock variable in the adjustment function of a stock adjusUnent model.
However. as pointed out by Stoneman (1985). the epidemic model is really
describing the transmission of infonnation and should therefore account for forms of
information tnnsfer other than by social contact. the most obvious other form being
advenising. Lekvall and Wahlbin (1973) recognised this by interpreting the behavioural
nature of the simple epidemic model in terms of an extemal and intemal influence on the
2S
communication of inlonnation on an innovation. Their wort. is entirely theoretical with
no empirical investigation.
They argue that the shape of the diffusion curve for a new product is primarily a
function of the nature of the process of communication about the innovation among
prospective adopters. the two major fonns of influence on the individual adoption process
being external and internal. The distinction depends upon whether the source emanates
from outside the set of prospective adopters or from members of the social system
respectively. As an example of the extemal channel of infonnation transfer, Leltvall and
Wahlbin quote advertising, whereas the internal channel refers to social interaction or
'word of mouth' and the demonstration effect (where mere usage or consumption of some
good will communicate infonnation and influence individual attitudes towards it). A
simple epidemic model is employed with a one stage adoption process so that once a non
adopter receives inlonnalion. he immediately becomes an adopter. So,
lli:l1.[g+ky]
N
2.S
where,
N = number of prospeclive adopters.
g = number of individuals contacted through external influence such uadvenising.
k = number of influential contacts made by adopters .
.
y = number of adopters of the innovalion.
The authors go on to show how the shape of the diffusion curve will depend
upon the relative strength of the extemal channel of information. When g = 0, then the
simple epidemic model results and so the curve is logistic. At the other extreme when k =
o the curve is a modified exponential.
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This paper is useful in emphasising that it is the spread of information which is
analogous to the contagious disease epidemic equation and showing how advertising can
have an important role to play. However the role of advertising is not developed in any
great detail at the lheoreticallevel and no empirical wort is undertaken. Being basically
an epidemic model it suffers from the criticisms already mentioned (such as a
homogeneous population, one stage adoption process etc). Also the model is not totally
correct as presumably the marginal buyer can receive information from both the internal
and external channels simultaneously. Strictly one needs to argue that the mathematical
equation 2.5 is in fact a linear approximation.
Another major problem of the model is its total conceruation on demand side
factors. Advertising is seen as influencing the shape of the diffusion curve and yet the
role of suppliers and their advertising policies are not pursued. Explicit recognition of the
importance of both demand and supply side factors on the resulting shape of the diffusion
curve was clearly demonstrated by Stoneman and Ireland (1983). As the demand
framewort used by these authors is very differmt to the epidemic model, discussion of
their model will be reserved for laler in the chapter. However it is wonh pointing out that
supply side factors had not been totally ignored by previous writers. Grilic:hes (1957)
mentions that the growth curve observed wu an intersection of shon run supply and
demand CWVCl. He overcomes this problem by assuming that the supply curve of the
irmovation being investigated is very elastic, such that demand factors dominate. Also
other writers have incorporated supply factors, if in a limited way, into their models. In
particular there are two papers which address advertising in this COIUexL
Gould (1970) stresses the notion that it takes time for information to spread
through a market and that diffusion models are primarily reflecting this phenomenon. He
uses two basic models developed by Stigler (1961) and Ozga (1960) respectively.
Essentially. these frameworks are similar to the imcmal and euemal channels of
influence presented by Lelcvall and Wahlbin (1973). except dual the two sowteI are not
combined into one equation. Instead Gould anal)'lel each model separately. The Stigler
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based model is like the external channel of influence process with the addition of a
constant forgetting parameter in the equation. Advertisina acts upon the direct contact
coefficient (represented by g in the Lekvall and Wahlbin equation 2.S above). The other
model based upon the framewort presented by Olga is primarily a simple epidemic
equation where infonnation is spread by social contact In addition some of the existing
infonnation is forgotten in each period at a constant rate. The role of advertising
promotions in this framewort is to increase the social contact coefficient (equivalent to k
in equation 2.S above) but unlike the Stigler model, advertising does not have a direct
effect
Gould then separately analyses the profit maximising advertising policies for a
monopolist in each of these information diffusion models. Not surprisingly, the
qualitative properties of the optimal time path of advertising differ with the demand
diffusion process employed. In the Stigler model, the optimum policy is to advertise most
heavily at the stan of the campaign and continually decrease these expenditures to the
long run equilibrium level. In the second model adapted from Ozga, the time path will
generally be quite differeM. At the beginning the profit maximiSing level of advertising
will be low. it then builds up to a maximum which lies above the equilibrium level, and
finally reduces towards this level Gould incorporates a simple supply side into the
diffusion model and highlights the differing role and policy implications but he only
considers the case of a profit maximising monopolist. Because the models are not
referring explicitly to product diffusion but to information spread. no attention is paid to
other economic variables except for a note in the conclusion thai 'there cenainly will be
shifts in the demand function over time'. Also of course the wort is theoretical and no
empirical investigation is undertaken.
Glaister (1974) also incorporates supply side factors into a diffusion model by
concentrating upon a monopolist's profit maximising price and advertisina poliCies. The
underlying behavioural model is one where information nOwt between individualJ and
like Lekvall and Wahlbin. once I member of the potential market receives the infonnation
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he automatically becomes a buyer of the new product. Glaister arbitrarily restricts the
primary role of advenising to be indirect, increasing the initial number of users who then
act as impartial infonnation carriers in the social contact transmission process. This word
of mouth advenising provides the extra stimulus required before a potential buyer is
transformed into an actual buyer.
Basically, Glaister adoptS a simple epidemic equation and allows some owners
to forget or become passive in the information transfer process at a given rate. He then
obtains a threshold effect such that the initial number of potential buyers must exceed the
ratio of the rate of loss of users (as they forget or become passive) to the social contact
rate, if sales are to 'take off. This condition will be independent of the initial number of
owners who can be created by advenising. However once the thJeshold is crossed, the
number of initial owners at the stan of the process becomes more imponaru and
consequently so do advenising expenditures. It is therefore imperative that the seller
carefully selects the subpopulation of identical individuals who are the potential buyers of
the new product if this thJeshold condition is to be met.
Interestin&ly, Glaister suggests that advertising could have a role in increasing
the density of potential buyers but does not fwther continue this line of thinking.9 Also
he informally discusses the possibility of competitors advenising affecting the rate of loss
coefficient but keeps it constant in his model since he refers solely to a monopolist
supplier. Price is incorporated into his model indirectly through the social contact
coefficient and he interprets his modified epidemic equation u the probability of
purchase given that infonnation about the innovation ha been receiVed.
Due to mathematical complexities, Glaister initially ignores advertising and
looks at the profit maximising time path of price. He concludes that under cenain special
assumptions (constant mllJinal cost of production. constant price elasticity and consw.
elasticity of the threshold condition, ratio of loss of users to social contact coefficient), it
9. llwlila of !he mIrUt or PJPUIIlion would tt.. be • functiaa of economic vlriablel, ia IhiI cue
advenil ....
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is optimal for the monopolist to have a cheap introductory offer price below marginal cost
for this increases the successful contact rate, which in tum affects the skewness of the
growth curve, prompcing earlier sales than otherwise.IO
He then investigates the profit maximising advertising straIegy during a
launching campaign. assuming price is held constant at its long run monopoly equilibrium
level. Not surprisingly, the advice is to adopt heavy advertising eltpenditures in the early
period falling away to zero at the point of complete market penetration. This encourages
the early growth of users who will then act as infonnation carriers.
Glaister does not attempt to incorporate a wider role for advertising, its effects
being predominantly secondary in nature and no empirical investigation is undertaken.
However it is a funher exampte, although limited, of the consideration of supply side
factors in the diffusion process, in particular including advertiSing.
Before turning to the development of alternative demand diffusion models
which have a richer microeconomic base, it is necessary to consider diffusion models
presented in the marketing literature as the issue of advertising has been more directly
ad~ssed (cenainly at an empirical level). It is appropriate to take this slight detour now
because on the Whole, the demand diffusion modela employed are observationally
equivalent to the epidemic model already discussed.
1.J NEW PRODUCT DIFFUSION IN THE MANAGEMENT
LITERATURE
2.3.1 Introduction
It is not surprising, given their interests, that diffusion of new products has been
investigated in the management literature and obviously some attention has been paid to
the role of advenising here. Generally, the main concem of writers in this field is to
produce a model that can forecast the future sales of I new good. Consequently less
focus is given to deriving I theoretically sound model and establishinl statistically
10.This iIof ..... ferred ID • pmelrlbon pricina lInIeay in the IftII'bIina Ii........
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significant parameters. Instead the data is used to fit the most suitable mathematical
model in order to forecast future sales of the product
In tenns of its theoretical base, reference is made to the model proposed by
Rogers (1962). Individuals are asswned to differ in their response to a new idea and their
'innovativeness' can be classified u in the diagram below,
time
Source; Rogers 1962
Given this behaviour, the finn can then target its promotional effons towards
the group of innovators. Of course this begs the question, who are the innovators?
Rogers and Stamfield (1968) looked at a large number of resean:h studies and found that
among other things, social characteristics such u income and standard of living
correlated with the identification of innovators. From an economist's point of view, this
would be expected.
2.3.2 Innovators VI Imitators
However when moving to the modelling stage. much of the potential
behavioural content of the wort of Rogers is lost for the specification is simplified to
such an extent that only two social categories remain. irmovators and imitators. Little if
anything is said about their different characteristics. indeed models are used which
implicitly assume a homogeneous population (this conflict is dealt with in more detail
later on). For diffusion to proceed over time (as is observed in practice), there must be
some mechanism to prompt purchase by early adopters and so on down to the laggards.
Personal influence and social COnlad are assumed to play an intepal pan in this process.
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1be irmovators act as opinion leaders and communicate with the imitators. By using
epidemic diffusion models. this social interaction is summarised.
2.3.3 The Bass Equation
TIle earliest fonnalisation of this approach is by Bass (1969). He generates an
expression that is similar to an epidemic equation written in discrete fonn as follows.
2.6
where.
Ql = cumulative unit sales at time t
Q. = total potential martet
p = coefficient of irmovation
r = coefficient of imiWion
Using annual time series data on unit sales for eleven consumer dunbles in the
US. Bass derives the structural parameters p. r, Q. from the OLS estimates. TIle
objective is 10 obtain a good forecasting model, consequently the standard of diagnostic
testing is very primitive. mostly relying on R2. Given that this model uses a lagged
dependent variable as the basic explanatory variable, it is not surprising that high values
of R2 are obtained. If in addition the data suffers from serial conelation. the estimates
will be biased and inconsistent Interestingly, the author notes that where deviations from
the forecast trend are noticeable, this coincides with shon term income variation. This
hints that the model may benefit from the inclusion of economic variables in explaining
the diffusion process.
A major criticism of the Bass equation as poirued out by Tamy and Derzko
(1988). is that the mathematical model. does not reflect the undertyina behavioural
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interaction of innovators and imitators. As they say, 'whether an individual ultimately
adopts the product as a result of this tendency to irmovate or through COnlael with an
adopter is a process affecting all individuals in the same way'. 1be writers are surprised
that this logical contradiction appean to have gone wmoticed in the management
literature, emphasising that Mahajan and Peterson (1985) even omitted the basic
population homogeneity assumption from the list of assumptions underlying the
fundamental diffusion model!
Of course as the writers point out. this inconsistency does not invalidate the
research conducted to date which uses this model, rather it is a question of the
misinterpretation of the parameters p and r in the Bass model. Provided that users of this
model are aware that the mathematical specification merely distinguishes between
adopters and non adopters then it is still adequate. As has already been seen. Lekvall and
Wahlbin interpret these two coefficients as reflecting different sources of information
rather than due to differences in the nature of individuals in the population.
Tamy and Derzko go on to derive a model which more accurately reflects the
innovator-imitator dichotomy. This involves individually modelling the two population
sub groups with the innovator sub group responding to an extemal source of information
only, such as advertising (although this is not explicitly incorporated in the specification).
The secord sub group describing the imitators, respond primarily to information gained
from social contact with adopters in both groups as well as some external information.
The writers proceed to empirically estimate by Non Linear Least Squares (NLS) the sales
curve, which comprises the sum of the individual sales curves of the innovators and
imitator sub group.
The authors obtain very disappointing resullJ but are aware of the data
limitations of using IIImost 12 to 14 amual observations to estimate 5 panmeten. Also
the raw data is itself subject to much measuremenl error, for example including repeat
and multiple purchua. In some cases, they fotmd that estimation of the simple Bass
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equation actually produces better results (measured in terms of mean square error (MSE)
and mean absolute deviation (MAD) only). Given the data inferiority coupled with the
use of a sophisticated estimation technique, it is surprising that the authors expect the data
to distinguish the innovator-imitator dichotomy and it is much more likely that a simple
model would seem to be more statistically robust (although. even this conclusion should
be treated prudently as the range of the diagnostic testing is not extensive).
2.3.4 Modinc:atlons to the B.. Model
Despite its skimpy theoretical base and major shortcomings, the Bass model has
proved very popular in the management literature and is nonnally employed as the
fundamental equation. However the weaknesses have not been ignored and more
recently, various attempts have been made to modify some of the more anificial
assumptions underlying its specification. Of particular interest are those examples which
have sought to incorporate advertising and these will be discussed in more detail below.
However it is wonh briefly mentioning some of the other main areas of improvement
The interested reader is referred to Mahajan and Muller (1979) or Mahajan and Wind
(1986) for amore detailed account of the diffusion model in the management literature.
2.3.4.1 A Non Constant Population
In the Bass equation, the number of potential adopters or population is assumed
constant over the entire diffusion process and hence its numerical value is derived from
the estimated parameter, If the time span of the process is of considerable length this
would appear to be a dubious assumption. The potential population of adopters is likely
to change at least as a result of demographic factors such u the number of households, or
alternatively the ceiling can be determined by economic facton such as price: or
income, I I
11.nu. alumaliv. view .,... • dilfaent interpnUlian on Ihe modellnd iIno Iona- cIeIcri_ •
diMquilibrium JJIOC*I. nu iId.. 1t wilh inmen cIeWl in Ihe nat cIuIpMr.
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Mahajan and Peterson (1978) replace the constant cellini assumption with a
dynamic one. Simply. they assume the population of potential adopters at a point in time
is a function of relevant exogenous or endolenous factors. Employinl data on washing
machine sales in the USI2 and United Nations membership. the authors use the size of the
relevant demographic population for the explanatory variable in the potential population
equation. Thus the number of housing staJU in the US is used for washing machines and
number of countries in the world for UN membership.
Over time these demographic variables are likely to grow and usinl amual
observations and a basic epidemic, structure to represent the growth equation. the
interpolated values are used in the estimation of the potential population. which is
hypothesised to be a simple linear function of the demographic population. So the
potential population becomes dynamic and can be substituted into the basic diffusion
equation which explains the transfer of an individual from the potential market into an
adopter by social contact. Thus their final estimating equation becomes.
2.7
where.
b = the coefficienl of internal communication or imitation
Q·t = cumulative potential population at time t and
Qt = cumulative adopters at time t
Ht = relevant demographic population at time t
12.The IUthon do not aplicidy .... whelMr Ihia daIa nf .. 10 ..... hal t.n Idjulled for repeal and
replacanent pun:M.a.
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With a maximum of 30 annual observations the SlNcwral parameters are
derived from the coefficients estimated using OLS. TIle authors do not repon the
standard errors of regression coefficients but state that they are all statistically significant
at the I% level, with the exception of the social contact coefficient B3 in the washing
machine equation. TIle authors conclude that the model, using a dynamic potential
population performs better relative to the simple Bass model.
Unfortunately no substantial diagnostic testl are performed and so the
specification of the model cannot be challenged. Unlike writers in the economics field
such as Olow(1967), Mahajan and Peters do not attempt to include economic variables in
Q." instead assuming that the potential population is a constant linear function of a
relevant demographic variable. In the empirical chapters below, the potential population
is also taken to be the relevant demographic population. however actual observations,
rather than a linear function of them, are incorporated into the epidemic framework.
2.3.4.2 Awareness and Adoption
Another problem with the basic Bass equation (and epidemic model) is its
simplistic binary approach to the adoption decision. Potential adopters in the population
either adopt or do not. Once individuals come into contact with an existing owner, their
purchase decision is automatic.13 Dodson and Muller (1978) attempt to add richness to
the decision process by including 3 stages in the adoption process, unaware, aware and
purchase. This raults in a modification to the Bass equation by disaggregating the non
adopter population into those individuals who are unaware of the product and those who
are aware but have chosen not to purchase to date.
13.A. will be _peel iIllhe .. Xl c:bapter. !he auaom..ic tnnImiuioa &om non""_ ID .... ora
inlc:mwicn aboullhl ... product it received. doll Mrioualy Umilthe lilUlliaal ill which the ..pdemic
modeIit~.
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Individuals become aware either by social contact with those individuals
already informed (this will include owners and non owners) 14or from an external source
which could include advertising. A constant proportion of infonned individuals become
actual owners and the writers suggest that a finn's promotional activities could affect this
rate. although this is not explicitly modelled. TIley also extend the model to allow for
repeat purchases with some individuals forgetting previous information received,
Effectively Dodson and Muller are establishing a generalised version of the
Bass model which incorporates slightly more realistic assumptions with respect to the
decision process. TIley show how USingparticular restrictions on the parameters. earlier
models such as those proposed by Bass (1969). Gould (1970). Glaister (1974) and
Nerlove and Arrow (1962) deduce from their generalised model or at least are closely
related.
Whilst having the advantage of being relatively more realistic than the Bass
model or epidemic equation. the biggest drawback to the resulting generalised equation is
its non operationality. Unless data is available on the numbers in the population who are
unaware or aware but not yet owners at each point in time. the general model cannot be
applied empirically. Also. assuming that a constant proportion of the informed
individuals automatically become owners. does not overcome the weaknesses of the
decision theoretic base of the Bass model.
2.3.4.3 Marteting Variables in the Bass Model
Not surprisingly. writers in the managemel11 field have sought to incorporate
marketing variables into the Bass equation. Those models which focus upon price will be
briefly mentioned before lUming to the marteting variable of most interest in this
investigation. namely advertising. Mahajan and Peterson in the model described above.
did refer to price as one of the factors affecting the potential population. however they did
14.11 iJ IllUmed thIl thai indivicIuaJI dapi&e beina non purc:t..a. DDnIIhIleu .... OIl said••
inlonn.rion.
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not pursue this theme either theoretically or empirically. Robinson and Lakhani (197S)
allow price to enter into the Bass equation in a multiplicative fashion. TIle population of
potential adopten is assumed constant but price affects the rate of adoption through the
'imitation' coefficient IS The writers go on to discuss the profit maximising strategy
along the diffusion path but do not give any empirical validation of their model.
A slightly different way of introducing price into the diffusion equation is
presented by Bass (1980). Interestingly, this paper also models the price setting
behaviour of the supplier and so explicitly incorporates a supply side into the diffusion
process. He argues that as a result of learning economies, casu fall in relation to
cumulative output The myopic monopolist supplier maximiSing current output sets
marginal revenue equal to marginal costs. Thus prices are also declining over time.
Demand depends upon price (which in tum is a function of cumulative output as
described) and is multiplied by an exogenous time variable representing an exogenous
shift in demand (Bass suggests this time shift factor to be the curve generated by his
original simple model in equation 2.6 above).
Bass empirically tests his model for 6 consumer durables. The actual
estimating equation is in reduced form, however the structural parameten are identified
by a two stage process, initially obtaining estimates of the constant leaming parameter in
the price equation. Then assuming the elasticity of demand is constant. the parameters
can be derived from the estimated reduced form coefficients. There are problems both
logically (since as Stoneman (1983) points out. his theoretical model assumes a
monopolist supplier whereas this industry structure does not hold within the data used)
and econometrically because the elUe" of the diagnostic tesUnl is almost non existent.
Therefore the robustness of the specification cannot be confirmed. The author himself
admits that on his own criteria (a priori expectations of the magnitude of the parameters),
the equation is likely to be mis-specified for two of the products.
1.5.Lib 01........ P -/ (price).
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Kalish (1985) proposes a model that incorporates both price and advertising.
His theoretical framework also benefits from a sounder economic decision base. There
are two stages in the decision process, individuals become aware and then choose
whether to adopt the innovation. 1bc awareness stage refers to information about search
attributes 16 and this son of infonnation is spread by advertising and word of mouth
contact modelled in a simple epidemic framework, (but in which, a distinction is made
between existing owners and members of the population who are aware but not yet
owners. like Dodson and Muller). The adoption stage is conditional upon being aware
and occurs if the perceived risk adjusted reservation price exceeds the product selling
price. Individuals differ with respect to their true underlying reservation price but are
equally risk averse. Perceived risk exists due to uncertainty about the experience
attributes of the new product but is reduced as the number of actual owners increases.
The adoption stage is modelled as a stock adjusUDeruequation with a constant adjusunent
parameter. The desired stock or potential population depends upon the proportion of the
population who are aware of the product multiplied by the risk adjusted price (where the
risk adjustment depends upon the existing penetration level of ownership). This is
obviously an improvement on the model presented by Dodson and Muller for the author
does not assume that I constant proportion of aware individuals adopt, but explains this in
lenns of risk adjusted price.
Kalish also discusses the profit maximising price and advertising policies of a
moropolist, Costs are assumed to be a function of cumulative production and the
optimum price path is monotonically decreasing over time, unless the effectiveness of
adopters in generating awueness and or the uncertainty reduction from early adopters is
high. The profit maximising time path of advertising is moootonically decreasing over
time, assuming decreasing retums to scale in advertising and a zero discount rate. These
results extend to the case when the discount rare r is positive, so long uris not 'too big'.
16.FoUowina Nelion (197").1he auchar UIUIMI rhII-.da aari __ .. thou chlrllCWiJtica which C8l be
vd" before 11M •• colour "iaN aize , whnla .~ IllribuMlIUCh • dunbilily Iftd reliability will
only be revealed by UIina Ihe poducL
39
At introduction. provided r < b (where b represents the effectiveness with which actual
adopters transmit information) then the result will hold.
When turning to the empirical investigation stage much of the theoretical
richness is abandoned. The author has the same problem as Dodson and Muller; without
information on the level of knowledge in the non adopter population. the awareness
equation cannot be estimated. He therefore restricts his attention to the adopter (stock
adjustment) equation. assuming the proportion of the population aware to be unity. The
potential mmet or desired stock functional form is imposed with price and existing
proportion of owners as the explanatory variables.
The structural parameters are estimated using NLS on 32 quarterly observations
for a consumer durable (no information is given about the product). Very little attention
is directed towards establishing the robustness of the estimated coefficients. The model is
judged on its forecasting ability relative to altemative specifications in the management
09~) (lcn~~
literature such as those of Robinson and Lakhani or Mahajan and Peterson. The price and
population parameters are extremely sensitive to the model specification employed. hence
emphasising the need for a thorough investigation of the statistical robustness of each
model before any conclusions can be reached.
2.3.4.4 Advertising in the Bass Model
Turning now to the marketing variable of primary inte~ it is clear that some
of the papers already discussed do refer to advertising but not in any explicit or thorough
manner. Horskyand Simon (1983) directly model advertising in the Bass equation and
proceed to test the validity of their model empirically. For them, the primary role of
advertising is to inform the innovators directly about the existence and value of the new
product The imiwors are not affected by this external sourc:e of information and instead
rely on social contaa with existing owners of tile new prodUCl
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Horsky and Simon employ a model which implicitly assumes a homogeneous
population and yet in their discussion of the innovator-imitator dichotomy, they refer to
differences in the characteristics of these sub groups. For example, the innovators are
assumed to obtain a greater utility from early ownership relative to the imitators and are
not as risk averse, so consequently do not need the information reinforced from an
impartial source (existing owners). 1be logical inconsistency of the interpretation of the
underlying behavioural nature of the actual mathematical model employed still applies.
However the authors argue that their equation could represent the average probability of
purchase and so each individual is a mixture of both innovator and imitator, accepting
information from all sources.17
In order to substantiate their model empirically, Honky and Simon effectively
assume that the extemal or innovator coefficient in the Bass equation is a function of
advertising expenditure. The actual form used is,
2.8
where
N = the number of potential buyers in the population
Q 1 = the number of individuals who have already ado-AA at time t-It- .,._.
At == the level of advertising expenditure by a monopolist at time t
a = information conveyed to innovators through alternative means such as press reports
x = the effectiveness of advertising directed towards the innovators
~ = the effectiveness of word of mouth information
17.ThiI illftIIopillD IhI 'linar IppI'Olimadan' IrJUIIWU UIIdto juIIify IhlIpidImic mocW pNMIlled in
eMpr.3.
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So a diminishing marginal effectiveness of advertising is imposed a priori,
since the natural log transfonnation of advertising expenditures is used and no alternative
fonns considered. A maximum of 26 monthly observations on the number of new
telephone banking accounts opened with a bank in a geographical n:gion wen: used to
estimate by NLS the time series equation 2.8 above. This exercise is n:peated for a total
of S localities. 1be estimated parameters for the effectiveness of advertising and word of
mouth wen: positive and statistically significant at the S% level in all n:gions.
Unfortunately, very little diagnostic testing of the model is perfonned. Given
that monthly data is being used, it is likely that serial correlation could be present and
coupled with a lagged dependent variable on the RHS of the equation. the estimates will
be biased and inconsistent The description of the data is fairly brief so it is not clear
whether advertising expenditures an: in nominal or real terms. Nominal values will fail to
capture the real volume of messages, n:sulting in measun:ment error in one of the
explanatory variables. This causes the estimated parameters to be biased and
inconsistent
1be authors also investiga!e the optimal advertising policy for a monopolist in
their model. The analytical solution as a function of time is judged to be too difficult and
so the characteristics of the optimal advertising policy an: discussed. Assuming a
constant price cost margin over time and that pN > r (when: r is the cost of capital),
generates optimal advertising to be a decreasing function over time. Thus the profit
maximising behaviour for a monopolist is to advenise heavily in the initial period to
infonn the innovators and gradually reduce such promotions as these individuals act as
word of mouth carriers.18
A paper by Simon and Sebastian (1987) addresses some of me empirical
shortcomings of the Horsley and Simon model. They too use the basic Bass equation but
set up 6 economebic specifications based upon different assumptions about the
18.Mvn.ina iI-. • indinctly havin, ..... ed effect via &heM WOld or mou&h canitn only, no
Idditional.oodwill effectl .. included.
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parameters influenced by advenising and the lag structure of the advertising effects. The
objective is to evaluate empirically the alternative models using data on the diffusion of
new telephones in West Gennany. However the authors qualify this objective with the
statement.
'it is NJive to a.rSIUM tJuu we CtUIdiscrimilltlU betweell 1M alt~rflaJiv~
models ...... Oil plUely ecolIDmetric grounds. We will have to app~al
to IHhaviolUaI twJ sitlUllioN1l cOlUitkrDlWfU.'
The competing specifications allow for advertising to enter through the
irmovation coefficient or the imitation coefficient A third possibility which combines
both. proved intractable econometrically giving several wrong parameter signs and was
therefore rejected. Also the possibility that the potential martet itself was not constant
but a function of economic variables such as advertising was rejected for being
behaviourally insignificant and econometrically difficult to measure.
This seems questionable unless the Dodson and Muller model is being followed
rigidly so that data on the non adopters at any onc time needs to be broken down into
those infonned and those ignorant of the product. If instead, the primary role of
advenising is seen as transferring individuals from the relevant demographic population
into the potential martet. then an economeUic approach similar to that used by Chow
could be employed, with advenising as onc of the variables explaining the potential
population N.
However if in addition, advenising is expected to affect the rate of transfer of
individuals from the potential martet into actual owners, it is likely that an economeUic
model would fail to distinguish both rouleS.19 Moreover, by lening the potential martet
be equal to a demographic factor such as number of households,20 the empirical impact
19.Al&houp Willi.unl (1912) did not l1li idvertiaina. his model did illicorpor ... economic vU'ilbl. in cbe
IdjUlbNlll function and.,.,..tial popuIlIion function but cbe r.W1I proved urubIflClDly. SUlMmIn in hiI
inv_,1lion of UN of c:omputen in 1M UK follllllimilir JII'Ob'ema.
20. A. iIdone by Simon IIId SebIIa. (1987) IIId 1M proc:eckn foUo'" in IhIl_ empirical chlpc.n of
tru. invatiptiaft.
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of advertising is blurred and the advertising variable may be picking up the combined
effect of advertising on transferring a member of the population into the potential mutet
and into an actual user. It is therefore not feasible to argue that the effect of advertising
has been segregated into the final stage only, as implied by Simon and Sebastian.
Given the two competing specifications,
MODEL 1
2.9
where
all is the effectiveness of infonnation conveyed to imovators and is a function of
. advertising expenditures by finns, ie all = feAt>
N = the number of potential buyers in the population
Q I = the number of individuals who have already ado_AA at time tell- ~
Al = the level of advertising expenditure by a monopolist at time t
~ = the effectiveness of word of mouth infonnation
MODEL2
2.10
where
~ = the effectiveness of word of mouth infonnation and is affected by advertising such
The authors also discuss the lag structure of the advertisinl variable. Like
Horsky and Simon (1983), they impose a priori a naturallol transfonnation but they also
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allow for current sales to be affected by past advertising effons directly, not just through
word of mouth caniers. Two basic lag hypotheses are used,
STRUcnJREA
It (A) = 1;-0 a.1n At-i
and
2.11
STRUCIUREB
It (A) = a.1n o, 2.12
where Gt is a stock of goodwill such that
Gt = 1;-0 wt·1nAt-i
The weights wt in the stock of goodwill are assumed to have a beta distribution.
the parameters of which are found by a search procedure once this function has been
substituted into the basic diffusion model.
As mentioned earlier, the writers are not convinced that the innovator vs
imitator role for advertising is merely an empirical matter. They argue that it depends
upon factors such as the stage of the produa life cycle. At the beginning advertising is
primarily directed at the innovators and later on al the imitators. Presumably this could
be tested empirically by looking at the stability of the respective estimated coefficient
over time, provided that the data covered the full length of the produa life cycle.
Unfortunately as the authors investigate a period at the start of which 49% of the
population are already owners, this possibility would not be open to them.
As the writers use monthly data. a 12 lag model is used to test the dynamic
effect of advertising. Not surprisingly, only one of the lags in Structure A is significant
and as they say, this is most likely due to multicollinerarity of the advertising lag
variables. However no joint test of significance seems to have been pcrfonned.
4S
The authors conclude that the stock of goodwill specification proved superior in
both the innovator and imitator models. Both specifications gave adjusted R2 of
approximately 0.8 but much of this explanatory power could be due to the dummy
variables which are included to account for seasonality and telephone rate structure
changes.
The diagnostic testing of the models rests upon adjusted R2, t statistics and
predictive perfonnance measures and on this basis coupled with their a priori
expectations, the imitation model with a stock of goodwill (model 2B) is favoured. The
possibility of autocorrelation is not addressed and this would seem to be a distinct
possibility given the use of monthly data. Bearing this in mind, advenising is found to
have a small positive and statistically significant effect in accelerating the diffusion
process for telephone installations. The average goodwill elasticity was calculated to be
approximately 1.16% but varied considerably over time. Also the lag stNcture indicated
that advertising attained its maximum effect with a delay of about one half year with 72%
of the total advenising effects occurring between 4 • 9 months.21
The Simon and Sebastian paper is one of the few attemptS to validate
empirically the effectiveness of advenising in the diffusion process. The example
product chosen did generate certain data advantages. For example 91 monthly
observations for a product supplied solely by one finn, during which time the product
itself did not alter to any major degree (this must be very rare). Also, whereas installation
data were available as an explanatory variable in the equation, monthly applications data
were available as the dependent variable. This enabled the authors more accurately to
reflect demand conditions, ruling out supply factors such as shortages etc which might
blur the data.
However the data had some disadvantages because presumably the problem of
repeal purchases and replacement demand will remain in the data and conflict with the
21. It it in__ " &ha in Ihe empirical inv.ti,1liona in chapen 5 Iftd 6. Illhoup UIina diff'1I'IIII producu.
Ihe laged effectl oC Idv~ MIIIl eo diaaipale aft.« 9 monaha.
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underlying behavioural model which applies to first usc only. Unfortunately the data
refers to both the household and corporate sector. The authors assume that all existing
companies have a telephone so that any new applications from the corporate sector will
be from newly formed companies. On this basis. they include a constant term in the
model to account for this demand. This assumption would appear unrealistic given that
the data set covers 10 years. Also it seems likely that nominal advertising expenditures
were used rather than real volumes.
The results certainly indicate a role for advertising in the diffusion process. if
somewhat minor, through either the innovator/external chamel coefficient (Horsley and
Simon) or the imitation/intemal source of information coefficient (Simon and Sebastian).
However in order to increase confidence in this conclusion and in the magnilUde of the
estimated parameters, the robustness of the models should be subject to more rigorous
diagnostic testing.
So far the few empirical smdles that have looked at the role of advertising in the
diffusion process have found positive results. However Kalish and Lilien (1986)
conclude that advertising is insignificanl in their model They estimate a diffusion curve
for a new consumer durable22 incorporating both price and advertising. In effect. the
estimated model is a stock adjustment equation. with the desired stock being equal to a
relevant demographic population. weighted by the fraction of this population who rand the
product acceptable and this fraction depends upon price.
The adjusunenl parameter is not assumed constant (this is obviously similar to
Williams (1972). although he does not include advertising), but is a function of word of
mouth and advertising information sources. The fonn in which these variables enter into
the adjustment parameter is imposed a priori to be,
[(ADV, WOM) = e +a.ADV + b.WOM
1 +a.ADV + b.WOM
2.13
22. Very little inlonn8&ion iI liven about the da&a. on the pounda &hIl iI it proprieta'y in naDn.
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and the variables also enter in an imposed manner,
ADV = O.S.At + l:i-8 At_i.O.6i 2.14
where At = Advertising expenditures in time t,
WOM= l:i-8 salest_i.O.Si 2.15
The equation, subject 10 these many arbitrary assumptions, is estimated by NLS
using quarterly data. The authors note that all the parameten except e and a are
statistically significant So they conclude that advertising is not very effective in the
diffusion equation. No formal diagnostic testing is undertaken except 10 note the OW
statistic of 2.OS indicates that serial correlation is not a problem.
Unfortunately, given the use of a lagged dependent variable as one of the
explanalOry variables, this statistic would be biased IOwards 2 in the event of
autocorrelation and in any case is not really applicable given the use of NLS. As
quarterly data is being used, it would seem advisable 10 investigate the presence of higher
order serial correlation. Many restrictions are imposed apriori without any statistical test
of their validity. On the whole this research would appear naive and inferior 10 the other
empirical papers of Horsky and Simon (1983) and Simon and Sebastian (1987).
2.4 THE DIFFUSION PROCESS; PROBIT MODELS
As can be seen, the epidemic based diffusion model (or Bass equation) has
proved a very popular vehicle in the diffusion literature, moreover some attempt has been
made 10 incorporate advenising into the model, although in I limited and empirically
unsatisfactory manner. But the epidemic model from an economist's point of view,
suffers from a fundamental weakness, it has no economic decision theoretic base.
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1.4.1 ThresholdlProblt Approach
Alternative models have been developed which contain a richer micro economic
foundation. the objective being to explain the ~ulting aggtegate diffusion curve in terms
of economic variables. These models. often referred to as threshold or probit models
begin with the notion thal individuals in the population of size M differ with respect to
some characteristic ~ (i=L..M) and therefore stan from a very different perspective from
the epidemic model. Given some assumption about the distribution of Z over l, then at
any point in time an individual will adopt the innovation if Zj exceeds a critical level Z·.
hence the concept of a threshold which has to be crossed before an individual adopu the
innovation. By defining the appropriate characteristic and its distribution. the
detennination of the critical value and how this critical value varies in relation to the
distribution of the characteristic over time, the emerging diffusion path is fully explained.
Such a model differs from an epidemic framework not only in respect of the
undedying economic behaviour. but also in regard to the interpretation of the concept of
equilibrium. The epidemic model primarily shows a transition towards a long run
equilibrium level. consequently the diffusion process is one of disequilibrium adjustment
towards a conswu ceiling. 23 In conlJ'aSt. these threshold or probit models describe an
equilibrium process because at each point in time, all those wishina to adopt. have done
so. There will be no further forces causing adjustment unless the equilibrium position
itself a1ters.24
David (1969) gives an interesting application of this approach to the
introduction of the mechanical reaper in the US. Adoption will take place only if labour
savings from the use of the irmovation exceeds its cost The potential for labour savings
will differ amongst the population due to differences in the size of the potential adopters
fann. So the critical value of farm size will be determined by the relative input prices
(wages and annual cost of reaper) and the labour savings of the new tectmology relative
23, Except in rhoN ulenlionl which Ilplicilly model the ceilina.' func:I.ion of economic va'iablellnd 10
it chin.ina ov. time.
24, The ctiff'erina CCJIIC8III of equilibrium it di.IcuIaed inmore de&ail ill1M nell~.
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to the old. As either this relationship changes over time or the distribution of fann sizes
shifts. so the diffusion path will be described. David assuming a given lognonnal
distribution for farm sizes, then imposes an exogenous constant growth in relative wages
and so obtains a sigmoid diffusion curve. The diffusion process is thus basically being
driven by an exogenous factor.
The model developed by Davies (1979) is very similar but more realistic, as it
allows uncertainty to enter into the decision process. Finns are comidered satisficers
rather than profit maximisers and consequently the notion of payoff periods is employed.
An individual finn will adopt the new process provided that the expected time taken for
the innovation to recoup the initial outlay exceeds some acceptable payoff period. The
expected payoff period is assumed to be a function of finn size and other uaspectned finn
attributes. The acceptable payoff period is also a function of finn size and other
unspecified finn characteristics.
Davies then argues that over time. the expected payoff period will decline due
to improvements in the teclmology (as a result of supplier's learning economies) and
better infonnation received by potential adopcers. which in tum. leads to improved
expectations. Davies distinguishes two classes of innovations. Group A innovations
which are reasonably cheap and simple. and Group 8 innovations which are complex and
expensive. He then argues that the rae of decline in the expected payoff will vary
between these two classes. He also considers that the acceptable target payoff period
will be relaxed over time but that this rate of decline will also vary between Group A and
B innovations.
From these hypotheses, the author predicts a cumulative log nonnal time path
for the diffusion of Group A innovations and a cumulative nonnal time path for Group 8
ilUlO'Vations. An empirical investigation is undertaken and the hypothesised models
appear consistent with the data giving inferior results when the 'wrong' theoretical curve
so
is applied to the data. Davies then proceeds to use the estimated diffusion speed
parameters as dependent variables in a second cross section estimation stage.
The contributions of David and Davies are significant due to the superior
economic rationale underlying the diffusion equation. However they are limited because
they concentrate on the demand side factors only, consequently appeal must be made to
exogenous changes in order to drive the diffusion process. Also, neither David or Davies
explicitly model the problem of limited information which could prevent instanWleOUS
adjustment to the equilibrium position (although Davies does implicitly use the idea that
increasing information over time is justification for falling expected payoff and target
payoff periods). It seems reasonable to argue that if the lack of information does
constrain the diffusion process, the it would be most acute in the early stages of the
process.
1.4.2 Problt Model. Ind Supply Flcton
As already shown, the imponance of supply side factors on the diffusion path
has not been totally neglected in the literature on epidemic models. However the demand
side of such models does not benefit from the richer theoretical reasoning of the probit
framework, relying instead on an epidemic specification. This shoncoming is overcome
by Stoneman and Ireland (1983), who integra&ea supply side with the probit type demand
diffusion model of David (1969) and Davies (1979). Unlike these authors, the model
presented by Stoneman and Ireland endogenises the price path which drives the diffusion
process. This results from modelling the supply sector ie. the behaviour of produccrs of
the new technology.25 Their demand framework is used as the foundation to the model
presented in more detail in Olapter 4, however whilst Stoneman and Ireland concentrate
upon endogenous price decisions driving the process, interest in lhat chapter is directed
towards advertising expenditures as the relevant supply side variable. Owlges in the
level of quality of the new product after its introduction are not considered in this thesis.
2S, SlriI:dy dUI Ipplia only in 1Mcue 01.manopolill auppI_. WlMIllhl model iIeuended IDIII
oliJOPOIy .iluacion il iIeaoacnoua rKIDn in &he IhIp or IIIUIMd increuina .. w... Iha& cmv. &he
proceu.
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However, in a recent paper, Stoneman (1989a) confronts this issue directly. A
monopolist supplier chases both price and qUality and diffusion proceeds as price fall or
quality improves over time. Also in this thesis, intra product heterogeneity of the new
product is ignored but Stoneman (1989b) considers the implications of differing supply
conditions on the diffusion pa1h when there are a number of different brands of the new
generic product. Given myopia on the part of consumers, when a monopolist supplier
offers a number of brands of the new generic product, diffusion is faster the greater is the
number of brands offered. For an oligopolistic industry where each brand is controlled by
a separate finn, each oligopolist acts like a single brand monopolist with a monopoly
price. Thus the diffusion path is unaffected for a period until in some period there is an
end period competitive game which will drive usage above the monopoly level
2.4.3 Consumer Durables and Problt Model.
Given that the focus of attention is the diffusion of process innovations, it is not
surprising that advertising is not considered a variable worthy of investigation by David
(1969), Davies (1979) et al. However the use of a threshold or probit concept has been
used by previous writers in the economic literature in explaining the factors affecting the
ownership of major consumer durables (Farrell (19S4). Cramer (1962». However these
studies are not concemed explicitly with new·products or the diffusion process itself. A
cross sectional approach is adopted to explain ownership of existing durables as a
function of the characteristics of owners at one point in time. It is not until changes over
time in the stimulus variable (usually income in these studies) and or the critical value
distribution are explained that a diffusion path emerges. Demberg (1958) also uses a
threshold argument in his cross sectional study of the detenninants of ownership of a new
product, namely TV, by families in the US in 1950. A time path emerges because the
author allows the thn:shold index to be panly detennined by the period for which a TV
service has been available.
.52
Bonus (1973) provides a very interesting empirical application of this probit
approach and because he has both cross section and time series data26 on various new
consumer durables for households in West Gennany over the period 19S6-67, he is able
to estimate Quasi Engel curves. These show the probability of ownership for a given
level of income at a given point in time and consequently is in effect the cumulative
distribution of critical values. The author can then statistically examine the hypothesised
linearity (due to the assumed distributions) of the Quasi Engel curve and the stability of
the parameters over time. As the structural parameters of the distributions can be
deduced from the estimated parameters, any changes in them over time will lead to
various conclusions on the reasons for growth in ownership of the products investigated.
For example, growth in ownership of cameras and projectors is found to be fully income
induced since the distribution of critical values is stable over time, the fraction of the
population who are potential owners is unity throughout. but the distribution of actual
incomes shifts over time. In the case of TV everything is changing, with shifts in the
critical and actual income distributions and a changing fraction of potential owners in the
population over the period studied.
The aggregate diffusion curve is found by aggregating the Quasi Engel curves
over the income distribution at each point in time. Given the assumed lognonnal
distributions and various additional assumptions on the time path of the parameters (the
means and variances of the actual and critical distributions and the fraction of potential
owners in the population), Bonus shows how I variety of aggregate diffusion curve
shapes can result Contrary to other writers, he fmdJ I symmetric logistic curve emerges
as a result of changes in actual income only and not beause of epidemic learning.
The use of a superior data set enables Bonus, usin, a more satisfyin, economic
decision foundation. to separate the epidemic 1eamin, effects from the economic
variables (in this case income) and to ,0 some way towards explainin, the shape of the
diffusion path for various new consumer durables. However the problem still remains
26, Not pad da&a.
.53
that changes in the fraction of the population who are potential owners and shifts in the
critical value distribution are imposed ra1her than explained.
It would seem that other economic variables such as price and especially
advenising could have a valuable role to play in explaining changes in these parameters.
Also at this stage incorporation of a supply side so that changes in these decision
variables might drive the process would be appropriate. Unfortunately data requirements
are likely to limit the possibility of following through the investigation of the effects of
advenising using a combined cross section time series approach.
2.5 THE INTEGRATION OF EPIDEMIC AND PROBIT MODELS
It is interesting to note that Bonus, by using a simple logistic function of time to
describe how the fraction of potential owners in the population increases, does attempt if
somewhat implicitly. to integrate the epidemic and probit models.
This objective is approached more directly by David and Stoneman (1986) who
use a probit based framewort to model the fully infonned adoption decision and this is
weighted by the fraction of the population who are aware of the innovation. Individuals
in the population become aware through epidemic learning and from an exogenous
source. The authors do not attempt to validate their model empirically. the wort being
entirely theoretical. the aim being to investigate the welfare implications of government
policy towards information dissemination or subsidy under different supply conditions.
Whilst their integration approach is more theoretically satisfying. Bonus (1973),
by summarising the infonnation transmission process with an assumed logistic curve
opens up the possibility of empirical application. However this approximation then
makes the role of advenising in the process itself unreceptive to direct empirical
validation.
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2.6 SUMMARY
From the literature, there have been basically two competing demand diffusion
frameworks employed to explain the diffusion of new consumer durables, the epidemic
and the probit models.
TIle epidemic model has been extended to incorporate a role for advenising.
Also at a theoretical level, this framework has been used to take account of the
endogenity of advenising decisions assuming a single monopoly supplier of the new
product. Some limited empirical testing of the role and significance of advenising in an
epidemic based demand diffusion equanon has been undertaken. On the whole, the
robustness of the resulting econometric specification is open to question, given the
limited and simple diagnostic testing of these models.
Whilst a probit framework has been used to model the diffusion of a new
consumer durable (based on demand factors only), no consideration has been given to the
role of advenising in such a model, either at a theoretical or empirical level.
Each of these competing demand diffusion specifications has a very different
underlying behavioural foundation. TIle reasoning behind the epidemic model makes
sense in explaining the spread of infonnation about the new product, that is, the
awareness stage. TIle probit model is more applicable to the adoption stage, assuming
full information. In reality diffusion of a new product is the outcome of both the
awareness and adoption stage, consequently there has been an attempt to integrate both
models. However the focus of such worle is theoretical with no attention given to the
inclusion of advertising in the integrated model.
Unfortunately, at an empirical level, a combined approach will prove extremely
difficult to validate, especially if the intention is to include additional economic variables
(such as advenising) into the explanation of the infonnation dissemination process. TIle
resulting estimation equation will prove complex and messy and it will be asking a lot of
the data to distinguish the route by which the economic variables have entered.
ss
Consequently the following chapters will maintain the separation of the two competing
demand diffusion models. This will have the advantage of highlighting the special
features of advertising in each framework and the consequences of a changing supply
structure, without blurring the analysis. Also at an empirical level, it will enable
comparison and validation of previous work, which has been confined to the integration
of advertising in an epidemic model.
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CHAPTER3
THE ROLE OF ADVERTISING IN AN EPIDEMIC BASED MODEL
3.1 INTRODUCTION
In this panicular chapter, one of the competing demand diffusion models (the
epidemic framework), will be discussed. The prime purpose is to incorporate advertising
expenditures. Like Lekvall and Wahlbin, the epidemic model will be interpreted in terms
of infonnation diffusion, and advertising expenditures will constitute an additional and
external source of infonnation flow. Having discussed the main theme of such a model, a
supply side is then considered.
To begin with, the analysis centres on a single supplier of the new consumer
durable. The advertising sales ratios derived from the first order conditions for profit
maximisation within this model are investigated over time, and compared and contrasted
with the standard Dorfman-Steiner and Nerlove-Arrow conditions found in the literature.
Having done this, the monopolist supplier assumption will be relaxed. Again
the profit maximising advertising sales ratios will be derived and the outcome for these
ratios of using a dynamic framework for new products will be considered. Finally, the
effect of a changing martet structure (in tenns of number of suppliers) on the profit
maximising advertising sales ratio in the epidemic model is explored. The implications of
relaxing the Coumot behavioural asswnption are discussed informally.
3.2 FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS; SOME GENERAL ISSUES
Before proceeding to the theoretical analysis of the epidemic model, it is useful
to clarify certain assumptions and conceptual issues used in this chapter.
3.2.1 Diffusion vs Demand Theory
The focus of this thesis is on new product introduction at the industry level
The analysis centres upon the generic product and is not concemccl with either explicitly
S7
investigating the diffusion of a parucular standard of the product (eg VHS versus
Betamax video cassette recorder) or a panicular variant or 'brand' of the generic product.
Another distinction in the analysis must be emphasised. Diffusion theory, when
applied to a new consumer product, is concerned with the initial spread of ownership of
this product, ie the cumulative proponion of the population who become ownerslusers
over time. Whilst diffusion proper will include both the initial use and extent of use, this
work is primarily concerned with the decision to adopt for the first time. To use an
analogy from capital theory, interest here centres upon product widening, not product
deepening. So by assumption, multiple product ownership is not being analysed. Whilst
this may be realistic for cenain consumer durables, where usually only one unit will be
acquired. such as washing machines. it is by no means always appropriate. However as
this analysis concentrates on the earty period of the product life cycle, it is probably a
reasonable assumption.
This does not exclude the feasibility of modifying diffusion models 10
incorporate such features, if so desired (Mansfield 1968 or Glaister 1974). Similarly,
replacement expenditure is assumed here 10 be of no importance. Once again there are
specific examples where such assumptions have been relaxed (eg. Dodson and Muller:
1978). However since here the models are being appUed to consumer durables and the
emphasis is on first use, on the grounds of simpUcity this added complication was not
introduced into the analysis. With most consumer durables, it is unlikely that
replacement purchases will be very significant over the periods in the product life cycle
prior to inaturity.
3.1.1 Population Deftnltion
The epidemic diffusion model usa a satiation concept for the proportion of the
population who eventually become owners ie. X·tIN. Normally this proportion is
assumed to be unity. However at any point in time the number of owners le, Xt is not
equal to X·t.Thus ",approaches X·l in a disequilibrium process. The rate of adjustment
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of Xl to X· t can be detennined by economic variables (the primary variable of interest in
this thesis being advenising), however in its simplest fonn, the epidemic model needs no
economic variables to drive the diffusion process. Xl will eventually approach the
saturation ceiling due to infonnation being spread by the social interaction amongst the
homogeneous population.
3.3 THE EPIDEMIC MODEL
3.3.1 Advertisina, Diffusion and Information
The basic epidemic model is built upon the theory of social contagion. It has
been seen that a useful interpretation of this model when applied to economic phenomena,
is that it refers to the transmission of information. with a given population of potential
owners adopting the new product as they become informed of its existence.
In its simplest form, the model allows for only one source of infonnation,
contact with existing owners. To limit the model in this way is obviously unrealistic.
Moreover it requires infonnation from an exogenous source at the stan of the process.
Leltvall and Wahlbin (1973) have shown that extending the basic model to allow for
information from an external source such as advertisina can overcome this second
problem. However even the restricted epidemic model still calls for some suspension of
disbelief about realism, especially if a saturation ceiling of unity is imposed. For then, the
only constraint on the inevitable purchase decision is lack of information. Once
informed, from what ever source, an individual will become an owner of the new durable
witOOut further recourse to any economic decision makinl based on variables such as
relative price. or income. This seems highly dubious, nonetheless, it could be argued that
such a model will have limited applicability to a particular type of product innovation.
Recall that new products (which are not radically differed to existing goods)
can be differentiated from similar existing goods and categorised u vertically or
horizontally distinct. Vertical differentiation implies that all potential buyen are agrud
about the new product's superiority to the existing substiblte. So. ceiling of unity (given
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appropriate prices) may be a realistic assumption and the use of the epidemic model could
be appropriate.
Within the epidemic framewort, the function of advenising will be to provide
infonnation. both directly as an external source and indirectly by increasing the number
of infonnation earners in future periods. There has been great debate in the literature
about whether advenising is infonnative (eg. Stigler 1961, Telser 1964 and Nelson 1974)
or persuasive (eg. Bain 1968, Comanor and Wilson 1974). Thi. conceptual distinction
has been criticised for being non operational and thus redundant and there is cenainly
some justification in this argumenL Within the diffusion models, advenising is allocated
a primarily infonnative role. However, advenising could just as likely be intonning
individuals about the relative price or the image of the new product and the information
provided need nol be reliable or uuthful. No judgement will be made aboul the value of
the infonnation and so the effect on consumer welfare and the resulting policy
implications will nol be considered.
3.3.2 The Theoretical Model; A Monopolist Supplier
A model will now be established using the epidemic demand diffusion equation
with advenising included as a direct external source of information. The profil
maximising advenising sales ratios applicable to a monopolist supplier of the new
product will be derived and these expressions considered over time and compared to the
standard Dorfman-Steiner and Nertove-Arrow advertising sales ratios .•
3.3.2.1 Assumptions
For simplicity a two period model labelled 1 and 2 will be employed. Demand
is represented by a modified epidemic equation in which advertising enters as a direct
external source of infonnation through «It in the equation (3.1) below:-
• 1'hiI model will be modified in alai« section 10 IDow for maN thin one 1UppIitw. TM."llIe of
initially Nllrictina cM modellO amanopoliallUpply is thal a caml*ilon can be ckawnlbout the effecu of
&hae dift'erina .~ condilicna upon the .tvtniJina IIIIInIio iD .. epidImiIC ditflaaioD model.
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U~'(Xl-I) + Ot].(N. Xl-I]
N
3.1
where
P = the effectiveness of social contact coefficient and 0 ~ P~ 1
At = Advertising messages in time t and Ot = g(AJ.
Ot = the effectiveness of advertising messages coefficienL 2 Clt ~ 0
Xl = cumulative ownen at time t and Xl" N
N = size of population of potential acquiren of the new product.
The monopolist supplier is assumed to maximise discounted profits n by the
choice of his advertising expenditures in each time period given the demand equation 3.1
where,
3.2
where
n = Discounted profit of a monopolist
XI = Cumulated unit sales in period 1 (since by assumption ownen purchase one unit
only).
X2= Cumulated unit sales in period 2.
therefore
2 In arcW to make dUI model operllional. apecially .hIIl movina to 1MeI&imaIioa .... of 1M
invetbaltion. 101M r..ctianaJ relalionahip mUll be apecullld. For .... IDOIIIInl &ha func&ian wiD be .. It in ill
' .... form.
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(X2 - x 1)= Quantity sold in period 2.
At = Advertising expenditures in time t
Ct = Marginal cost in period t (assumed constant).
P = Monopolist price (assumed constant. but see discussion on this point below).
r = DiSCOWll rate.
Equation 3.2 can be expanded and rewritten in stock tenns as follows;
I' I' X C X Cl X Cl X .4.42 3.2b.. • PX I + I+' Xl - l+r I - , ,- 1+, 1+ 1+, ,- ,- 1+,
Constant marginal costs within a period will be assumed but may differ across
periods.
The simple epidemic model nonnally takes N as given. Thus emphasising the
rate of approach towards this given level due to the spread of infonnation amongst the
homogeneous population. It is arguable that the size of N could be determined by
economic variables such as price.3 Diffusion will then consist of both adjustment
towards the ceiling of the epidemic equation and shifts in the ceiling itself. As argued in
the last chapter, it will then prove extremely difficult to disentangle these effects
empirically.
On the other hand, ignoring any such changes in N has the advantage of
specifically focusing attention upon the effect of advertising on the rate of approach to
this given ceiling. However this is achieved at the expense of implicitly treating another
imponant economic variable price (P) as constant over the two periods. It could be
argued that N will be that level detennined by the Iona run equilibrium price for a
monopolisL The analysis would then follow the same approach as Glaister (1974),
keeping the separation on the grounds of malhematical intractability.
3. In tmpiricaI work. Bain (1~) l\III_ted thaiN could depend upon ecIlIIKJIftic vlri.t.a.lUCh. price. In
whichcaM !he IIY"II** 01 dill epidemic equation would be Ihihina till. time _'w" ..... Ilioa of mlity.
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This is obviously an artificial partition. In reality, a monopolist would use
advertising and price simultaneously. Indeed in an epidemic based model, given
incomplete knowledge, one could perceive that any reduction in price would need to be
accompanied by advertising in order to inform individuals of the price change.
Unfortunately, because the epidemic model assumes a homogeneous population, there is
little possibility for including price in any satisfactory manner. Rather than include this
variable in an ad hoc manner, it would be preferable to employ a model using a more
satisfying decision-theoretic base, such as the probit model introduced in the next chapler.
Indeed the main contention of the empirical investigation to follow, is the a priori belief
that the epidemic model is too naive to describe the diffusion process adequately. The
probit based model is expected to perform better statistically. However given that the few
empirical studies to include advertising have mostly used an epidemic framework, the
model will still need to be investigated.
In this simple framework, with advertising as the only decision variable, the
essence of the determination of advertising expenditures centres upon the profit
maximising allocation of information by the monopolist supplier between the two periods
and this will affect the timing of demand. Why then would a supplier not wish to ensure
that all of this demand arose in the first period? One possibility is that the exogenous
(~rn.. co~"",,,~ c.s e~Ir";"";'<l oJ...oo"..,)
price cost margi""in the second period may be higher. So the benefits of waiting until the
second period will be positive. However it may not be rational to meet demand entirely
within the second period as the monopolist will also have to take account of the costs of
waiting. that is the discount rate r. Thus the profit maximising outcome is likely to lead
to a distribution of advertising expenditures across time. Additionally. if no information
is supplied from an external source in the first period the diffusion process will not
operate unless the assumption is made that at least one owner already exists at the start of
the first period. Previously it was noted that the modelJ employed in the marketing
literature tend to call these knowledgeable individuals 'imovaaon' as opposed to the
'imitalOn' who leam of the new product through 'word of mouth' coruct.
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3.3.2.2 Paths of Influence of Advertising
The effect of advertising expenditures in the two period epidemic model can be
broken down into three paths of influence. Firstly and most directly. advertising in a
period is an external source of infonnation and therefore directly increases the number of
actual owners in periods 1 and 2. This is the full extent of the influence of advenising in
period 2 as this is the fmal period in the model. However in period 1. the increase in the
number of owners has two further indirect effects which work in opposite directions. The
new owners become infonnalion carriers about the product in the next period4. This
wont of mouth infonnation flow in the next period. represents a positive dynamic
infonnalion externality and shall be called the infonnalion carrier effect.
However. given that N is fixed. as the number of first period owners increases.
the number of potential buyers left in the second period obviously decreases. This
negative effect on demand shall be referred to as the negative early extraction effect.
Whether the sum of these indirect effects of first period advenising and hence the overall
dynamic owner extemality. is positive or negative. depends upon the relative strengths of
these two opposing forces. That is whether or not the benefit of increasing the number of
infonnation carrien offsets the cost of early extraction of the owner from the finite
population.
To summarise, first period advenising expenditure in this two period epidemic
model has an impact through three channels.
1. on current demand through Ot; this effect is positive.
2. on second period demand via Xl; this dynamic owner externality can be positive or
negative as it depends upon the net effect of,
i) the positive infonnation earner effect
4 The implicit IINnpbon ... is that the infomwion will be poIitiv. md wW DOCdiI.'" •potential
own. from becornina 1ft own.. Thia iJ IUIOILIbIe liven that dw infannalian iJ by dal'aaiIion of • ,eNric
MIUn md • JRYiouIIy ..- Ipplicable 10 v..ucauy ditrerwUaed aoodI wh8N Ip8MRl OIl their
~ iI accepted by aU 01 thI pocemill pnp".rioa..
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ii) the negative early extraction effecL
If the number of actual users at the begirming of a period is relatively large, any
additional advertising expenditures in that period could be superfluous, for the existing
number of infonnation carriers will already be large relative to the number of non owners
left to be transfonned into actual owners. In equilibrium, the allocation of advenising
over the two periods will be taken to the point where the mllJinal benefit in terms of
discounted profit of transfonning the marginal buyer in the first period equals the
marginal COSL 'The benefit will include the dynamic owner effect. ie, the value of the net
outcome of the opposing infonnation carrier and early extraction effects.
First Order Conditions for Profit Maximisation
These arguments can be seen more clearly by looking at the first order
conditions for the maximisation of discounted profit n by the choice of advertising A by
the monopolist (recall that price is assumed fixed, maybe at the long run monopolist
equilibrium level). The derivation of the fU'St order conditions is detailed in Appendix 3.1
at the end of this chap(er. In equation 3.3, the fU'St order condition relating to advertising
in period 1 is reproduced.
3.3
The direct net benefit of advertising expenditures in period 1 is represented by
the first term on the right hand side of the equation. However there is also an additional
term which is me dynamic net benefit, (P-CV!(1+r).bXlIbAI.[bXi/&X1 - I]. It is
composed of the discounted marginal conttibution in period 2 md the irxSirect impact and
effectiveness of period 1 advertising via Xl md explicitly includes the dynamic owner
externality [bXtbX 1 - I].
65
This indi~ct dynamic effect need not be positive as already explained. It
becomes a question of the sign of [~X2"bXl - 1]. Referring back to the epidemic equation
(3.1), the following can be derived
3.4
'The RHS includes the parameters associated with the internal or word of mouth
channel of infonnation. ~, as well as the external channel of infonnation in period 2, ~.
If the overall dynamic owner externality is to be positive then,
p[1-2~1-a.~0
3.5
where
If Xl/N is more than 0.05, then condition 3.05 is violated. Effectively this implies
that the negative early extraction effect dominates the positive word of mouth or
information carrier effect. there already being a ~latively large nmnber of information
carriers compared to the potenlial market of non owners remaining in the second period.
If X lIN is less than 0.05, then whether condition 3.05 holds depends upon the
relative magnitude of the infonnation carrier effect and the negative carty extraction
effect If the effectiveness of period 2 advertising 002, is relatively large, this will serve to
enhance the negative first period extraction effect. 1be more effective is period 2
advenising, then ceteris paribus, the grea1Cr will be the sacrifice resulting from early
extraction since the marginal buyer could be left dormant and be extradCd later using the
relatively effective external channel of current advertising in period 2.
If ~1 - 2Xt/N] > 002" then the information carrier effect more than compensateS
for the full opportunity cost of extracting the mll)inal buyer in period t ramer than 2.
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If ~[I - 2Xl/N] < ~, then the relative effectiveness of period 2 advenising
serves to enhance the opportunity cost of extracting the marginal buyer and the
information carrier effect is too weak to fully compensate.
3.3.2.4 Advertising Sales Ratio in the Epidemic Model
In the literature, interest in the finn's advertising decision tends to focus upon
the advertising sales ratio. The standard profit maximising result known as the Dorfman-
Steiner condition shows that
A/PX = 1lJrlp
3.6
where
1la = elasticity of flow demand WIt advertising
1lp = elasticity of flow demarxl WIt price
The profit maximising advertising salea ratio for a monopolist within the
epidemic model in period 1 is derived in appendix 3.1b and reproduced below,
3.7
where
1lqlAI
aXI cbi AI=«iidA7l'i
elasticity of flow demand in period 1WIt advertising in period 1
3.8
The Dorfman-Steiner (D-S) condition which does not take account of any
dynamic effects and the ratio in the epidemic model differ due to the final term on the
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RHS of equation 3.7 above.S Whether or not the D-S ratio will be larger or smaller
depends upon the dynamic owner extemality term. As explained above, this ultimately
comes down to the relative magnitude of at, ~ and ~.
1be profit maximising advertising sales ratio in period 2 for a monopolist in the
epidemic model is as follows,
3.9
where
3.10
T'Iq2A2 =
elasticity of flow demand in period 2 WIt period 2 advertising
Not surprisingly, this expression corresponds exactly to the usual D-S condition
since by definition period 2 is the final period and hence there are no further dynamic
effects to be taken into account
3.3.2.S Goodwill Effects of Advertising
In the standard industrial economics literature on advertising. it is common
practice to enter advertising into a model via the stock of goodwill. This lauer approach
has been adopted because it has been argued thal the effects of advertising do not fully
dissipate within the current period. Advertising expenditures are thus seen as analogous
to investment expenditures, adding to a stock of capital. where the capital is called a stock
of goodwill. In the epidemic model a dynamic effect has already been generated without
recourse to this device. 1be reasons for including lagged effect of advertising
S. A. price ia not endo.tIIOUI in lhiI model. the price CIOItmao... hu noc beaa IlIbIti&uIId for i&a profit
rnuimiJina condilian Imp. in the Dorfma SIoeirwuJftllion.
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expenditures in the standard literature have been discussed in Cowling et tU (197S).
However the infonnation carrier effects that arise in the epidemic model have not been
used in the standard literature as specific justification for treating advertising expenditures
as a stock of goodwill. It can be argued that some of the reasons given by Cowling and
others (eg. the durable fonn in which some expenditures like press advertising occur),
still apply in the epidemic model and stK>uld be included as an additional dynamic source
to that already contained within the epidemic framewort (as done by Simon and
Sebastian in their empirical model).
When advertising is treated as a stock of goodwill, the standard Nerlove-Arrow
(N-A) result for the profit maximising goodwill sales ratio is that in 3.11.6
3.11
where
0t = Stock of goodwill in period L
At = Advertising expenditure in time L
Pt = Price in period L
6 The N.love • Afro." raull is not normally preICIlIed in • diIc:nIa model. How... it hu t.n derived
IMn .n1hiD• two pII'iod model inonWlD lid~ .nih thi.a .... fr........t (.. Apperdia 3.2).
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qt = Row demand in period t,
r = Rate of discount
= Rate of decay of the stock of goodwill.
l1qtGl = Elasticity of flow demand in period t wn the stock of goodwill in period t,
l1qlpt = Elasticity of flow demand in period t wn price in period t,
If advenising has a goodwill effect. this increases the ways in which advenising
expenditure in period 1 affects demand in the epidemic model to the following;
1 an effect on current demand through czt; this effect is positive.
2 an effect on second period demand through Xl; this dynamic externality can be
positive or negative as it depends upon the net effect of
i) the positive infonnation carrier effect
ii) the negative early extraction effect
3 an effect on second period demand through the impact of goodwill on ~; this
goodwill effect is positive and comparable to the Nertove - Anow path of
influence.
Concentrating upon the first period profit maximiSing advenising sales ratios
(derived in Appendix 3.3), it is clear that the goodwill sales ratio in the epidemic
framework 3.12
G I • (I' -c I) ( lii!"- p -C'1 [ ~}!I] '1. IGI7Ir. p (,. I) ·,.IQI + P I - <,+2&01) 3.12
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differs from equation 3.11 by the second term on the RHS of 3.12 which represents the
effect of the additional channel of infonnation described in influence 2. U the rate of
decay a = 1. then the goodwill effect is zero and so the epidemic result in equation 3.7 is
reproduced. However in general. the profit maximising goodwill sales ratio in the
epidemic model will be larger than that suggested by Nerlove and Anow provided that
the two following conditions hold.
I) [~: _I] >0 3.13
2) 2a> l-r 3.14
Condition 1 has already been referred to and so there is no need to dwell on the
circumstances under which it will be positive. 1be second condition just states that the
rate at which goodwill depreciates should not be "too high" relative to the discount rate,
3.3.2.6 Over Time
Over time the Nedove - Anow result implies that with a constant goodwill
elasticity and price elasticity of demand. the advertising sales ratio will fall ceteris paribus
provided that a < 1. Since a is the rate of decay of the stock of goodwill. this condition
will always hold. When a = 1 there is no lasting effect from current period advertising
expenditures and so the Dorfman-Steiner condition is applicable. In these circumstances
and under Ihe assumption of constant elasticities. then the advertising sales ratio will
always be constart.
In the epidemic framework. the trend in the advertising sales ratio is more
complex. Recall that in the model without goodwill effects
3.7
A~=
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3.9
where
So if the price cost margins arc constant over the two periods then,
3.1.5
Assuming that the advertising elasticities are constant over time, then whether
arnot
3.16
depends upon whether
3.17
Provided that the dynamic owner externality is positive then the advertising
sales ratios will fall over time. The greater intensity of advertising in the first period.
given constant price cost margins and constant consumer sensitivity to advertising, is due
to the existence of the dynamic externality attached to first period advertising.7
7. Il.arock of aoodwill is -1WMd. since bq 1!~A 1 • ~ 1/001 Ibm under the ....,. condition&, AS 1 >
AS2 provided that (l>XibX 1 - 1) > 2(6-1). 1l6. 1. lhae are no.oodwiD efl'ecta mel dUI condilicn reduceI
103.17. HowlV•• it&< 1. provided Ihllthe rill of decay is ,.,. too 1.,t, 1Mdynnic al8nllily CIDbe
ne,mvelO Ihallhc neamve arty ulnlCtion effect cIorninIIeI.lnd yea thlldvtrlilina 111M nIio will atill fan
ov. lime becaUIe the I_tin, aoodwill effecu olldvG'tiaina COIIIpInNIa for 1Mom. dynanic Ind .,alive
effect.
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When price cost margins are constant but the advenising elasticity is declining over time
such that 'lq2A2 < 'lqlAl ,then for ASl > A~ requires
[ax 2 _ I] 1 > 'IdU _ 1~ ,-;; 'ItlA ,
3.18
If'lq2A2 / 'lqlAI is less than 1, then the RHS ofcquation 3.18 will always be
negative, then the advenising sales ratio will fall over time providing that the dynamic
externality is positive. Without the dynamic externality, the advertising sales ratio would
fall over time under the assumption of a diminishing advenisina elasticity. When a
positive dynamic externality is added to the model, this will serve to enhance the
attractiveness of advenising in the early period and the advenising intensity will iberefore
be greater in the early period.
If 'lq2A2 > 'lq 1A l' then from 3.18 for AS 1 to be greater than AS2 it is necessary
that not only is the dynamic owner externality positive but ill discounted magnitude must
be such that it offsets the relative advantage of period 2 advertising resulting from the
increased sensitivity of consumers to advenising expenditures over time.
Changes in the responsiveness of consumers to advertising over time will
depend upon many factors (see for example Cowling et al 1975) which may include the
amount of advertising already undertaken. If the advertising response curve is eventually
subject to diminishing returns, then ceteris paribus, a laraer potenlial population is likely
to delay the point at which such diminishing returns set in. Over time, in this model, the
remaining potential market is getting smaller, thus it i.quite reasonable to assume that the
advertising elasticity is decreasing over time.
In addition the type of commodity may affect consumen sensitivity to
advertising, this generally being greater for luxuries, for new products, and for complex
prodUCb whose chancleristia cannot be substantiated before use. AlIo, if price is seen
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as a proxy for the search benefits of consumers. then products with lower prices (and by
implication low search benefits for this product) may have a greater advenising elasticity.
since consumers may be reluaant to conduct extensive and therefore costly search to
confinn the advertising claims. The sensitivity of consumers to advenising will also
depend upon the reactions of competitors and the cyclical phase of an economy. This last
point rests upon the Galbraithian notion that in boom periods more income is available for
consumption of luxury goods once the necessities of life have been purchased.
Over time. given that some volume of advertising has already occurred and the
remaining potential marltet is falling. consumers become more familiar with the new
product. and may become less sensitive to advertising expendinm:. On the other hand.
producers may be adding to the complexity of the product by including new features and
if in addition prices are falling. then the responsiveness of consumers to advertising may
actually increase over time8. Consequently it is not easy to say a priori whether a
constant. increasing or decreasing advertising elasticity is more applicable. Provided that
a constant or declininl advertising elasticity is assumed (with constant price cost
margins). then a falling advertising sales ratio will be the outcome. subject only to the
requirement that the dynamic owner extemality is positive. The conditions under which
this holds have already been discussed above.
3.3.2.7 Summary
To summarise. in an epidemic demand diffusion framework with a monopolist
supplier. the profit maximising advertising sales ratio in period 1will be larger or smaller
than that given by the standard Dorfman-Steiner condition depending upon whether the
dynamic owner extemality is positive or negative respectively. This condition may be
staled as.
3.19
8 Fallini raJ pr;c. of new consumer dwlbla iJ oCtenoblerved in pnctic::e.
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In comparison to the standard Nerlove Arrow condition. the first period
goodwill sales ratio in the epidemic model will be larger. provided that the dynamic
owner externality is positive (equation 3.S) and that
25> t-r 3.14
Over time. with constant advertising and price demand elasticities. the Dorfman
Steiner condition suggests constant advertising sales ratios. whereas under these same
assumptions the Nertove Arrow expression will show declining advertising intensity.
In the epidemic framework what happens to the advertising sales ratio over time
is more complex. Assuming that price cost margins and advertising demand elasticities
are constant then the profit maximising advertising sales ratios will fall over time
provided that the dynamic owner externality is positive (but when the goodwill effect of
advertising is also included. the advertising sales ratio will still decline even when the
negative earty extraction effect dominates provided that the rate of depreciation of the
goodwill is not too large).
U the price cost margin is constant but advertising demand elasticity declines
over time then (if the dynamic owner externality is positive). advertising intensity will fall
over time.
U the price cost margin is constant but advertising demand elasticity is
increasing over time then the advertising sales ratio will fall over time only if the dynamic
owner externality is positive and its magnitude is such that it offsets the disadvantage of
the lower contemporaneous advertising responsiveness in earlier periods
3.J.J The Theoretical Model; More than One Supplier
The supply side factors can be just as imponant in determining the shape of the
diffusion path as the demand factors concentrated upon so far. This will become clearer
once the epidemic framework above is extended to accommodate a supply sector with
more than one firm. Multiple suppliers introduce rivalroua behaviour and this will
impinge upon the firm's advertising expenditure decision. The key factor isolated in the
7S
epidemic model under monopoly conditions is the e~istence of a dynamic extemality, all
of the benefit will accrue to the monopolist supplier.9 Allowing for at least one more
producer in this framework adds to the decision problem because each producer must
recognise mutual interdependence. Intuitively it is obvious that although the dynamic
externality will still exist. the potential for one finn to secure all of the dynamic benefit
resulting from its own behaviour will be limited. To see this more clearly, there are some
issues and additional assumptions which need to be considered.
3.3.3.1 Intra Product Heterogeneity
Relaxing the monopoly supplier assumption means that fulther complications
are introduced. Once the assumption of a single producer of the new product is
abandoned, heterogeneity of the product should be recognised so that more than one price
can hold in the mmet at anyone time. Product differentiation between the new and
existing good has been mentioned. However in moving from monopoly to oligopoly in
the supply of the new product an implicit assumption of intra product homogeneity will
be made. This provides a logical contradiction once a fum's advertising is allowed to
affect brand share.
Whereas this may appear open to criticism, the primary focus of the analysis
here is the role of advertising in the diffusion of the generic product rather than on a
particular brand. Whilst the inclusion of the latter may add richness to the specification.
it would also cloud the issue under investigation, namely whether advertising has a role in
spreading the ownership of a new generic product amongst the population and is unlikely
to yield further insights into this particular question. There are basically two approaches
that have been adopted in the literature to overcome this problem of product
heterogeneity. Price can be assumed to be exogenously determined and the analysis
concentrates upon advertising as the decision variable and to quote Schmalensee (1972),
9 11will be .... 61provided Ih.I& 1Minfonnalion c.m. affect orr.... 1hIMID ... Iy alrlCtion effect
ucUc:uIIed .. _.
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Such rrtiN.Uu ....... are incompkte since they do not COfLSuurftmu'
price (or output) decisiofLS. Logically, though, they are 110 ku
complete tIatua price-output rrtiN.Uu ill which seUillg upendilures art
uogellOlU.
Altematively product heterogeneity can implicitly be recognised but a
symmetry rule be invoked, such that only one price exists in industry equilibrium (Cubbin
1974).
In effect. both of these approaches will be used because each one is more
appropriate to one of the two particular diffusion models given their underlying features.
The approach adopted by Schmalensee with price exogenously determined will be used
for the epidemic model presented in this chapter because the population is assumed to be
homogeneous. In the probit type diffusion model the population diffen with respect to
some characteristic and hence price can be used as a decision variable, so the symmetry
rule will be invoked.
3.3.3.2 Heterogeneous Advenising and Market Share
It is assumed that.
i) total industry advertising, the summation of individual firms' advenising
eltpemitures. will detennine total industry stock demand.
ii) each firm's market share will depend upon their share of total advertising spend and
such eltpenditure will be equally effective. so that quality differences of
advertising campaigns are ignored.
In reality the second asswn~on may appear naive. However allowing for
heterogeneous advertising expendilllJa becomes hi&hly subjective. Lambin (1970) did
attempt to incorporate this factor by using dummy variables to represent advertising of
two particular brandI of petrol as 'image-building' and other 'promotional' campaigns. but
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this approach can still be criticised for being subjective, as the researcher has to allocate
expenditure to each of these categories.
However Chiplin and Sturgess (1981) consider that the problem is not so
imponant to the final econometric results if, as they believe, differences in advertising
quality are random across finns and over time. So they conclude 'differences in copy
quality should not persistently bias results based upon aggregace data'. Given the focus of
attention of the analysis and the ultimate desire to test empirically the impact of
advertising on the diffusion curve, the assumption of homogeneous advertising is
probably an acceptable simplifying ·assumption. The lack of recognition of this factor
would of course be more serious if the primary interest was at the finn level, when the
issue would need to be addressed.
Given the fact that intra product heterogeneity and advertising heterogeneity are
being ignored, some allocation rule must be specified for the effectiveness of a finn's
individual advertising expenditure. It is assumed that total industry advertising, which is
the summation of advertising expenditures undenaken by all firms within the industry,
affects industry demand due to its infonnative role. It is then assumed that this demand is
distributed amongst finns in relation to the fmu's sham of total advertising expenditures,
ie 'it = lit' At·
Hence the greater the intensity of an individual firms advertising relative to the
industry total, the more likely it is that consumers will receive information from this finn
and so buy its product. Given that. by assumption. the model is not explicitly concerned
with intra product heterogeneity, this would seem a reasonable allocation rule. Current
advertising expenditures are thus assumed to contain information about the generic
product and the different suppliers of the good.
78
3.3.3.3 Market Share and Loyalty Effects
In addition to the current effect of advertising expenditures, infonnation will be
carried forward into the future by the new owners. This spread of infonnation will affect
the buying behaviour of the remaining non owners in the population. Upon receiving the
'word of mouth' information, these non owners will purchase the new product. about
which they were previously ignoranL It will be assumed that the infonnation transmitted
is purely of a generic nature ie about the product per se, rather than any particular brand.
Thus the model abstracts from the possibility of goodwill or loyalty effects in market
shares10. Given that the dynamic infonnation extemality is generic in nature and there
are no goodwill or loyalty effects from current market share, an individual finn will have
to undenake future advertising in order to secure any future benefit from the dynamic
externality .
This future advertising represents an additional cost which is incurred by an
oligopolist but would not be necessary if only one supplier existed. Thus the dynamic
infonnation externality is no longer free, as is the case for a monopolist. This additional
payment is bound to affect the advertising decision. In addition. the precise outcome is
also dependent upon a firms attitude to the mutual interdependence and its expectations of
competitors reactions. 1be model will follow the standard Coumot assumption of zero
conjectural variations but this will be relaxed and discussed informally later in the
chapter.
To swrunarise, assuming there is more than one supplier, each holding zero
conjectural variations, and that a finn's current market share is dependent upon its relative
current advertising share. 1bere are no market share loyalty effects as the dynamic
information tranSmitted is of a generic nature. Under these conditions, current advertising
by a firm will have the effect of increasing both current industry demand and its own
current market share. In the next period, there will be a positive dynamic infonnation
10 The irnpIicIliona or reluiq thillIIUIIlfIlion wiD be diICUIIed ......
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carrier effect. however due to the generic nature of the infonnation flow this benefit will
be shared amongst all producers.
In addition, there is the negative early extraction effect and this will also be
bome by all finns in the industry. Provided thal the net outcome of this dynamic owner
externality is positive, then this benefit will be shared by all finns undenaking advertising
in the future period. 1be requirement of an extra cost to secure this dynamic benefit will
act to discourage an oligopolist finn from undertaking the same volume of first period
advertising as a monopolist
3.3.3.4 First Order Conditions
Given the conditions described above, an oligopolist iwill maximise discounted
profits "i
3.20
subject to the demand diffusion equation 3.1 by the choice of advertising in each period.
Xl = Total industry cumulated unit sales in period I (since by assumption owners
purchase one unit only).
X2= Total industry cumulated unit sales in period 2.
therefore
(X2 • Xl)= Total industry quantity sold in period 2.
Sit = An oligopolist's market share of total industry sales in period t and sit is a function
of the oligopolist's advertising share ie. ai' At-
Ijt = Oligopolist's advertising expenditure in period L
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At = Total industry advenising expenditures in time l
Cit = MllJinal cost for an oligopolist in period t (assumed constant).
P = Long nm oligopoly industry equilibrium price.
r = Discount rate.
As before, marginal costs within a period will be asswned COnstad but can vary across
periods. Finns are assumed to adopt zero conjectural variations behaviour. TIle full
model and derivation of the first order conditions are given in appendix 3.4 at the end of
this chapter.
TIle first order conditions for advertising in period t are reproduced in equation
3.2 t. An oligopolist will advertise in period 1 up to the point where the marginal benefit
equals the marginal cost of advertising, such that.
o-c ')[~:(1-,,,1+1,, ~: 1 + [ 'i:"IJ~:[~: - Ij ••
3.21
TIle marginal benefit includes the standard current industry effect (Pi-
Cil)'Sil.(bX1!bA1) and the current market share effect (Pi-Cil).X1/A1.(1-sil)' However
in this panicular model, there is an additional element in the marginal benefit. ie, the
firms share of the discounted dynamic extemality, (Pi-Ci1/1+r).Sj2.(bXlIbAl).(~X2/~Xl -
1). This dynamic benefit depends upon the period 2 advertisinl share. Unless the
individual finn undenakes some second period advertisinl so that su > 0, it will not
capture any of this dynamic benefit that has panially arisen from its previous advenisinl
expenditure.
Compared to the monopolist, an olilopolistic firm must consider the fact that
rivals in the next period can benefit from its current IdvertisiDl expenditures. In other
81
words, the finn will be providing a free benefit to its rivals in the next period. 111iswill
have the negative effect of reducing the volume of first period advertising undertaken by
an individual oligopolist. 111is result arises due to the generic nature assumed for the
infonnation carrier effect. 1be effect on the result if this generic assumption is relaxed
will be discussed later.
3.3.3.S Industry Advenising Sales Ratio
Assuming there are n symmetric finns, each facing the same cost conditions
and holding the same Couroot conjectures about the behaviour of rivals, and summing
across n to obtain the industry advertising sales ratio gives the following conditions,
3.22
3.23
Over time. given the number of firms and assuming a constant price cost margin
in both periods. then AS 1 > A~ provided that
[ax 2 _ 1] 1 > "dU _ I'3I'j t ., 11. lA , 3,18
Obviously this is the same condition derived earlier in equation 3.18 for n = 1
since although the within period ratios are likely to differ with respect to the number of
supplying finns. the change in this ratio over time will still rest upon the intertemporal
requirement thal the current and discounted dynamic benefit of period 1 advertising is
greaIer than the current period 2 effect. As the cirtWDStanCes under which this condition
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will hold have already been discussed for the case of a single supplier finn. there is no
need to dwell further upon this panicular aspect.
3.3.3.6 Martet Structure and the Industry Advertising Sales Ratio
Traditionally. investigation of the detenninants of advertising across markets
has tended to concentrate upon the degree of seller concentration in the miJkeL There is
some debate in the literature about the sign of the relationship between the advertising
intensity and the number of finns within an industry (Cable 1972). Under the
assumptions of equal size finns with equal costs and advertising effectiveness adopting
Coumot quantity setting behaviour. then the standard Dorfman Steiner condition gives.
3.24
This corresponds exactly to the advertising sales ratio for period 2 in the
epidemic model 3.23 above.tt The sign of the derivative of this ratio with respect to n is
ambiguous and will depend upon the values assumed for the advertising elasticity.12
What can be said about the impact on the advertising sales ratio in the epidemic
model as the number of suppliers increases? In general no conclusions can be drawn
about the change in the ratio with respect to the number of fmns n. There are the two
limiting cases,
1. when n = 1. the monopolist result given in equation 3.7 holds and
2. as n-. GO then the advertising sales ratio is equal to the price cost margin.
In between these two extremes. the outcome is more ambiguous. However, it is
this first period which is of most interest. The approach adopted here will be to
l l Except lha& &he price COlt m_am hal been IUbitilUl.ed wilh ill proI"ll nwtimisina condit ian. MIllay
Iln.11p·
12.See WIImOft (1914) for 101M numeric:aJ eumplel.
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investigate some special cases to obtain an indication of the effect of a change in n on the
first period advertising sales ratio. Ignoring for the moment the additional complexity
that the price cost margin will be a function of the number of supplier firms, and further
assuming the advertising elasticities and the dynamic owner externality are all invariable
with respect to the number of finns then,
3.25
If the advertising elasticity "q1A1 is constant then the first term on the RHS of
equation 3.25 will be negative, positive or zero subject to the value of'lqlAl' The second
term on the RHS of equation 3.25 will be positive, negative or zero dependent upon the
sign of the dynamic owner externality (bX2/6X 1 • 1).
For example, if 'lqlAl> 1 and (bX2IbXI • 1) > 0 the advertising intensity will
be greater under monopoly than an industry having more than one supplying finn
(provided that supplien do not collude to act as a monopolist. the likelihood of which and
its implications will be discussed later).
If'1qIAl < 1 and (&X2~Xl • 1) > 0, the advenising intensity will still be larger
under monopoly provided that the current period industry and market share effect of Al
does not offset the fact that the oligopolistic finn only secures a share of the dynamic
benefit, ie. the relative magnitude of the second term on the RHS of equation 3.25 must
outweigh the positive first term. This accords with the intuitive explaJWion given earlier
that the existence of an extra cost incurred by an oligopolist in obtaining any of the
dynamic benefit would tend to lower the amount of advertising undertaken by an
individual oligopolist.
Now allow the price cost margin to vary with respect to Do but again usume the
advertising elasticity and dynamic owner extemality are invariable to the diff'erinl supply
conditions, then.
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n~:-l)]
3.26
TIle sign of this expression 3.26 will depend upon various assumptions made
about the parameters and in general no conclusion can be reached.
One special example provides evidence of the intuitive result expected, namely
that the advertising sales ratio will be dec~asing in n. This result holds when I constant
unitary advertising elasticity and a relatively large present value of the dynamic owner
externality are assumed.
As can be seen, the signing of condition 3.26 is very complex even with certain
restrictive assumptions. Unfortunately, the position is in fact even more difficult because
assuming that the owner externality is invariable with respect to n is not ~ally plausible
since it is endogenous to this particular model. From equation 3.1 the diagrams below
can be drawn. Figure 1 is the epidemic equation curve 3.1 showing period 2 Oow demand
(X2 - Xl> as a function of period 1 stock Xl.
Figure 1
As can be seen in figure I, the position of the curve will shift in response to the
effectiveness of period 2 advenising. Figure 2 below, shows the dynamic owner
externality equation 3.4 and is obviously the gradient of the curve in figure 1.
8S
figure 2
The dynamic owner externality function (equation 3.4) will shift in response to
the effectiveness of period 2 advertising. If ~ > ~ then the dynamic owner externality
will always be negative.
In addition, although it may be reasonable to assume a constant advertising
elasticity of demand in the ftrst period. aiven the functional form of the epidemic model,
the second period advertising elasticity will be endogenous and therefore not constant 13
So although in the second period there is no dynamic extemality to cause problems in the
comparison, the endogenity of the second period advertising elasticity is a major
stumbling block.
3.3.4 Market structure, Industry Advertlslnl Sales Ratio and Dlf'fusIon; An
Informal Approach
These complexities make any formal general assertions on the effect on the
advertising sales ratio of changing supply conditions impossible. However at a more
informal level, given the assumptions already described, especially the eNcial assumption
that the information transmiaed is of a generic nature, intuitive reasoning would suggest
that an oligopolistic industry would have a lower advertising intensity in the first period
relative to a monopolist Presumably this is because of the inability of oligopoiistic firms
to secure all of the positive information externality, other firms being able to seize a share
of thil beneftt by advertising in the second period.
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3.3.4.1 Collusion
So far. all of the analysis has assumed that where more than one supplier exists.
although recognising their mutual dependence. each finn nonetheless acts as if no
reaction takes place (Coumot zero conjectural variation). As the number of supplying
firms contracts towards the monopoly situation. this is obviously a dubious behavioural
assumption. Incentives for explicit or implicit collusion exist such that the group of
colluding firms may seck the joint profit maximising outcome. Due to the nature of a two
period model. there will be I difference between the tirst and second period outcome.
In the second period. the analysis becomes static. Thus advertising by an
oligopolist in this period is primarily about market share. So it is likely that such
expenditures will exceed those of the joint profit maximising situation. There is an
incentive to collude. however the agreement. whether tacit or overt. can prove difficult to
police. Although deviations away from the agreed levels may be easier to witness than
for price collusion. retaliation is more awkward. It can take time before a rival's
promotional campaign can be matched and. in reality. such campaigns are not
homogeneous (u assumed in the fonnal model). 1bere can be no guarantee that a rival's
campaign can be nullified. So the credibility of retaliation and perceived loss inflicted is
lower and if the gains from cheating outweigh the loss when the cartel breaks down. the
situation will be highly unstable. In addition. the artificial assumption of no future in the
second period ensures that cheating in this final period is more or less guaranteed.
In the first period. with the infonnation transmitted limited to being generic in
nature. the intert.emporal joint profit maximising outcome for an oligopolistic firm
probably requira an agreement to increase the level of expenditures above that which
would be undertaken in the absence of collusion. Presumably. this would be extremely
difficult to enforce u an individual finn would be tempted to 'free ride' and obtain the
future benefit of rival's current advertising expenditure. The credibility of the 'free ride' is
likely to be lower when the number of firms in the agreeme .. is small. Say there are only
two suppliers. each is likely to perceive that I reduction in their contribution to the pool
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of infonnation carrien will mean that the future total benefit will be negligible. if it exists
at all (as the other duopolist could also reduce its contribution). Consequently the
expected intertemporal loss from breaking the collusive a~ment will be relatively
large. When allowance is made for loyalty effects. the incentives to cheat are probably
intensified because of the relatively large intertemporal gains arising from the possible
simultaneous existence of loyalty effects of first period market share and the incentive to
race to extract the marginal buyer (due to the negative early extraction effect which is
bome by all supplien in the next period).
To summarise, the chances of a successful collusive ~ment are unlikely in
this particular framework. However collusion is possible with the special assumption of
generic infonnation flows. provided that the number of supplying finns in the industry is
very small.
3.3.4.2 Entry
The model has been derived under the assumption that the number of supplying
finns n is given over the two periods, ie. the possibility of entry and exit has been
ignored. Relaxinl thil is likely to have important consequences. Consider the case where
in period 1 there ila monopolist supplier but entry can occur before period 2 commences.
If the monopolist recognises the possibility of entry in the second period. then he can no
longer expect to reap all of the dynamic benefit arising from his fint period decisions. He
will bear the cost of the first period advertising expenditwa but under the expectation of
entry, the monopolist will have to incur a fw1her oost in tenns of second period
advertising to secure a share of the dynamic lain. Effectivdy then. under the threat of
future entry. the monopolist in the first period wiU act u if more dwl one finn exists in
the rust period (of course the monopolist will not be concerned with the distributive effect
of advertisinl in the current period). Thus the level of advertisinl will probably be lower
than would be the case with closed entry.
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This result is unusual since advenising expenditures are nonnally seen as a
barrier to entry via their creation of brand loyalty. Such a loyalty barrier will be
expensive for any potential newcomer to overcome and therefore place the entrant at a
possible cost disadvantage to the incumbent This would imply that a monopolist may
undertake more advenising (compared to a situation of closed current and future entry)
provided that the duut of entry is recognised and credible, rather than less.
3.3.4.3 An Invitation to Entry
1be opposing results emerge because the epidemic framework explicitly takes
account of the newness of the product and hence the lack of information about its
existence. With the assumption of generic infonnation flow between individuals, the firm
who contributes to the pool of infonnation cannot solely exploit it Thus advenising
expenditures will encourage new entrants (an 'invitation to entry') not deter them. It will
have a knock-on effect, providing a greater pool of information. thus a greater number of
potential buyen in the next period, ready for the new entrad to exploit
3.3.4.4 Loyalty Effects of Information Flows
Of course, if the assumption of generic information flow is abandoned. it is
likely that this result will change. Allowing for loyalty effects such that a firm's second
period maJtet share si2 depends not only on current advertising share but also on previous
advertising share, would then mean that it would no longer be necessary for a firm to
undertake second period promotion to secure pan of the positive information externality
created by previOUS advenising. In these circumstances. the 1ll1est advertiser in the
earlier period not only obtains the advantage then. but the benefit of past actions carry
forward.
So for an oligopolist facing entry. allowing for loyalty effects tends to mitigate
the incentive to lower advertising (which follows from the problems of secwing the spill-
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over information benefit in the future). However the intenemporal behaviour of the
oligopolistic finn will not simply reflect thal of a monopolist (who with closed entry.
always obtains the future benefit of current actions). This is because of another
peculiarity of the model. namely the lack of a repeat demand. Given that individuals buy
one unit only. a finn has also to take account of the negative early extraction penalty
(recall that the dynamic owner externality is comprised of two opposing forces. the
positive information carrier effect and the negative early extraction effect).
With only one firm in both periods. the consequences of early extraction are
suffered solely by the agent whose actions led to the situation. However when n > 1. the
individual finn is no longer uniquely accountable for its actions. In effect the early
extraction penalty is shared by all firms in the market. Each finn will not wish to bear
this cost without receiving any of the earlier benefit and so it is likely that firms will race
to extract the consumers. Coupled with the loyalty effect (which offsets the tendency for
an oligopolist to reduce advertising expenditures in the generic infonnation case). this
will serve to increase the advenising of an oligopolist industry relative to a monopolist 14
To summarise. under conditions of monopoly in period 1 with the threat of
entry and generic information flow. the monopolist is likely to advertise less than would
have been the case with closed entry. 1be conclusion that a monopolist's advertising
expenditures will attract entry is unusual and a result of the special fealUre of this
particular model.
For an oligopoly situation with the threat of entry and generic information flow,
there are two effects which wort in opposite directions. There will be an incentive to
reduce advertising because of the problem of securing the dynamic information benefit
but there may be an incentive to increase advertising because the new finns in the next
14 Wilhoul the loyally effllCl. lhia incruN in.civ.n.m, uptlldianaalD IhInc.1De.1I'IIC&,may offill
the lower expendiDll'elelJ*Ud - • r.u1t of the problem of 1eCUI'in, cha benef"1l from cha infomwion now.
H the O¥...u dynamic owner utemality it p:IIi&iv .. thM cha inform ..... effect dornin-. and CDnIeqUllldy
&here will t. .....dl..ey ., ... 10••• .ni.Iina.
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period will be forted to share the burden of earty extraction encouraging a race to extract
the marginal buyer. 'The net effect is ambiguous.
For an oligopolist finn and entry, but allowing for loyalty effects in the dynamic
information flow, it is likely that advenising will increase compared to the same situation
without entry. because the race to extract will be enhanced by the ability of finns to gain
some of the dynamic informadon extemality u a result of previous Idvertisina.
3.4 CONCLUSIONS
The explicit recognition of the diffusion of new consumer durables has
substantial consequences for the profit maximising adverdsing sales ratio. Existing
theoredcal wodt in the literature has included advenising in an epidemic framewodt.
However relatively liUle attendon was given to the associated supply side and resulting
implications for the Idvenising decision. The time palh of adverdsing (without any
addidonal goodwill effects) for a monopolist supplier in an epidemic model has been
invesdgated. The wort in this chapcer explored the profit maximising advertising and
goodwill sales ratios within an epidemic fnmework both for a monopolist and
oUgopolistic industry.
It was found that the special features of explicitly recognising new consumer
durables within. dynamic framewort impinged upon these ratios. Compared to the D-S
condition (which was derived from a stadc framework and did not account for new
consumer durables per .rt) the first period adverdsing sales ratio in the epidemic model
was found to be larger or smaller than the D-S condition. dependent upon the sign of the
dynamic owner externality. This term was a special feature of the epidemic model and its
sign ultimately came down to the reladve magnitude of the effectivencsa of the social
contact information flow p and the inter temporal effectiveness of the extemal channel of
information Dow at and~. The N-A condidon doet incorporate. dynamic aspect.
however it was shown thal the reasons for this (ie stock of aoodwill) could also be
justified in the epidemic modeL 10 adding • further dynamic feature into the profit
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maximising advertising and goodwill sales ratios derived from the epidemic framework.
Again, whether the advertising sales ratio with a goodwill effect in the epidemic model,
was larger or smaller than the N-A condition reSled on the Sign of the dynamic owner
externality and the additional condition that the goodwill depreciation rate was not 'too
high' relative to the time discount rate.
Next, the time path of the advertising sales ratio in the epidemic framework was
considered. Various cases were explored. Taking the Simple cue where the price cost
margins and advertising demand elasticities are constant over time, the D-S condition
would suggest a constant ratio. Under the same assumptions, the N-A condition would
indicate a falling one. In the epidemic model, without goodwill effects, the advertising
sales ratio would decrease, increase or remain constant dependent upon the sign of the
dynamic owner extemality being positive, negadve or zero respectively. When goodwill
effects are also included then under these same assumptions, the advenising sales ratio in
the epidemic model could still fall over time even if the dynamic owner externality was
negadve (which would be the case if the negative early extraction effect dominates),
provided that the lasting effects of advertising due to the stock of aoodwill compensated
for this negative early extraction effect. If this was not the case, the advertising sales ratio
would increase over time and not decrease as suggested by the N-A condition. This is
obviously a result of noting the further dynamic aspects of investigadng new consumer
durables.
In the existing literature, the effect of concenuadon on the advertising sales
ratio in a static framewort has been considered. The resulting advenising sales ratio in an
oligopolistic industry was found to be higher or lower than for a monopolist dependent
upon the number of firms in the industry and value of the advertising elasticity. The wort
in this chapter also looked at the effect of a changing number of suppUen on the profit
maximising sales ratios when derived within I dynamic epidemic framework. The
ambiguity of the effect of concentration on the advenisinl sales rado wu intensified.
However at an intuitive level, the oligopolistic industry advertisinl sales ratio was
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expected to be lower than for a monopolist because of the inability of oligopoly fmns to
secure all of the dynamic externality in the future period. An advertising sales ratio
decreasing in the number of firms in the industry was confirmed in the formal model
under the special assumptions of a COnstanl unitary advertising elasticity and a relatively
large discounted value of the dynamic owner externality (althoup this had to be treated
with caution given that the dynamic owner externality was itself endogenous).
Finally, an informal approach was adopted and the effect of relaxing some of
the market strucmre assumptions explored. TIle Coumot conjectural variation assumption
was relaxed and the likelihood of collusion discussed. On the whole, this was considered
unlikely in this particular epidemic framework except under the special assumptions of
generic information flows and a small number of suppliers in the industry.
When the threat of entry was recognised, unlike the standard case in the
literature (Bain 1968), advertising was not seen as a barrier but an invitation to entry.
This occurred under the special assumption of a generic information Dow. Consequently,
the profit maximising advertising sales ratio would be lower than for a monopolist secure
from potential entry. In an oligopolistic industry, the effect wu ambiguous due to the
opposing forces of the positive information and negative early extraction effects.
However, relaxin& the generic information assumption and allowing for loyalty effects in
the information Dow, the threat of entry would tend to increase the advertising intensity.
This was likely beause the race to extract prompted by the negative early extraction
effect would be enhanced by loyalty effects in the information externality.
APPENDIX 3.1
(For a full description of the variables, refer to page 60 in chapter 3.)
A monopolist will aaximise the following profit function (in stock ter.s):-
Subject to the following stock de.and functions (based upon an
epide.ic de.and diffusion .odel)
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A monopolist will maximise the following profit function (in flow ter.s):-
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Subject to the following flow demand functions (based upon an epidemic
de.and diffusion .odel)
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The first order condition with respect to the advertising variable in period 1 is,
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Gives the profit maxi.ising advertising sales ratio in period 1,
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Gives the profit .axi.ising goodwill sales ratio in period 2,
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Nerlove - Arrow two period .odel deivation.
(For a full description of the variables, refer to page 68 in chapter 3).
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(2)
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CHAPTER4
THE ROLE OF ADVERTISING IN A PROBrr BASED MODEL
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In this panicular chapter, the alternative demand diffusion model (the probit
framework) will be explored. Unlike the epidemic model, advertising has not been
included into this panicular framework in the existing literature. Consequendy, this shall
be the first priority, also, advertising will be allowed to have an independent dynamic
effect through the stock of goodwill concept discussed in the last chapter. As shown in
the literature review chapter, a supply side has been added to the probit demand diffusion
equation but obviously, given the neglect of advertising OIl the demand side, no
consideration has been given to the advertising decision of suppliers and the implications
of using a probit structure on the resulting profit maximising advertising sales ratios.
This deficiency will be addressed in this chapter. Like before, the procedure will be to
derive the advertising sales ratios in the model for both I monopolist and oligopolistic
industry and compare these results to the standard D-S and N-A conditions. The time
path of the ratios will then be considered, as will the effect of a changinl martet structure
(in terms of number of suppliers) on the advertisinl sales ratios. Fmally, the advertising
sales ratios derived under the same supply side assumptions but usinl the competing
epidemic and probit demand diffusion models will be reviewed.
4.1.2 AppUcatlon or the epidemic and problt framework.
One of the major weaknesses of the epidemic framework is its lack of a
decision-theoretic base and this seriously limits the extent to which imponant economic
variables can be included in the model In the last chapter it was suggested that the
epidemic model may have limited applicability to a particular type of product innovation
ie, a vertically differentialed new product. Nonetheless, althouah all potential consumers
in the market may apee on the superiority of. vertically differentia&cdproduct. then: can
still be other imponant factors which differentiate the population of potential buyers, el
incomes may vary. Even if thil was not the ~ individuals may qree on the relative
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superiority of the new product but disagree over the extent of its absolute improvement.
Yet the epidemic model with its assumption of a homogeneous population ignores this
faet.
Further, there are some products for which the epidemic model is unsuitable.
For example, some new products may be better described as horizontally differentiated as
a proportion of the population (due to their underlyina preferences) may never be
convinced of the superiority of the new product relative to an exiSlina substitute. A
simple example may help to highlight this point The introduction of the colour television
receiver is most likely an example of a venically differentiated produet. If rational
consumers are faced with the choice of a colour or monochrome set, given equal prices, it
is highly unlikely that anyone will choose the existing monochrome technology.
Eventually one would expect to see the complete disappearance of the monochrome set
(see diagram A6.1 in chapter 6 for a clear demonstration of this inevitable obsolescence).
On the other hand, a new product such as a microwave oven may never completely
replace the use of conventional ovens within the population. Not all individuals will be
agreed on the superiority of this new product relative to the existing one, even with
equivalent prices.
In reality, many new products will be both horizontally and vertically
differentiated, such that this classification is blurred. Fwther, some products will not fit
into this classification at all as they arc completely new and serve a function for which no
previous product existed (eg. the video cassette recorder). The probit based model, given
its explicit recognition of a heterogeneous population, will be much more general in its
suitability, applicable to both horizontal and vertically differentiated new products. 1 Also
this framework can cope with completely new goods u well as the 'mongrel' product
innovations.
I. ;..•..,t1iMd. vertically dill'eNIIliaIed product cm be ~ ill tMM modela by allowina
all individualllD Oft chi rellIiv. auperiority of lhI new poduct. but ctiaaar- wilh .....-:t IDchi G.a
of chllbIoluIe impO¥-'
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4.1 FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS: SOME GENERAL ISSUES
Before introducing the model it is worthwhile reiterating the special features of
the analysis in this thesis. As explained in the last chapter, the focus of attention in this
thesis is on the inttoduction of a new consumer durable at the industry level, ie, it is the
generic product that is being investigated. Also, this analysis is concerned with the
decision to adopt for the rust time, multiple purchases are ruled out by assumption.
Further, only the early stages of the product life cycle is considered and for a consumer
durable, the question of replacement purchases can be reasonably ignored.
4.2.1 Stock Demand Curvel
As a result of these special assumptions, downward slOping demand curves for
individuals do not exist Instead, the notion of reservation price is used. An individual
only will enter the martet once the expected benefit of ownership exceeds or equals the
cost of purchase and will buy only one unit, He will not re-enter the marteL However at
the aggregate level, the concept of a downward sloping industty demand curve can be re-
employed, for it is simply the summation of the number of individuals for whom the
benefit exceeds the reservatim price at each price level.
4.1.1 Potential Population
The concept of the population of potential buyers for the new product also
differs in this model compared to the epidemic one. An equilibrium approach is adopted
in the probit type model Let Ml be the number of individuals in the heterogeneous
population. Mt will c:hange due to demographic: fadOn which will most likely occur
slowly over a considerable period of time. Economic: variables such U prices, income
and in particular to this analysis, advertising, will determine the desired equilibrium stock
X·t. Individuals respond immediately to Ihese economic: variables. So at any point the
number of owners will be Xl and since an equilibrium concept II beinl used, Xt • X· r
1berefore X·, will be the total number of owners (and hence stock owned due to the
assumption of unit ownership) when diffusion is complete, liven the level of the relevant
economic: variables.
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Over time the proportion of the population who are ownen X· 11M1will change
as these economic variables alter the desired equilibrium level X· t. If there is no chanle
in the economic variables, then diffusion will cease. This may occur before complete
diffusion amongst the wrole population. that is before Xt = X· t =- Mt. The underlying
assumption in probit models is one of full information. Individuals adjust to the desired
equilibrium immediately due to chanles in the economic variables which determine x",
In a world of product innovation, this is a nlher extreme assumption. It is more likely
that the adjustment is panial, not least because of incomplete information. 2
4.3 THE PROBIT MODEL
The probit based models bepn with the basic usumption of a population of
potential buyen who differ with respect to some characteristic. To become operational,
the characteristic and the determination of the critical value of the chancteristic need to
be defined. This is explained in the following su~sections.
4.3.1 Definition orCharacteristic
New goods will be viewed as a bundle of attributes following Lancaster (1966)
and Ironmonger (1972). Given his preferences for various combinations of attributes, an
individual will seek to achieve the hiihest level of satisfaction subject to the budget
constraint. The model introduced by Lancaster (1979) to accoutt for goods whose
attributes camot be linearly combined seems an appropriate framework for adapting and
appending to the pmbit based diffusion model as it uses physical rather than monetary
values. This will become clearer in the following paragraphs.
The figure below is based on the model presented by Laraster (1979). Assume
that differences in products can be decomposed into differmcea in measurable attributes
of these goods. These attributes will be assumed to be identifiable and quantifiable. A
subset of goods will form a separable group in which an products possess attributes in
common. but none of the attributes in the subset are poueued by aooda outside this
2 ,.. will be _ laW. the empirical model reI.ea IU I1IIIrictioD eoaDow far --1a&Pd 8djuIcmML
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group. Consequently, the utility of consumen is separable between group and non group
attributes. Thus the analysis can concentrate on one group at a time.
For simplicity, assume that the group 10 which the new product belongs
contains attributes CHI and CHl only. The axes in figures I and 2 measure the quantities
of these attributes CHI and CHl. The curve pp describes the Product Differentiation
Curve. It shows all possible specifications that can be produced and the resources
required 10 produce goods of differau specification, once the different goods have been
normalised 10 give comparable units. This is achieved by assuming that the bundle of
resources available is fully used to produce a single good of a given specification. There
will be some maximum amount of the good that can be produced. Since the ratio of the
attributes are given by the specification of this good, the maximum amount of this good
will correspond 10 the maximum collection of attributes in the proportion determined by
the given specification.
If potential product differentiation is assumed continuous, then the maximum
collections will also vary continuously, and so, the locus of all such collections will be a
continuous curve. Given the resources available, the shape of the curve can be expected
to slope downwards 10 the right showing that the amount of one particular attribute can
only be incrused at the expense of reducing the other. If this rate of substitution was
constant. then pp would be linear. However, it is more reasonable 10 assume that given
the available resources the ralC at which one attribute can be transformed into another is
diminishing. In this case, the curve pp will be concave towards the origin (like the
traditional production possibility frontier).
However, in reality, not all such product differeNiation specifications will be
available. Assume product X only currently exists and then a new product W is
introduced. Each consumer has preferences for the collection of attributes CHI and CH2
and not the goods ptr st. 1bcse preferences are usumed 10 follow traditional
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consumption theory such that the set of indifference curves (I) are smooth. convex
towards the origin and non intersecting.3
In Figures 1 and 2. Consumer 1 prefers the attribute ratio contained in product
X compared to product W. in the sense that. if one unit of X is available this consumer
attains his higher indifference curve I", compared to r, which would be attained if one
unit of the new good W was supplied instead. Meanwhile, the reverse is true for
Consumer 2. For this consumer. given his preferences for the combination of attributes
contained in the new product. once this new product specification becomes available. one
unit will provide greater satisfaction compared to one unit of the existing product.
However at this stage. no account has been taken of the relative prices or incomes of the
individuals.
Maintaining the assumption that only one normalised unit of the product is
available4 and since the diagram is drawn with attributes measured along the axes and
relative quantities of the same good are defined to be proportional to the attributes
content. the ratio OW,jOWb gives the ratio of the quantity of the available good needed
to bring the consumer to the same welfare level he could attain from one normalised unit
of his most preferred good instead. S This ratio will be referred to as the 'compensation
ratio'. For a consumer with indifference curves such as those portrayed in Figure 1. this
ratio will always be greater than 1 and the funher away is the new specification W from
the existing good X. the llller will be this ratio. On the other hand, for a consumer with
indifference curves such as those ponrayed in Figure 2, this ratio will always be Jess than
1 and as X tends to W. so OWJOWb tends to 1.
3. A full ctilculPon of &he __ )yin, UlwnpQOIII CIIl be round in lIlY inIamedi ... mic:roeconomic lext. ror
eumple. ORval" Iftd a.. (1911).
4. Akhouah itv uniu or r.oun:e .. Ivaillble. the Production Dilf~ Curw (PDC) c.n be dlrived
inaldly &he ...... way widlthe 8ddi1ional1llUlllpCian IhI& &ha v .. PIX ill •pnbamoIhIIic .lpGIIicn of
1MOM wUl POC.
S. Akhoup I point IUCh • W. it not knowable, in principle. the CDa1pINIIian raDo oouId be dIIenninDd by
obMrvuioa. The CICJIIIUIMI CID be ubd ID ltale whal quntiry or the avlillble JDOd ia equiv .... 10 I
speciI'_ qunrily of his mall pret.... aoocL
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Consumer I
1"
Consumer2
CHI
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CH2
Figure! Figure 2
At this stage no accowu has been taken of relative prices or the individual's
income. However consumers can rank the relative attractiveness of the available good to
the new product introduced. It is clear that whether the individual ultimately purchases
the new product will depend also upon the budget constraint For the moment. all that is
required is the definition of the distribution of potential buyen who vary with respect to
some characteristic. So, assume that individuals in the population can be ranked
according to the inverse of this compensation ratio (le. Z = 1/ (OWJOW~ ). such that.
the lower an individual in the ranking. the larger will be the compensation ratio and hence
the lower will be the value of Z. Thus this individual is less likely to prefer the new
product introduced.6 Let this characteristic Z be distributed I(z) with a cumulative
distribution FOO. For simplicity. the variance of this distribution will be assumed
constant so that relative positions in the population do not alter. However the wtx>le
distribution may shift as the mean of the distribution changes and this will be one way in
which diffusion can occur. This will be discussed in more detail later. for now. assume
that 100 is invariant with respect to time.
4.3.2 Critical Level Determination
At time to an individual is assumed to be an owner of the new product if his
characteristic level Z is above some critical value Z·. Followina SlOneman and Ireland
(1985). assume that individuals receive a flow of benefit hOO. from ownership of the new
6. For individuala widl Z> 1. IhI new product iIpreC.,. reliliv. IDthI old ana. Ho.... 1hIUlal of Ihe
aupericlrity will vary ... wiD be ..... for &hole individual with • Z rllio ca.t IDinftnily.
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product in each period that is related to their ranked position, such that the lower the
ranking (and hence lower the value of Z), the less is this flow benefit Ineach period, an
individual must make the decision whether or not to purchase the new product given that
he has not already done so. A rational consumer will only purchase if the following
conditions are met,
1) Profitability condition
4.1
2) Arbitrage condition
·pe'+l + (1+r)P, ~ h(Z) 4.2
where
h(Z)/rz the present value of the expected flow of benefits given acquisition in time t,
assuming that h(Z) is constant between periods and is received in perpetuity.
P, = the cost of acquisition in time t
r = the discount rate.
pet+l = the expected cost of acquisition in time t+ 1.
In order to simplify the analysis, individuals will be assumed to have myopic
price expectations such that pet+} = Pt. In these CircumSWlCeS condition 2 becomes
equivalent to condition 1. (Other possibilities with respect to price expectations are
discussed by Stoneman and Ireland 1985).
As a slight digression. it is interesting to consider whether the cost of
acquisition Pt is the appropriate variable to use when investigatin,1 durable aooc1 This
good by definition will last for !OIDea>nsidenble time, conscquellly by ownin, the
asset. the pun:haser acquira I·title to the future stream of benefits that this uset will
provide. Instead of owning the asset, the individual could rau the durable and still obtain
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the flow of benefits from using the product. For the two products investigalCd
empirically, such rental markets are nonnal. The data used in the empirical investigation
includes 'ownership' whether by outright purchase or rental. In a perfectly competitive
market, the rental cost in each period will be equal to the benefit received from using the
asset in each period. Ultimately in equilibrium, the cost of acquisition of the asset would
be equal to the sum of the discounted rental payments. If these rental payments were
constant over time then the price of the durable could be replaced with the discounted
rental payment. Of course the assumption of a perfectly competitive martel may not be
appropriate. In any case, since the empirical investigation is focusing upon explaining the
diffusion of the stock of the durable, the cost of acquisition Pt can be used legitimately in
the following empirical chapters.7
With a two period model and assumina myopic price expectations. the marginal
buyer in period 1will be of rank position such that the profitability condition holds,
4.3
Thus the critical value Z· will be determined by economic variables, which in
this particular case will be price P and the rate of discoum r, so that implicitly the
following can be written.
4.4
As P and r change over time Z· 1will change. As z: t changes relative to F(Z),
ownership extends and the diffusion pa1h is mapped out
To be specific, in any period. the stock demand function will be,
Xt• M.( 1 - F(Z:t» 4.5
where M is the size of the population and Xl is the cumulative stock of the new product
owned at time t,
7. UOM wu inr.aa&ed in IhI conaanpIion apnlilUl'el in lIlY one period. !hen .... Yalue ollhe flowof
~ from lhe durlbla in Ihal..- would be "'''IN Iftd ~y 10would ......... COIL
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4.3.3 Advertlslnl in the Probit Model
It is now a fairly easy step to incorporate advertising into this framework. The
most straightforward way is to allow advertising expenditures to increase the perceived
flow benefit h(Z) of every individual such that relative positions remain unchanged. This
could occur because increasin, advertising expenditures over time cause individuals to
alter their preferences in favour of present as opposed to future consumption (Cowling
1982). However, although each individual's perceived benefit increases in response to
advenising, this does mt necessarily mean that it rises by a constant amount across
individuals. Some consumers may be more prone to the advertising expenditures than
others, for example, those individuals towards the top of the ranking.8 Incorporating such
an idea would have the effect of capturing the diminishing marginal productivity of
advertising messages as advertising is used to reach a continually less responsive
audience (Simon 1970, Telser 1962).
So, with the introduction of advertising into the model equation 4.4 can be
modified to allow that Z· t is a function of advertising expenditure At and thus write
equation 4.6 as follows,
sz; 0
d:4, < 4.6
As these economic variables change over time, so diffusion proceeds as
progressively individuals lower down the given ranking have a characteristic level Z that
exceeds the critical value Z· as detennined by equation 4.6 above.
There is another way in which advertising could be incorporated into the model.
If advertising is assumed to affect the tasU:s of consumers, then dlcsc expenditures could
be used to change the preferences of individuals in favour of some attribute inherent in
8. U lha c:hIrw:Urialic by which individuU .. nnbd ia iDcame. chen diIf ..... in reIponM .....
individuals CIft be elpllined by the meN.,' ban, ...... pnuuiv. ID IhoM in lhahi'" inccme brlCUI
becauIe • Galbni&h (1967) -.u-. •srClUr proportion of IhIir apmdibn it dlYo&Id &0 luury aooda.
_ira ror which .. more plYCholopc:al in ILIIIIn nllhul ...... ..,... &0 ..... pa1.uveldv ... ina.
HoWlVa' 1M undlrlyina __ pcion now iIthIl .. individual'. Dow bIne& ia poIitively NlIIed &0 their
income level ..s dUI would MId &0 be uplained.
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the new product. For example, refening back to Figures 1 and 2, if advertisina is used to
increase the relative preferences towards attribute 012, then the compensation ratio for
those individuals like consumer 1 will become smaller, although still greater than 1. For
an individual like consumer 2, who is not totally satisfied with the attribute combination
in the available good X and would prefer a specification such as new product W, the
advertising would enhance this dissatisfaction with good X and this consumer's ratio will
tend towards zero. 'This is shown in Figure 3 below.
Consumer 1 Consumer2
CHI CHI
cm
Figure3
'This has the effect of shifting the characteristic distribution f(Z) to the right (as
individuals are ranked from left to right accoiding to the inverse of their compensation
ratio).
f(Z)
Z
Figure4
Effectively, the mean of this distribution becomes a function of advertising. Of
course it will be impossible to distinguish empirically the route by which advertising
enten the model However this does not neglle the exercise of trying to identify whether
advertising does have a significant role to play in the diffusion proc:eu, it just means that
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the precise manner in which it enters must be abandoned in favour of a more infonnal
assessment For the present. equation 4.6 is maintained as the working hypothesis.
4.3.4 Addinaa Supply Sector; A Sinale Monopolist Supplier
Once a supply side is incorporated. price and advertising become endogenous to
the model. To begin. assume a single monopolist supplier (however this will later be
modified to include other competing producers). A monopolist will choose the level of
price and advertising in order 10 maximise discounted profit subject 10 the stock demand
function. In a model with two periods labelled 1 and 2, this means maximiSing.
4.7
subject 10.
4.8
where
n = Discounted profit of a monopolist
M = The ~1.3e of It'\e fOP'''''''' t.Of)
Xl = Cumulated unit sales in period 1 (since by assumption owners purchase one unit
only).
X2. Cumulated unit sales in period 2.
therefore
l~
(X2 - Xl)=- Quantity sold in period 2.
At = Advertising expenditures in time L
Ct = Marginal cost in period 2 (assumed constant).
Pt = Monopolist price in period L
r = Discount rate.
(to simplify notation the exogenous rate of discount has been left out of the demand
equations in order to concentrate upon the decision variables P and A).
Equation 4.7 can be expanded and ~writt.en in stock terms (given the
relationship between stock and flow demand [X2= (X2 - Xl)+ Xtl) u follows;
re = P IX I - t:~X I + t:~x, - C IX I - f+z X z + ~x I - IiI - ..A!.., 1+' 1+' 4.7b
4.3.4.1 Rate of Extraction
The essence of the problem facing the supplier is the appropriate moment at
which to extract a potential user from the finite population (the~ is obviously an analogy
here between the optimal extraction rate of a finite mineral resource). Unlike the
epidemic model. advertising expenditures in the first period do not produce a positive
dynamic information externality to potentially offsct the unambiguously negative early
extraction effect. This early extraction effect is negative simply because the~ is a fixed
pool of consumers. Given the asswnption of unit purchase only, extracting a consumer
now. as opposed to later, reduces the pool of remaining non owners in the next period.
Thus first 'period advertising expenditures serve to increase the number of users
in the first period but at the expense of reducing the remaininl stock of potential users
available for extraction in the following period. Whether it is better to extract the
marginal consumer in the first period rather than the second will depend upon the ~lative
intcnemporal discounted price co. margins available to the monopolist. So in
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equilibrium, a monopolist will take first period extraction to the point at which the benefit
of so doing equals the opponunity cost of such an action. 1bis opponunity cost will take
account of the possibilities that arise in this model for intenemporal price discrimination.
4.3.4.2 Intertemporal Price Discrimination
The feasibility of this intertemporal price discrimination arises due to some of
the special features of the model. In any given period, consumers have differing
perceptions about the total benefit from ownership commencing in that period, and
assuming myopic price expectation$ a profit maximising monopolist can exploit these
differences to charge individuals according to their perceived valuation of owning the
good in a particular time period (the logical sequence of time prevents arbittage as
individuals who buy at a lower price in period 2 cannot raell to consumers in period 1).
Of course if price expectations are not myopic but individuals expect prices to fall in the
next period, then the possibilities for discrimination are reduced to some extent.
1beoretically, in a model having a continuous and infinite time horizon and
myopic price expecwions by consumers, the monopolist could appropriate the total
consumer surplus by charging a different price to each individual in the population
(Stoneman and Ireland 1985). However since the analysis here is restricted to a two
period model with only one equilibrium price in each period, the opportunities for price
discrimination are limited. This can be seen more clearly in the Figure below,
p
r. - ... - -
r- --
x
figureS
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An individual who purchases the product in period I, will obtain the perceived
flow benefit of ownership in both period 1 and 2, that is, h(Z) + h(Z)I(1 +r). CUrve ab
shows the martet cumulative stock. demand function for the first period and the total
discounted benefit h(Z) + h(Z)l(l+r) is reflected in this curve, with the benefit reducing as
X increases, that is, higher X being associated with lower values of Z and lower h(Z).
XM is equal to the size of the population M (as only one unit is pun:hased) and would
therefore represent a situation of complete diffusion amongst the population.
Assume Xl units are purchased in period I at price Pl' In period 2 each
individual who then acquires the product will receive only the flow benefit for one period.
Consequently the second period martet stock demand function shown as cb in Figure S
must lie below ab but still cross the horizontal axis 11 XM' In period 2 the size of the
remaining potential martet is X1XM' Unless price falls below p. no further sales will
occur in period 2 since the flow benefit and hence total benefit received by the (Xl+l)1h
individual will be 100 low relative to the cost of acquisition. 9 Hence the price at which
the (Xl+1)lh unit can be sold in the second period depends upon the position in the
ranking of the first period marginal buyer and therefore upon the total stock sold in the
first period X t-
4.3.4.3 Advertisil1l and the Stock Demand Curve
The effect of advertising can also be illustrated in this Figure. As advertising is
assumed to increase each individual's perceived flow benefit and consequently the total
benefit. this has the effect of rotating the market stock demand curve ab to position db as
shown in Figure 6 below.
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With the inclusion of advertising expenditures in the model. the number of
owners in the first period given a price level PI is X'I' If individuals do not remember
first period advertising. then those potential owners in the second period X' IXm will have
a perceived flow benefit h(Z) which is unchanged to that shown in the curve cb in Figure
6 above. Of course the difference is, that as a result of first period advertising. price must
now fall below p•• (assuming that second period advertising is zero) if diffusion is to
continue in the second period. Period 2 flow demand therefore depends upon lagged
values as well as current values of the decision variables. price and advertising.
4.3.4.4 Advenising. Goodwill and the Martet Stock Demand Cwve
However it may be that potential buyers in the second period X'1Xm remember
the earlier advenising expenditures (Nertove and Arrow (1962». In which case the
perceived flow benefit of individuals in the second period will also mcrease, So first
period advenising will rotaIC cb to fb in addition to the movement of ab to db.
Consequently the (X' 1+l)th unit can now be sold in the seoond period for I price above
p.. (but below P") even if advenising in the second period is zero. This is shown in
Figure 7 below.
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4.3.4.S First Order Conditions; Price Cost Margin
Returning to the maximisation problem faced by the monopolist in equations
4.7b to 4.8 above, Pl will be chosen (see appendix 4.1) such that in equilibrium,
cm p ax I x c ax I C z ax I P z ax I
d1'j= Id1'7. I· Id1'7 - T+r d1'7 +m"3J'T 4.9
The marginal revenue in the first period must be equal to first period marginal
cost _ the opportunity cost of extracting the marginal consumer in the first period
rather than in the second, that is, (P2 • C2>/(1+r).~X I/bPl.
In period 2, the monopolist profit maximising price cost margin is the expected
static result.
...
4.10
where
£X2P2= elasticity of stock demand in period 2 WIt price in period 2
and
where
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Tlq2p2:' elasticity of flow demand in period 2 wn price in period 2
However the first period profit maximising price cost margin will explicitly take
account of the dynamic implications of this particular framework as shown below,
4.11
where
£XIPI = elasticity of stock demand in period 1wn price in period 1
Equation 4.11 indicates that a profit maximising monopolist will equate the
difference in period 1 and 2 price cost margins to the inverse of the first period stock
elasticity. In a stalic model, the price cost margin is known as the Lerner degree of
mooopoly power and shows that for a monopolist. the ability to raise price above the
perfect competition level depends upon the flow demand elasticity. In this model the
expression in equation 4.11 refers to the degree of price discrimination power (remember
that the key issue in the probit model is the right time to extract the marginal buyer) and
this depends upon the stock elasticity of demand in period 1.
4.3.4.6 Row Demand Elasticities
Expressing the profit maximising price cost margin in now rather than stock
elasticities (and representing these by their absolute values, see Appendix 4.2) gives,
4.12
4.13
III
where
l1qlpl = elasticity of flow demand in period 1 wn price in period I
"q2pI:l: elasticity of flow demand in period 2 wn price in period I
l1q2p2 = elasticity of flow demand in period 2 wn price in period 2
Equation 4.12 clearly shows the price cost margin in the first period derived
from the probit model will be larger than that of a monopolist who considers the current
period only and ignores the dynamic implications of his decisions. ie. the possibilities (or
intenemporal price discrimination.
4.3.4.7 Over Time
Over time, comparing the period 1 and 2 price cost margin in this particular
framework, shows that the profit maximising price cost margin will fall provided that the
flow price elasticities of demand are assumed constant so that 1'1qlpl = "q2p2' Effectively
the monopolist will be pursing a 'price skimming stralegy' to exploit the possibilities (or
intenemporal price discrimination.
4.3.4.8 Advertising Sales Ratio
Turning to the profit maximising advertising conditions (derived in Appendix
4.1 and 4.2), first period advertising expenditures will be such that.
4.14
So the marginal revenue product of period I advertising must equal the
marginal cost of such promotions IWII the opportunity cost of extracting the marginal
consumer by using advertising expenditures in period I rather than in period 2, that is ,
(PrCVI1+r.bXlIbAI' The profit maximising advertising sales ratio will be,
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4.lS
where
EXIPI = elasticity of stock demand in period 1wn price in period 1
EX1A1 = elasticity of stock demand in period 1wrt advertising in period 1
This on first sight. looks to be the Dorfman-Steiner condition. However the
stock elasticity EXIPI has been substituted for the degree of price discrimination over the
two periods, so that 4. IS can be rewritten as,
4.16
4.3.4.9 Row Elasticities of Demand
In order to highlight the differences arising in this panicuJar model relative to
the advertising sales ratios common in the literature, absolute values of Dow elasticities
rather than stock conceptS are used below (assuming that l'lqlAl > 0, l'lq2Al < °
and 11qlPl < 0, l'lq2Pl> 0),
4.17
4.18
where
l'lqlAt = the elasticity of Dow demand q in period t wrt advertisinl in period L
113
TlqlPl = the elasticity of flow demand q in period t WIt price in period l
It is the first period results that are of interest Equation 4.17 contains two tenns
additional to the Dorfman Steiner condition. Define 'If as.
'If =
4.19
1bese new terms within the profit maximising advertising sales ratio in period 1
are a consequence of the long run implications of rU'Sl period decisions. The effect of
changes in price or advertising in the first period. consists of two elements. Firstly there
is the early extraction effect Transforming a potential owner il1lOan actual owner in the
current period. reduces the number of potential consumen in future periods (hence the
assumption that TlqlAl is negative and TlqlPl is positive above). Secondly. there is an
opportunity cost to this early extraction. because of the intertemponl price discrimination
possibilities.
Consequently. the advertising sales ratio derived in this particular framework
will be greater than the Dorfman Steiner condition provided that 'If >O. This requires that
the following condition holds.
4.20
Thus the ratio of the responsiveness of demand to the current decision variables
must be larger than the ratio of the responsiveness of demand to the lalled decision
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variables. In other words, the negative early extraction effea must be outweighed by the
relative effectiveness of the current variables.
Within this model, if the simplifying assumption is made that the current flow
elasticities are equal so that.
1lqlAl = 1lq2A2 and 1lqlPl = 1lq2P2
then provided that '" > 0, the profit maximising advertisina intensity for a monopolist will
fall over time.
These dynamic implications arise as a result of analysing stock demand for a
new consumer durable. Flow demand in anyone period will be dependent upon the
present level of diffusion of the product. as this limits the pool of non owners remaining
in the population. Consequently a flow demand function can be derived showing the
quantity that can be sold as a function of present price and advertising expenditure, given
the existing level of ownership. Existing ownership will in tum have been affected by
past pricing and advenising decisions and so lagged values will impinge upon current
flow demand indi~y, via the cumulative stock sold to date. This route will be referred
to as the stock effect.
4.2.4.10 The Effects of Past Advertising
However this is not the only route by which lagged advertising can affect
current flow demand. If, as explained in Figure 7 above. individuals remember earlier
advertising. then even with zero current advertising. an individuals perceived flow benefit
will be higher than otherwise due to the lagged effect of promotions undertaken in
previous periods. This will be in addition to the stock effect and will be referred to as the
goodwill effect (as advertising expenditures are addinl to • stock of loodwill as
suggested by Nerlove and Arrow 1962).
l1S
This additional dynamic role of advcnising therefore modifies the basic model
as follows.
4.21
where
4.22
Now the profit maximising results with respca to the advertising decision
variable only (derived in Appendix 4.3) and using absolute flow elasticities are as
follows.
4.23
4.24
where
1'lqtGt = the elasticity of flow dcmand q in period t wn the stock of advenising
goodwill in period l
If the rate of decay of the advertising SlOCk& is I, then the results obviously
collapse to those in equation 4.17 above because advenisinl messages are completely
forgotten within the current period. Thus referring bact to Flgure 7 the period 2 martet
stock demand curve will not rotate clockwise to tb unless period 2 advertising is
undertaken.
If & < 1. then some of the previous advenisinl messaaes are remembered by the
non owners in the next period. causing them to increase their perceived flow benefit of
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ownership h(Z). Consequently, "q2Gl is not unambiguously negative because it is
composed of two conflicting elements, this introduces the uncertainty into the sign of the
second and third terms in equation 4.23 above. Increasing period 1 advenising (and
hence 01 ) increases Xl thereby inducing the negative early extraction effect However
the stock of goodwill is also increased and this has a positive effect on period 2 flow
demand. This can be seen more clearly in the Figure below,
x
figureS
Curves ab and cb represent the stock demand functions in period 1 and 2
respectively when advertising expenditures are zero. Positive advertising expenditures in
period I rotate the stock demand curve ab to db. However, in addition, this eartier
advertising is remembered by the population of remaining potential buyers in period 2,
thus increasing their perceived flow benefit in that period 2 even if advertising
expenditures in period 2 are zero. This is the N-A goodwill effect and rotates the stock
demand curve cb to eb. X'l - X1 is the increased eady extraction due to period 1
advertising. X'2 - X2 is the goodwill effect of period 1 advertising. Provided that the
goodwill effect X'2 - X2 outweighs the negative extraction effect X'1 • Xl then "q2g1 will
be positive, thus the goodwill sales ratio derived from the probit based demand equation
will be greater than the usual Nerlove-Arrow condition. This implicitly enlw1ces the
benefit of period 1 advertising.lO
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If however. the overall dynamic effect of G1on period 2 flow demand X2-X 1 is
negative, so that the stock effect is offsetting the goodwill effect then the advertising
intensity in this model will only be larger than the Nerlove Anow condition provided that
the following holds.
4.25
As explained previously, this requires that the ratio of the current elasticities be
more responsive than the ratio of the lagged elasticities.
4.3.4.11 Over time
If the simplifying assumption is made that current elasticities are constant
(l'lqlGl = l'lq2G2 and l'lqlPl = l'lq2PV' then the profit maximising advenising sales ratio
will decline over time provided that.
4.26
The LHS of equation 4.26 is the time discount factor. so a falling ratio requires
this to be larger than the net result of the relative intertemporal advertising and price
effects. 1be time factor is a consequence of preferring revenues today rather than
tomorrow. yet the monopolist needs ID weigh this against the additional intenemporal
features of this model. namely the early extraction effect and price discrimination
opponunities.
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4.3.4.12 Summary
To summarise, the main feature of the probit model analysed in this chapter, is
the finite nature of the population of potential buyers. A monopolist will need to take
account of the intertemporal implications of his decisions, which arise from analysing
stock demand for new consumer durables in a probit model. Current flow demand will
depend not only upon the current decision variables (price and advertising) but also on the
existing level of diffusion. Consequently past levels of the decision variables will
impinge upon the current flow demand function. Given myopic price expectations by
consumers, the monopolist has the opponunity for intertemporal price discrimination in
this probit model. In a static model, a monopolist's profit maximising price cost margin
(degree of monopoly power) is equal to the inverse of the elasticity of flow demand with
respect to price. In the model presented in this chapter, the profit maximising condition
for a monopolist is that the degree of intertemporal price discrimination (ie. the difference
in the discounted price cost margins in the two periods) is equal to the inverse of the
elasticity of IlSR demand in period 1 with respect to price in period 1. Using current
flow elasticities instead, it was shown that the first period price cost margin for a
monopolist in this probit model, would be larger than that for a monopolist who did not
consider the dynamic implications of his decision.
Compared to the Dorfman Steiner condition, the profit maximising advertising
sales ratio for a monopolist in the probit model included two additional tenns which took
account of the dynamic implications of early exuaction and intertemporal price
discrimination. These additional tenns would be positive (and so the advertising sales
ratio larger than that suggested by D-S) provided that the ratio of the raponsiveness of
current flow demand to the current decision variables was larger than the ratio of the
responsiveness of flow demand to the lagged decision variables ie.
4.20
If this condition holds then the negative early extraction effect is outWeighed by
the relative effec:tivenesa of current variables on demand. U the revene wu tnae then the
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advertising sales ratio would be smaller than that suggested by the D-S condition. Over
time. assuming that the current demand elasticities ~ constant and that equation 4.20
holds then the advertising intensity in this model will fall.
The inclusion of lagged advertising variables in the current flow demand
function arose due to the special features of the analysis using the probit model.
However. in addition lagged advertising could have an effect on current demand through
the stock of goodwill concept of Nerlove and Arrow (1962). So even if no advertising is
undertaken in future periods. individuals will still remember past promotions and so the
effect on the perceived flow benefit would be lasting (although at a decaying rate).
Unlike the probit model in which advertising did not add to a stock of goodwill. the effect
of advertising on period 2 flow demand is ambiguous. In the model without goodwill.
first period advertising has a negative impact on future sales due to the early extraction
effect, 11 In the N-A model, without recognising the special feat\lRs of the probit model,
the effect of past advertising on Dow demand would be unambiguously positive. Hence
in the probit model with goodwill effects the net outcome is ambipous. Provided that
the goodwill effect outweighs the negative early extraction effect. the aoodwill sales ratio
in the probit model will be larger than that suggested by the N-A condition. If the
negative extraction effect dominates to such an extent that it outweighs the effect of
cumnt variables on current demand plus the positive goodwill effect. then the profit
maximising goodwill sales ratio will be lower than that suggested by the N-A condition.
Over time, if the current demand elasticities are assumed constant. then the goodwill sales
ratio will decline provided that the time discount factor is larger than the net result of the
relative intertanporal advertising and price effects.
4.3.5 The Probit Model with More than One SuppUer
So far the analysis has centred upon a monopolist supPier of the new consumer
durable. However this assumption will now be relaxed to allow for more than one
supplier of the product. The eltistence of heteroaCllCOUlproducts amonpt suppliers.
II. Unlike 1M epidemic model. &hen it no cornpeNaIina politi" iftfornwiaIl.atmLI1iIy.
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causes problems in the probit model. as this framework uses the concept that individuals
in the population are ranked according to a characteristic Z which was related lO an
individuals relative preference for the new product. For simplicity. the distribution of the
ranking will be assumed to refer to the generic product type. for example a colour
television receiver rather than for a particular brand of colour receiver. If this assumption
was not made. then each firm would faee a unique distribution and this would present
difficulties in the a~gation procedures necessary to explain the diffusion of the generic
product type.
To recap. intra product heterogeneity is not being addressed explicitly. Whilst
recognising that products can differ once the monopolist supplier assumption is relaxed.
the analysis here will adopt the approach suggested by Cubbin (1974) ie. invoke a
symmetry nale such that only one priee exists in industry equilibrium.
Likewise, advertising by individual firms is assumed homogeneous (the
limitations of this have already been discussed in Chapter 3). So it is assumed that.
i) lOW industry advertising. the summation of individual firms' advertising
expenditures will determine total industry stock demand.
ii) each firm's martet share will depend upon their share of tow advertising spend and
such expenditures will be equally effective. thus quality differences of
advertising campaigns are ignored.
Tow industry advertising is assumed to determine tow industry stock demand
because it adS upon the flow benefit perceived by all individuals. Thus each firm's
advertising is additive in its effect upon the identity of the marginal buyer. Therefore the
larger the volume of advertising the greater will be the total benefit of ownership
perceived by all individuals in the population. This could be explained U I variant of the
'demonstration effect'. AI more supplien of the good appear on the martet, the intensity
of the advertisina persuades individuals to increase their valuation of this new good
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relative to the old substitute. Alternatively. advenising could contain infonnation about
some feature of the new product. The more advenising undertaken. the more likely it is
that a variety of features are highlighted. so this accumulation of infonnation may
increase a consumer's valuation of the product in an additive fashion.
The essential features of the probit model are the finite stock of potential
consumers and the implications of inaenemporal price discrimination for the optimal
extraction raIC. Should a monopolist decide to postpone extraction of an individual. then
without the threat of enll)'. the sole producer can be secure in the knowledge that this
individual will be available for extraction in the next period. However once at least one
more supplier or pocential supplier exists. then the effect will be to pocentially increase
the profit maximising extraction rate. This arises due to the fear that existing rivals may
poach the consumer first. There will be a race to extract the consumer from the finite
population and unlike the epidemic model introduced in the previous chapter. there is no
information externality to potentially offset this negative factor.
Of course oligopolistic suppliers may be encouraged to collude. either implicitly
or explicitly. The stability of their aareement depends upon the intertemporal trade-offs
involved. The gains from cheating must not be outweighed by the subsequent loss from
retaliatory action and the breakdown in the collusive agreement.
By aUlding the marginal buyer in period 1. the oligopolist obtains the full
benefit of his action. However the dynamic consequences. the negative extraction effect.
will be bome by all the suppliers in the following period. For the individual firm. the
decision about the optimal time to extract a consumer will obviously depend upon the
benefit and opponunity cost of his decisions. The benefit in the case of advertising. will
include an increase in current demand plus an increased share of the expanded marteL
Given the assumption of zero conjectural variations. each firm believes that any change in
price or advertising will not prompt a reaction from rivala. Consequently the individual
firm will expect to reap all of the benefit of its first period decisions.
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The opportunity cost of such action will be the discounted profit that would
have been obtainable from extracting this marginal buyer in the next period rather than
currently. Unlike the model with only one supplier, an oligopolistic finn will consider
that there are n-1 other finns in the next period who will ~ the burden of this early
extraction. If aU finns are acting with Coumot type behaviour, then in equilibriwn an
individual firm is likely to choose a lower price and advertise more heavily than a
monopoliSL Hence the diffusion rate will be faster in this probit framework when the
supply sector is modified to incorporate rival supplien.
4.3.5.3 First Order Conditions
The intuitive reasoning can be seen more clearly in the first order conditions.
These expressions are derived in appendix 4.4. An oligopolist will choose his advertising
expenditures Ail and stock xil in order to maximise discounled profits Kj
4.27
subject to
4.28
where
Marginal cost cil is assumed constant within a time period but can differ across
time. Finns are assumed to adopt zero conjectural variations behaviour, so,
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1be first tl1ree terms in equation 4.29 arc the usual first order terms found for a
Coumot quantity setting oligopolist in a static framework. 1be fmal term is the
opportunity cost associated with changing first period output. of which the individual firm
bears the second period share. that is. si2,(P2 -CiVil -r,
Assuming therc are n symmetric finns. each facing the same cost conditions
and holding the same Coumot conjectures about the behaviour of rivals and summing
across n to obtain the profit maximising industry price cost margin.
4.30
Thus the degree of monopoly in the first period less (l/n)lh of the second period
discounted degree of monopoly is set equal to the individual firms stock elasticity in
equilibrium.12 For a symmetric Coumot quantity seuing firm in a static environment. the
industry and individual price cost margin will be.
4.31
However in this particular probit model. a firm must take account of the
negative early extraction effect. the cost of which is shared by all suppliers in the second
period. The first period price cost margin is still larger in this particular framework than
would be the case for the equilibrium condition derived for an oligopolist within a static
environment as in equation 4.31 above. Compared to the single supplier who recognises
the dynamic implications of this probit based framework, a laraer equilibrium price cost
margin cannot be rigourously proven from the mathematical express due to the
endogenity of the discounted relative price element contained within the second term of
the LHS of equation 4.30 above. However it was argued thal this was likely to be the
outcome due 10 the incentive to race to extract the marginal buyer as part of the cost of
this action will be passed on to rivals in the next period.
12.Wilh IJIIIIMaic ramln CoumoI behaviour.1hia it equivalent ID (11nP. of induIIry price cIenund
eluticily.
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Turning to the first period advenising decision, a profit maximising finn will in
equilibrium advenise up to the point at which.
dft, _ (I' \. ax I I' X I [ I] axdG,T. I-c'j,,.i IdAj + ( I-c'd>r.0-SII) - I' ~j IT+;' S'l~. 1 4.32
TIle first two terms refer to the usual current expansionary industry demand and
the market share effects. The third tenn captures the opportunity cost involved in
extracting the marginal buyer in period 1 rather than in the next period. However this
opportunity cost will be distributed amongst all firms, therefore the second period market
share sil is the appropriate factor for consideration by the individual finn. Further
manipulation and aggregation across all firms gives the following profit maximising first
period industry advenising sales ratio,l3
4.33
TIle first tenn in equation 4.33 above refen to the distributional effect of
advenising on martet share. The second tenn captures the intenemporaJ price
discrimination possibilities. Substiwting for the profit maximising first and second period
price cost margins gives,
4.34
As shown in the previous chapter, the condition derived for a symmetric
quantity setting finn adopting Coumot behaviour within. static framework is,
13. ~ aD firma ... IIIUmIId aynuneIric: then 1Mmqinal COlt ror all rlmll wiIhin • period wiD be equal. !hat
ia. et
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= 4.3SA
P.X
Compared to equation 4.3S. the condition derived within the probit based
demand diffusion model. has an additional term which can be positive or negative. This
is analogous to the monopoly result derived in equation 4.16 and the dynamic profit
maximising ratio will be lll'ler than the static condition provided that the negative stock
effect consideration is outweighed by the relative responsiveness of the current elasticities
(refer to equation 4.20 for the precise condition).
Summary
When allowing (or more than one supplier in this particular probit model. the
main implication is that the opportunity cost of early extraction is shared by all the n-I
firms in the next period. Intuitively. this would tend to promote a 'race to extract' the
consumers from the finite population in eartier periods than would have been the case for
a monopolist supplier. Hence the expectation of I lower price cost mllJin and lll'ler
advenising sales ratio in an oligopolistic industry as compared to I monopoly one.
However this result could not be proved rigorously due to the endogenity of the relative
price term in the profit maximising conditions.
4.4 EPIDEMIC VERSES PROBIT MODEL
Although a strict comparison between the profit maximising sales ratios derived
from an epidemic and probit based demand diffusion mode) is not legitimate. it is
interesting to consider the differences informally. Within an epidemic framework. the
existence of the information externality gives rise to the possibility of a positive net
dynamic effect. whereas in the probit based model. the dynamic effect is unambiguously
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negative.14 Consequently, the profit maximising advenising sales ratio is likely to be
larger in the epidemic model provided that in that model,
4.36
When this overall dynamic owner externality equals -1, then the situation is
similar to the probit based framework where extracting the marginal buyer in period 1
decreases the potential population in the next period by one. Provided that the
information externality compensates for this negative earty extraction effect either
partially or fully, then ceteris paribus, the advenising intensity will be larger when the
demand diffusion equation is of an epidemic based natlR. Of course this conclusion
must be treated with caution because as indicated above the mathematical expressions
cannot be strictly compared since, unlike in the probit based model, price is exogenous in
the epidemic framework, and the advertising elasticities within each framework are
unlikely to be the same.
14. The ..,uibiliti- of Idvertiaina havin, a poIitiv. ctyn.nic effect by 8ddina 10al&OCkof ,oodwill •
lUll-ted by Neriov.Iftd Arrow .. beina ipnd hire. Rcopilian of IhiIIddiIionaJ dynamic ro" will
Mnl 10emphuiM the p»ilivl dynIrnX: effect within the epidemic model_ pi riIIlD IIftbipily in the
probiI t.ed modal
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(For a full description of the variables, refer to page 104 in chapter 4).
A monopolist will .axi.ise the following profit function (in stock ter.s)
1'2X P2 C2 C2 Al
7t = PIX 1 - 1+, 1.+ l+fX 1- C IX 1 - l+fX 2 + l+fX I - A 1 - l+f
subject to the following stock de.and functions which are based upon a
probit demand diffusion .odel as described in section 4.3 of chapter 4.
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divide throuah by X 1 and multiply the LHS by ~
(1)
[
P l-C 1] .!!J. • _ .!J... • .!J...I., dI'2 T+r-r+r
(prell [(XrXI)] I'1 .- Xl iiiii' (2)
·2·
and substitute from equ 1
AI IXIA''r.T. .-iW'i (3)
ax, AI
where £X LA I :z CJ.t'ir.
(I'z-Cll ~~!·I
and substitute from equ 1
4
·3·
s
APPENDIX 4.1
X • ,." I - F (I •(A .oP •n]
Xl = .Cuaulated unit sales in period
X2= Cuaulated unit sales in period
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where
Xl = Total industry cumulated unit sales in period 1 (since by
assumption owners purchase one unit only).
X2= Total industry cuaulated unit sales in period 2.
Sit = An oligopolist's market share of total industry sales in period
t and Sit is a function of the oligopolist's advertising share ie.
ait/At.
cm. [axi a.ril] ap, aXICJ.t;7 a P I SiICJ.t;7 + X I 'di;'T + S, IX Idi;j' - c, IS;Idi;7 -
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Assuminl Coumol behaviour, thal is, conjeclural variation ~I ~ and substitutinl for equa-
tions inlO equation 2
Divide through by Pt and lel ~.!L = .-L-
OA I rl ~X"I
In order to simplify the ..,relation, we sball usume thal e.:b ftnn fllCel me same COIlcon-
ditions and holds the sane conjectures about rival's behaviour. Thus summiDl over the,. firms
gives,
(S)
and since if',•• 1 then,~
(6)
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·3·
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Substituting for expressions 8a and 8b into equation 8 IDd usumiDa Coumot behaviour,
-4-
Multiply the RHS ofequ 11 by!ll and divide by Pl1eninl _!_. ~!l"1 tXlfl OAl rl
(12)
Assuminl thar each finn faces the same cost conditions and holds me same conjectures
about rival's behaviour, then by summinl acrou II firma pves,
and since ~ Ij2. 1 theIl.
I~
( \4)
or
( 14b)
where
-~-
Substitutina equations l~a,b,c into equation 1~ and assumina zero conjectural variations,
we obtain the following:
(16)
Multiply throup by A: and divide throup by PI
Substiture for Ii I· A:
Asswninllhl1 each finn flCeS the same cost conditions and holds the same conjectural vari-
ations about rival's behaviour. then summinllClOSl finns lives;
·6·
Nonnl thal ~ I; 12 is die Herftndahl meuure of concentration H and dill .,; 1 • 1&ives;.~ ,~
l:ll)
However siDee all firmI are symmetric, tbeD H.*, IDd "n ...... *' cb.
or
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CHAPTERS
AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE ROLE OF ADVERTISING
IN THE DIFFUSION OF VIDEO CASSETIE RECORDERS IN THE UK
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to explore empirically the two competing demand
diffusion equations using data on the introduction of the video cassette recorder (VCR) in
the UK. Observations for the diffusion process will be the outcome of both demand and
supply side factors. In this and the following chapter, estimation will be confined to an
empirical investigation of the two competing demand diffusion models only. Supply side
issues will be merely relegated to a minor consideration. Indeed u awed in the opening
to this thesis, many of the theoretical observations with respect to the supplier's behaviour
will have to be abandoned in the empirical stage. nus is obviously not an ideal situation
but primarily occurs due to data limitations. Some anempt is made in the following
chapter to account for the endogenity of the advertising variable which results from
recognising the supply side situation. Of course, advertising is not the only decision
variable, price too may become endogenous once a monopolist or oligopolist supply
structure is included. In the empirical investigation, this factor is ignored, with the supply
side effectively viewed u exogenous. Inte,restingly, this may not be too serious a
limitation in the case of video cassette recorders since lhere wu virtually no domestic
production over the majority of the period under consideration. The data series is in fact
derived almost uniquely from impon data.
As explained in chapter 2, initial estimation will commence with an epidemic
based specification. An advenising variable will be incorporatcc1, rationalised on the
grounds of sources of information flow, rather than the innovaaor· imitator dichotomy of
writers like Horsky and Simon (1983) (H et S) and Simon and Sebastian (1987) (S et S).
The resulting equations will be observationally similar to the wort of these authors,
however the behavioural interpretation will be different.
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It is imponant to begin the investigation at this point. as previous research in
this field (H ck SandS ck S) has found a positive and statistic:ally significant effea of
advertising in the diffusion process. Yet the models employed were confined to an
epidemic framework only. Unfortunately. given the absence of even moderate diagnostic
testing of the chosen specification. serious misgivings must remain about the results
obtained from these previous studies.
The extent of cross comparison between the followinl investigation and that of
H ck SandS ck S can only be partial due to differences in the products investigaled.
There may be product-specific reasons why an epidemic framework is more relevant in
some cases than others (for example. as argued earlier. it may be appropriate for new
products which are vertically differentiated to the existing substitute good) Also the
epidemic framework may appear more suitable in the presence of network externalities.
The benefit derived by consumers from the use of a telephone will obviously depend
upon the extent of the current (and possibly expectations of the) size of the network in
existence. Consequently one of the major explanatory variables in the epidemic model.
(the proportion of existing owners in the population). could be acting as I proxy for this
external benefit ralhcr than showing the effectiveness of information passed by social
contact between ownen and non owners.
Additionally. the effectiveness of advertising is likely to vary across products.
It is commonly aarced that advertising expenditure will be more effecdve for consumer as
opposed to producer products. Fonunalely. in this latter respect. the empirical studies are
consistent. as all focus upon consumer orientated goods (telephones in S a: s. telephone
banking services in H a: S and VCR and Colour TV sell in this thesis). Of course the
actual magnitude of the advertising variable's coefficient will still vary to some degree.
especially since the data sets employed refer to distinct cowwies (W. Germany. USA.
UK).
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Differences also exist in the time span under consideration. In the following
chapters, an attempt is made to model the diffusion process from introduction to final
saturation or end of the data set. which ever occun fint. S & S begin their period of
investigation when the ownership level is already 49% of the population. H cl S cover
the two year period from the date of introduction (no final saturation figures are given).
So for all of these reasons, any cross comparisons between studies must be approximate.
Sol ESTIMATION OF THE EPIDEMIC STRUCTURAL DEMAND
DIFFUSION EQUATION
5.2.1 EstImation; The Basic Model
The basic equation to be estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is,
=
S.1
where
Xt = Stock of VCRs in time L
~ = Number of TV owninglusing households in time L
a = Extemal channel of infonnation
= Internal channel of infonnation coefficient (Word of Mouth).
Qit= Seasonal dummy variable in time t, i=3.
Ut = Enor term in time L
(A full description of the data and variables used is given in Appendix A5 at the end of
this chapCer)
Equation '.1 is simply the epidemic model writt.en in discrete form, allowing
for an additional extemal channel of information Cl. Funher, the equation has been
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slightly rearranged for sWistical ease, by dividing through by the number of non ownen
in the population at time to ie, 1"YLt - Xl_t.t
The potential population of households from which VCR owners originate is
represented by the number of colour television households.2 lbis has been done to take
account of the complementary nature of the VCR machine and TV receiver. A VCR on
its own is of little value and the purchase (or rental) decision is therefore conditional upon
current ownership of a colour television set.3 Of course the ownenhip decision may be
simultaneous, in that. both a colour television set and VCR are bought together, indeed
combined machines are now available. By using the number of television households in
time period to rather than tel, this factor will also be accounted for. Incidentally, the VCR
is a good example of a product whose enjoyment from use depends to some extent upon
the associated pre recorded software available (Stoneman 1989c). Whilst it would have
been interesting to include the existing pre recorded video cassette catalogue, data
limitations prevented the inclusion of this particular variable.
S.l.l Advertisinlln the Epidemic Model; A direct Route
Initially. advertising will be incorporated by hypothesising that a is some
function of advertising messages. a- I(A). lbis is analogous to the method adopted by
H cl S. However the exact functional form will need to be investigated. There is no a
priori reason for expecting advenising to enter in levels or logarithms. H cl S imposed a
logarithmic transformation on the grounds that the effectiveness of adveltising
expenditure diminishes u advenising expenditures increase. Although this factor may
eventually be appropriate. a similar effect is ~y captured. This occurs due to the
recognition of time and the special fealW'el of the epidemic model. To see this.
1. In fKt. Ihia may cauM IUIliIticaJ probleml if chi error tam 'It ..... no ChIorilinal unlrlNformed
equaaion. In dUI cue. equaDon 5.1 will NfI'. &om ~ticicy but IhilIhoWd be pic:bd up by ChI
~cic latina proc:ecIan.
2. Where &he runt. of colow iIion t.ou.holdI iI~ by ChInumbIr of colour ..... ilion
~ in fon:&.edjuaMd for ion. Sea &hi Mill chIpI. for more cII&ail abou& Ihia y.nabie.
3. Initially IhiJ y.n.hle •• \lied • OM of &hi ap&.nllary ylrilblll oaChllHS of ChI_ic ...-.me
aa.imaIion eqUIlion. Hotm. IhiI y.nlbll laded ID dominaIe thI ocha Ind incIeued &he proIHema of
mula.icoUinelricy. Oi~ &hi ~ ...... of aM two producta, • prior •• impoIed oaaM
coef&ie& 01 &hi TV YINbIe by limply takina it ID &he UiS 01 &hi ........
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remember that the marginal effect of advertising on sales will include the number of non
owners in the potential population and this will be decreasing over time. Consequendy,
for a given constant response coefficient in the a function, the effectiveness of £1 spent
on advertising in different time periods will decrease over time.
5.l.J Appropriate Lag Structure
The exact lag distribution of advenising in the a function must be ascertained
from the data as explained below. Once again the peculiarities of the model need to be
recognised. As explained in chapter 3, a lagged effect of advertising is already inherent
in the model, however this occurs indirectly via the existing ownership level variable, XTt
(where XTl = Xt-llI"VLt). Of course, the lagged effects of advertising could impact more
directly, for the reasons already discussed (eg, durability of some forms of media such as
magazines, the information from which can be transmiaed to potential owners in
following periods).
The appropriate number of lap to include in empirical models has always
proved problematic. Normally there is very little theoretical guidance in the area and so
the decision is left to the data. An econometric approach which has gained in popularity
(eg, Sargan 1964 and Hendry and Mizon 1978), recommends the estimation of a general
model in which the dynamics are of a relatively high order and then move towards a more
specific formulation by searching for common facton in the lag suucture. However this
approach should not be adopted uncritically. The possible problems from
multicollinearity and lou of degrees of freedom will remain. Also, the exact lags left as a
consequeru of foUowing this method may be difficult to justify on economic grounds
(for example say lags 3 and .5 only remain. then such lags would be difficult to
rationalise).
In addition. in this particular case, the dynamics of the model have been
partially indicaaed IIthe outset due to the adopdon of the epidemic model. Consequently
the focus of attention will rest upen the advertising variable. whim Cl priori. i, expected
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to have an additional direct lagged impact in the model due to the creation of a stock of
goodwill as already discussed in Olapter 3. Data limitations restrict the number of
observations to a maximum of 40. 'Therefore practical considerations will necessarily
confine the order of the lags thal can be included directly in the specifications.
Previously, researchers have circumvented this problem to some extent by using
extraneous information about the specification of the lag SUUC1UJ'e. Lagaed effects arise
for many reasons. How the total lagged effect is distributed over time is an area devoid of
much theoretical foundation. An infinite geometrically declinina 111 stNcture (such as
thal proposed in equation ~.1.4 below) can exploit the Koyck uansformation process in
the estimation stage. The theoretical justification for such a stNcture tends to be rather ad
hoc. Many applications using such a lag distribution appeal to die theory of adaptive
expectations. 'The expectation variable becomes a weipued avenae of die existing
variable and past values using geometrically declininl weiatus. Alternatively. the
resulting lag structure has been justified on the grounds thal economic agents do not
adjust instantaneously to new martet situations (possibly because of costs of adjusttnent).
Unfortunately. this particular lag distribution imposes a continual decline in the
coefficient of the lagged explanatory variable. Any altemative stNcture. such as a peak
effect in the 111 distribution is therefore ruled out by assumption. There may be a priori
reasons for expectina thal the major impact is delayed for some periods. Almon (196~)
incorporated a peak effect in the 111 distribution in her empirical investigation of
investme~ expenditures. There are specific tcchnicallild subjective factors which apply
particularly to capital investment decisions. For example, there may be a decision
making delay whilst firms ascertain whether the increase in output (which prompted the
invesUDe~ decision) is temporary or permanent. In addition. there may be administration
delays in raising the finance for the expenditure. Furthermore, if the capital good is of a
particular specification, it is unlikely to be available for imllM'diate delivery.
Consequently the delay will depend upon die amount of spare capacity in the capital
goods sector. For all these reasons, usinl a lag structwe which assumes the maximum
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impact in the CUJTeIll period (such as the Koyck model) may be theoretically
inappropriate. A polynomial lag structure which allows for several periods delay before
the major impact is felt (such as that given in equation !S.l.3 below) is more likely to
prove satisfactory. However the Almon method whilst having the advantage of allowing
for a peak effect. is not without its own disadvantages. Since the lag distribution is futite,
the number of lap to include must be chosen arbitrarily at the outset. as must the degree
of the polynomial. This will be discussed in more detail later in the chapCer.
In this particular empirical investigation, the variable which is expected to have
a lagged effect is advertising expenditures (as previously explained) and the theoretical
justification for any specific lag structure is open to debate. Say the IUSOIl for the lag is
due to the existence of advertising in a dunble form, then it would seem reasonable to
assume a geomeUically declining lag structuR since the media eventually becomes out of
date and obsolete. On the other hand, if the model wu cxplainin, replacement sales in
addition to the initial acquisition of the new product. then • peak effect may be
appropriate since it could be picking up the brand loyalty (habit) effect when the
consumer re-enten the martet.
Additionally, some of the reasons advanced for I peak effect with respect to
capital goods invesanent. would not seem altogether suitable in this particular
investigation. for ewnple, it would appear naive for firms to advertise against a
backgrowxl of supply constraints. This would alas appear likely even if there was I
separation between the advertiser and mllllfacturer of the product (eg. if the firms
undertaking the advertisina belong to the retail sector). In Illy case. it is much more
likely that in comparison to specific capital equipment. stocU of finished durable goods
would be held, thus reducing the possibilites of delay in obtaininl the good.
On balance. there does not appear to be any clear tJ priori preference for I
particular III distribution. Consequently. it will be left to the data to discriminate.
Therefore. the foUowinl advertisina specifications in the a function will be investilated;
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1) a = g +
S.1.1
where i = 0 in model S .1.1 and i = 4 in model S .1.1B as quarterly data is being used.
2) a = g +
S.1.2
3) a = g +
S.1.3
Ii = &.a. = 0.1 ....• 0<6 < 1 (Koyck)
4) a = g +
I I' 1'2 I 'rIi = "0 + 1.1+ 2.1 + ······T·I
S.1.4
(Almon)
r = degree of polynomial, i = 1.....5. lag length
Allowinl the parameter 'i to be a quadratic functi~ as in equation S.1.4,
means that it can take many shapes. The imposition of end pon zero restrictions could
be used to ensure a more plausible shape to the Iq distribution. However such
restrictions can lead to biased estimates of the remaininJ non zero parameten.
Consequently. if a particular end point is to be zero, it may be bener to simply reduce the
maximum laglenp rather than impose a restriction.
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5~4 EstImation Results
5.2.4.1 The Basic Model
To start with. the simple epidemic model without advertising. (equation S.l)
was estimated by OLS. 1be results are given in Table S.A. 1be explanatory variables
have the expected effect. There is I positive and statistically significant social contact
coefficient ~ and the seasonal dummies for quarters 1 to 3 are negative suggesting that
sales in this period are significandy below the 4th quaner. The seasonality of the data
showing higher sales in quarter 4 is clearly evident in diagram AS.2 in the appendix to
this chapter.
However the diagnostic tests indicate problems which is not surprising given
that many of the classical assumptions underlying the linear regression model are
violated. For example. the disturbance terms ut appear to be serially correlated
(autocorrelation) and have a non constant variance (heteroscedasticity). The breakdown
in the assumption of a constam variance is most likely to occur when there is a large
variation in the size of the explanatory variables. This is more normally the case when
cross sectional data is being used (for example. the variance of consumption i. likely to
be greater for higher income families than for lower income ones).
However such a range of variation in the explanatory variables need not be
restricted to cross sectional observations. Also, if the time span considered in time series
data is long, then a problem of heteroscedasticity may be encouruercd. It could be the
case that over time the dill collection technique improves. Thus errors from this source
may decline in imponance. leading to a non constant variance of the disturbance term.
Furthermore. the heteroscedasticity test may be indicative of. mis-specified model. An
omitted trending variable will have the effect of produdna • non constant variance, as
will an explanatory variable's coefficient which is subject to change over time. Another
potential source of heteroscedasticity in time series data would be the inappropriate
transformation of the variables. Many of these issues will be refened to again in the
followinl empirical results as appropriate.
TABLE 5.A
OLi Z.timatioD of the Zpidemic Mod.l.
D.pend.nt variabl., 'l'DP - (~- ~-l) 1'rYLt_ - ~-l
MODEL 5.1 MODEL 5.1.1 MODEL 5.1.1B
CONS 0.0258 -0.1013.-02 -0.2234.-03
(0.5316.-02) ** (0.6975.-02) (0.9432e-02)
X'l't 0.1012 0.0932 0.0922
(0.0109) ** (0.8651.-02) ** (0.0103) **
Qlt -0.0258 -0.6163.-02 -0.5951.-02
(0.6607e-02) ** (0.65908-02) (0.0113)
Q2t -0.0288 -0.0132 -0.0134
(0.6435.-02) ** (0.5988.-02) * (0.9130.-02)
Q3t -0.0217 -0.5566e-03 -0.5139.-03
(0.6430.-02) ** (0.6697e-02) (0.0114) :
At; 0.9500.-05 0.9200e-05
(0.2000e-OS) ** (0.2500.-05) **
At;-1 -0.1000e-06
(0.2800.-05)
At;-2 -0.9000e-06
(0.2700.-05)
At;-3 -0.5000e-06
(0.2800.-05)
~-4 0.1300e-05
(0.2900.-05)
NOB 39 39 36
RSS 0.7025e-02 0.4153.-02 0.3807e-02
DW 1.0801 1.6061 1.5389
02 0.7454 0.8449 0.8166
LM4 Reject Acc.pt Accept
RSET Reject R.j.ct Rej.ct
NOIUC Accept Accept Accept
BET Reject Rej.ct Acc.pt
Standard errors in parentheses.
*, ** denotes significance at 5' and l' respectively.
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It is imponant to bear in mind dlat a whole host of diagnostic tests are being
applied to the estimated model. Care must be taken not to view nanowly anyone
particular test statistic as indicative of one particular type of specification error. In fact. a
combination of the results from several test statistics can be more informative. In
addition to the overall information obtained from the statistical diagnostic tests, any
particular model must be judged in relation to the economic plausibility of the results.
For example, if the diagnostic tests indicate a robust model yet the silD of the coefticielU
of an economic variable is opposite to that expected, this would indicate some suspicions
regarding the model's structure and wamnt further investigation.
It is in this sense dlat the diagnostic test results are inlerpreted, unless there is Q
priori information which may hint at a particular problem. For example, in deriving the
basic epidemic estimation equation .5.1, the original theoretical equation 3.1 was
transformed by dividing through by the remaining population of non ownen in each
period ie. TVI.,-X'-l. Also, as explained in the next chapter. advertising data for later
periods in the colour tv model may reflect true expenditures more accurately than for
earlier yean. thus opening up the possibility for a non constant variance of the
distwbance tenD.
There are I number of heaerosc:edasticity testa which could be applied. The
implicit assumption underlying them is that the variance of the disturbance term is related
to some unknown variable(s). The teS1S differ in their use of different proxies or
surrogates for this unknown relationship. The tests further differ in respect of whether the
functional specification itself is explicidy expressed (el. the Olejser test) or not (ea. the
White test). The main test of heteroscedasticity quoted throughout the empirical
investigation followina in Chapten S and 6 employs the square of the fiued values from
the regression equation as a surrogate for the unknown variable to which the diSlWbance
term il assumed to relate.
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1be Reset test proposed by Ramsey (1969) can be used as a test for
specification error due to omitted variables. Suppose that the true relationship is y, • a +
bt.Xtt +~.X2t + el' where X2t is unobservable such that the false equation Yt • a +
bl.Xtt + vt is estimated instead. The disturbance term v, will include the influence of the
omitted variable. 1be Reset test examines the relationship of X2t to the false equation's
error term Vt. Since the omitted variable is unobservable, I proxy variable must be used
instead (the Reset test employed in these chapCen takes the square of the fined values
obtained from the false regression equation). As higher powen of the fined values can
also be used as the proxy, this test is also appropriate for picking up suspected functional
mis-specification.
1be rejection of the Ramsey Reset test in model 5.1 casts some doubt on the
chosen functional fonn. However given the failure of the other diagnostic tests as already
discussed, it seems likely that the tests are indicating that the simple epidemic model 5.1
is mis-specified and consequently, does not appear to be an adequare representation of
the diffusion of the VCR in the UK.
.5.2.4.4 Advertising: A Direct Route
1be failure of the simple model should not be surprising, given the omission of
the hypothesised role for advenising in the epidemic frameworL So the next step is to
include advertising in the model and the results are again shown inTable .5.A. Compared
to the simple epidemic model, inclusion of current advertising messages (model .5.1.1)
appears to lead to some improvemenL For example the adjusted R2 increases from
0.74.54 to 0.8449. Of course this statistic by itself is not very informative, as high values
can easily be obtained in time series regression and may be biased if the classical
assumptions of the linear regression model are violated. It i. interesting to note that
autocorrelation no longer appean to be a problem. The DW statistic now falls just inside
the top end of the inconclusive region. Of course given the use of quan.erly dala. a test
for higher order autocorrelation is more appropriate. Confidence in the null hypothesis of
no serial correlation is confirmed by the aa:eptance of the Laaranae Multiplier (LM) test
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statistic suggested by Godfrey (1978) under the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation.
both for order 1 and up to order 4. Thus the residual el from the original repession
equation is regressed on the original explanatory variables and the first lag of the residual
~.1' For autocorrelation up to order 4, the test is repeated using the first four quarter lags
of the residual et.t. ~.2' ~.3 and ~-4 as the additional explanatory variables in the second
stage repession.
1bc explanatory variables have the expected sign. with advertising messages
exerting a statistically significant positive influence. Unfortunately. the
heteroscedasticity test is rejected and consequently the estimaaed standard errors will be
biased. As explained above. there are a priori reasons for expecting this. due to the
tranSformation of the original diffusion equation. 1berefore a simple Glejser test wu
undenaken with the absolute error from equation !5.1.1 regressed on the suspected
variable le. the number of non owners <TVLt - Xt-l)' 1bc estimated coefficient on this
variable was statistically significant at the !5" level only. Given that the specification of
model !5.1.1 remains suspicious (as the Reset test is also rejected), the failure of the
hcteroscedasticity test could be further evidence of mis-specification rather than an
indication of a specific problem.
A useful complement to the more formalised diagnostic tests, is a visual
inspection of the rcsiduals from the estimation. A plot of the actual and fitted values
shows the estimated model producing values up to mid 1982 with far morc seasonal
variation than was evident in the actual serics. Of course, the seasonal variation in the
actual serics for 1978 and 1979 was estimated and the actual quarterly observations
interpolated using this infonnation. It is quite feasible that this correction factor Wlder
estimated the uuc seasonal variation during these early yean. However, this still leaves
unexplained why the difference between the actual and fttted values in 1980 to mid 1982
remained, given that these quarterly observations were obtained directly from source. An
inspection of the cumulative sum (CUSUM) and cumuladve sum of squares
(CUSUMSQ) of the recursive residuals givcs further evidence of a mis-specified model.
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As a result the model was not simply transfonned to remove the
heteroscedasticity and re-esumaied. Instead an altemative model using a logarithmic
transformation of the advenising variable was investigated (S.1.2). 1be deterioration in
all of the diagnostic tests perfonned indicates this particular step to be non beneficial and
therefore the results are not reponed.
S.2.4.3 Extending 1be Dynamics; Stock of Goodwill
Aoother possibility wonh investigating is the dynamics of the advenising
variable. So far only current advertising has been included in the model. However, as
argued earlier, there are a priori reasons for expecting lagged values of this variable to
enter dii-ectIy into the model. Consequently models S.1.1D, S.1.3 and S.1.4 were
estimated. 1be number of lags included in S .1.1 D was limited on practical grounds due to
loss of degrees of freedom when using a relatively small sample size of 40 observations.·
Also it is quite likely that lagged values especially in the corresponding quarter of
previous years will be highly correlated, leading to problems of multicollinearity.4
There is also some evidence from the literature thai the latina effects of
advenising are sIlon lived (eg. Carte 1979). although care must be taken when
extrapolating from these studies as most refer to existing and mainly non durable products
and it is quite likely thai the depreciation raie of advertising will be product specific. The
simple fact that purchases of durable products are undertaken relatively infrequently is
one reason why the lasting effect of advertising may be longer for such goods.
Mainly for practical reasons, the number of lap included in model ~.1.1.given
that quarterly data is being used, is restricted to 4. So the total effect of advertising would
be complete in IS monlhs. Tbe results for this particular specification are labelled model
S.I.ID in Table S.A. Whilst the coefficient on the current Idvertisina variable remains
positive and significant. the individual lagged variables are insignificant and some have
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an unexpected negative signed coefficient (although not statistically significant). A joint
test restricting the lagged advenising variables to be zero is accepted. Unfortunately, the
failure of the Ramsey Reset test indicates that there are still problems with the model.
Of course, the arbitrary restriction to only 4 lags may be criticised. Thus an
infinite geometrically declining lag structure wu hypothesised and a Koyck
transformation applied to the basic equation. These resultl are labelled model S.l.3 and
reported in Table S.B. The coefficient on the current advertising variable remains
positive and statistically significant The coefficient on the lagged dependent variable
represents one minus the rate of decay of the advertising variable. Its value of 0.27
implies a fairly rapid rate of decay in the lag distribution. giving some ex post justification
for using a limited number of lags directly in equation .5.1.1B. Unfortunately this
coefficient is not statistically significant Also the existing ownenhip variable XT" no
longer has the expected positive influence, although the coefficient is not statistically
significant The poor perfonnance of the lagged dependent variable and the existing
ownership variable may be due to multicollinearity since there is strong correlation
between each of these explarwory variables ..5
The Koyck transformation does possess cenain estimating advantages, by
reducing the number of parameten to be estimated. However the transformation process
itself might be expeaed to induce serial correlation into the error term. U so, OLS
estimated panmeten will be biased and inconsistent. Surprisinpy, the LM test up to
order 1 and 4 seem to accept the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation.
Of course the imposition of a continually declining I.. structure, may not be
appropriate. Therefore funher investigations were conducted using an Almon polynomial
lag distribution. which allows for the possibility of a peak effect. The order of the
polynomial must be specified in advance and this wu arbitrarily set to 3. The number of
finite lap to include must also be specified IIthe outset. Oiven the indications from the
.5. For .xlmple. the c:ornlaIion c:oeffici .. bIlw_ XT t - XTl.1 it0.991. - betw_ TOPl - XTt is
0.712.
TABLE S.B
OLS EattmatioD of the Epid..ic Mod.l.
Dependent variabl., TOP - (~ - ~-l) I~ - ~-l
MODEL 5.1.3 MODEL 5.1.5 MODEL 5.1.4+
COHS -0.7694e-03 -0.198ge-02 COHS 0.483ge-02
(0.7579.-02) (0.7961.-02) (0.8165.-02)
XTt -0.1336 0.0923 XTt 0.1035
(0.4161) (0.9333.-02) ** (0.0104) **
Q1t -0.8678.-02 -0.5352.-02 Qlt -0.0163
(0.8909.-02) (0.7307.-02) (0.7257.-02) *
Q2t -0.0139 -0.0123 Q2t -0.0118
(0.6424.-02) * (0.6810.-02) * (0.8746.-02)
Q3t 0.3501e-03 0.3085e-03 Q3t -0.8872e-02
(0.7281.-02) (0.7487.-02) (0.8299.-02)
At 0.9300e-05 0.1000e-04 Wet 0.8200e-05
(0.2400.-05) ** (0.2700.-05) ** (0.2400.-05)** ;
ACDt -0.7000.-06 Wlt -0.7500e-05
(0.2500.-05) (0.4400.-05)
XTt- 0.2105 W2t 0.2500e-05
(0.4062) (0.1900.-05)
'l'DPt1 0.2707 W3t -0.3000e-06
(0.3029) (0.2000.-06)
HOB 38 39 HOB 34
RSS 0.3885e-02 0.4143e-02 RSS 0.3190e-02
0" N/A 1.5942 D" 2.1107
U2 0.8397 0.8405 U2 0.8366
IM4 Accept Accept IM4 Accept
RSE'l Reject Reject RSE'l Reject
NOD Accept Accept HOQ Accept
HET Accept Reject UT Accept
Standard errors in parentheses.
*, ** denotes significance at 5' and l' respectively.
+ polynomial of degree 3 and 6 quarters lag.
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estimations already undenaken, a relatively shan maximum period of 8 quaners was
chosen. Estimation was repeated, gradually reducing the maximum number of lags to 4.
'The Almon method, using a third order polynomial requires the estimation of 4
parameters with respect to the advertising variables, regardless of the number of lags
chosen. 'Therefore to go below 4 would be superfluous, simply including the lags directly
(as in model S.l.l B) is more efficient
Throughout these estimations, the failure of the Reset test remained, but
ignoring this diagnostic for the moment, on balance a lag lenath of 6 seemed most
appropriate. The implied values for the coefficients on the advertisin, variables can be
deduced from the estimated parameten on the composite variables W(}....W3 and the
following relationship,
andi = 6
Unfortunately, some of the derived coefficienu on the lagged advertising
variables were negative, which does not make economic sense. This, in addition to the
failure of the Reset test. continues to cast doubt on the suitability of this particular
structure.
5.2.4.4 Advertising and Inter Brand Rivalry
The epidemic model with the inclusion of a cunau advertising variable does
produce some interesting results, although the consistent failure of the Reset test statistic
may be indication that the direct route for advertising may not be appropriate. However
before turning to the alternative route by which advertisinl can enter into the epidemic
framework. there is one further refinemenl to the advertising variable which should be
tested. M explained in chapter 3, the advertising variable represents the total number of
real advertisina messages transmiued by all firms in the martel The re-distribution
effec:u of advertising amongst rival finn. il effectively beina ipored. 10 that aacnDon
can fOCUI on the total market effect of advertisina. Becauae the inter brand rivalries are
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being ignored, the estimation of the total market marginal advenising response coefficient
proceeds on the implicit assumption of no changes in the underlying competitive SlN~
or behaviour of firms.
A closer inspection of the raw advenising data reveals that in addition to an
increase in the average volume of advenising in 1982, there is a considerable increase in
the number of identifiable brands advenised during this period. In fact the period 1981,
82 and 83 shows the greatest turbulence in terms of previously un-advertised brands
appearing, however 1982 is worst affected. This might be explained by the relaxation (or
expectation of the relaxation 00 hire purchase controls in the latter half of this year. In
addition, the attempt to lock new conswners into a panicular industry standard could have
intensified the amount of rivalrous advertising undertaken during this period. This
sudden appearance of a relatively large number of previously un-advertised brands, may
result in the true marginal effectiveness of total advenising on the total market during this
period being below that estimated from the entire sample period. In order to allow for
this factor, a multiplicative dummy was formed so that,
where
D=1
o
al > 0,
when t = 1982
otherwise
and i2 < 0
The results are labelled model 5.1.5 in Table 5.8. As usual. XT, has a positive
and significant coefficient. as does current advertisinl At. The multiplicative dummy
variable has the expected negative sign but since the coefficient a2- is not statistically
significant. no oonclusions should be drawn. A joint tat of siplificance of 11 and 12
beinl greater than zero wu accepced. However doubts about the model's specification
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must remain given the consistent failure of the Reset test coupled with the rejection of the
heteroscedasticity test.
SoloS Advertisina1n the Epidemic Model; An Indirect Route
As already explained. the Reset test can be an indication of general mis-
specification or in panicular. show tha1 the chosen functional form of the model is
inappropriate. Discussion in chapter 2 suggested that advertisina could enter iruo the
epidemic model through the social contact coefficient P in equation 5.1. thus altering the
functional fonn of the model. S cl S explicitly model this hypothesis. Their data set
covers the later stages of the diffusion process and they IIJUC tha1 the direct effect of
advertising may be more relevant in the early stages. The alternative estimating equation
when advertising enters via the word of mouth coefficient is u follows.
Xl - Xl-}
TV'Lt-Xt-}
where
= a + p.Xl_}+ I;.t·Xi·Qi + ut
rvt,
~ = f(A) S.2
S.2.S.1 Estimation Results; Advenising An Indirect Route
The results of estimating S.2 m given inTable S.C. When P is dependent 00
current advertising ie. P = bl + ~.Al (model 5.2.1). the variables have the expected
positive signs and ~ estimated coefficients m statistically significant (although given
the failure of the Lagrange Multiplier test for autocorrelation up to order 4. this statement
should be ttealed with caution). Whilst the Reset test is now acc:ept.ed. (sullesdng that
this change in functional specification may be preferable to advenisina eruering directly
via the a function) the presera of autooorrelation is now indica&ecl. So further
TABLI: S.C
OLS Estimation of the Epidemic Mod.l.
D.pendant variabl., TOP - (~ - ~-l) 1TVLr_ - ~-l
MODEL 5.2.1 MODEL 5.2.2
CONS 0.0135 0.0175
(0.4713.-02) ** (0.5768.-02) *.
XTt 0.0631 0.0571
(0.0112) ** (0.0238)*
Qlt -0.9949.-02 -0.0120
(0.5918.-02) (0.8011e-02)
Q2t -0.0143 -0.0159
(0.5672.-02) ** (0. 7182e-02).
Q3t -0.4637.-02 -0.0113
(0.5945.-02) (0.8017e-02)
AX'l't 0.2300.-04 0.2400.-04
(0.4500.-05) ** (0. 7600e-05) **
AX'l'lt -0.3200.-05
(0.7500e-05)
AX'l'2t -0.1200.-05
(0.7400e-05)
AX'l'3t 0.8400.-05
(0.6900e-OS)
AX'l'4t -0.3400.-05
(0.9300e-OS)
NOB 39 36
ass 0.3949.-02 0.3423.-02
DW 1.2783 1.2836
AR2 0.8525 0.8351
LN4 R.ject R.j.ct
IlSET Accept Accept
NORM Accept Accept
UT Accept Accept
Standard errors 1n parentheses.
*, ** denotes siqnificance at 5\ and 1\ respectively.
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experimentation with the lag structure of the iCNertising variable in the P function was
undertaken.
S.2.S.2 ExtcndiDl the Dynamics
To begin with. additional lagged advertising variables are included directly into
the P function. Again for pnctical reasons, a maximum of" lap are used. The results
are labelled model S.2.2 in Table S.C. Unfortunalely, a LM test for autocorrelation up to
order 1 and .. still rejects the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. Thus the swistical
significance of the variable coefficients must be trealed with caution since the estimated
variance of the parameters will be inefficient in the preserx:e of autocorrelation. BcafiDl
this in mind, the existing ownership variable XTI remains positive but the coefficient is
only significant at the S'II level The size of the advertising variables coefficient is very
close to that estimated in the previous model (S.2.1) but is now significanL
None of the additional lagged variables are statisticaDy significant and some
have an unexpected negatively signed coefficient. Experimentation with joint tests of
zero restrictions on the coefficients, suggests that. adding laged advertising variables to
the P function. does not improve matters overall. Further investigation of the lag
stJUcture within thi. panicular specification was not considered wonhwhile. An infinite
gcometricaDy declining lag structure could not be easily es1imaled as the Koyck
tranSformation procell doe. not reduce the number of parameters. This occurs due to the
presence of the multiplicative tenn, as the transformed equation becomes.
TOPt - TOPt-t = a(l-~ + boXTt- ~r_t+ atAtXTt + &a1At.t(XTt - XTt_l)
+ &2aIA,_2(XTt - XTt-t) .......
Whilst an assumption that (XTt - XTt_l) tends 10 zero would solve the
problem this i. clearly not feasible. An Almon III distribution is more amenable,
however Jiven the previous results. it is unlikely that such a transformation will be
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rewarding. Imtead. anention is directed towards the possible effects of a changing
competitive situation on the advertising response coefficient.
5.2.5.3 Advertising.lnterbrand Rivalry and Hire Purchase Restrictions
A multiplicative dummy variable. where Dt is as described previously. was
added to equation S.2. so that.
The resulting estimates are shown in Table S.D. Again XT t has a positive and
statistically significanl coefficient. as does current advertising. However. now the
multiplicative dummy variable does not have the expected negative influence. which is
necessary to reduce the magnitude of the overall advertising coefficient if the hypothesis
is correct Instead b:3 is positive and statistically significanl. Interestin&1y. the diagnostic
tests are all accepted. It may be that the multiplicative dummy variable is in fact picking
up a product variety effect. If the number of previously un-advertised brands actually
represents the number of new brands becoming available. this increue in product variety
could be having a positive effect on ownership. Alternatively. the multiplicative dummy
variable may be indirectly capturing the effect of hire purchase restrictions. It is likely
that the removal of these restrictiom. which occurred in I982q3. will have a positive
effect on the dependent variable. When the HP variable is omitted from the equation. but
a multiplicative dummy for the period 1982 is included. this positive effect may show up
through the advertising coefficient and swamp the expected negative competitive
influence.
Further investigation of the specification was undenaken to test for structural
change and the predictive power of the model. Both of these statistics are credited to
Olow. In testing for structural change. a SWldard F test is being used to test whether the
parameten of one data set (period I) are significantly different from the parameten of a
second data set (period 2). Uslna1982q3 u the break point (the date when hire purchase
TABLI! 5.D
OLB EatimatioD of the Epidemic MOd.l.
D.pendent variable, 'rDP - (~ - ~-l) /'rYLt_ - ~-l
.
CONS 0.0111 0.0128 0.8748e-02
(0.4379.-02) ** (0.4182.-02) ** (0.4448.-02) *
XTt 0.0679 0.0660 0.0673
(0.0103)** (0.0116)** (0.0100) **
Q1t -0.8878.-02 -0.0100 -0.6538_-02
(0.5408e-02) (0.5923.-02) (0.5362.-02)
Q2t -0.0146 -0.0152 -0.0119
(0.5111.-02) ** (0.5156.-02) ** (0.5088.-02) *
Q3t -0.36358-02 -0.4626.-02 -0.1669_-02
(0.5430.-02) (0.5949.-02) (0.5358.-02)
AX'l't 0.2200.-04 0.2250.-04 0.4640.-04
(0.4200.-05) ** (0.4600.-05) ** (0.8500.-05)**
COMPt 0.3440.-04
;
(0.1240.-04) **
BPt 0.1940.-04
(0.1990.-04)
BP'rt 0.23308-04
(0.1400.-05) **
NOB 39 39 39
RSS 0.31818-02 0.3835.-02 0.3015.-02
OW 1.6453 1.3921 1.7618
AJl2 0.8775 0.8523 0.8839
LM4 Acc.pt Rej.ct Accept
RSET Acc.pt AcC8pt Ace_pt
NORN Accept Acc.pt Accept
BET Acc.pt Accept Accept
MODEL 5.2.3 MODEL 5.2.4 MODEL 5.2 5
Standard errors in parentheses.
*, ** denotes significance at 5\ and l' respectively.
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restrictions were removed) the Chow test indicates no SUUcturalchange in the parameters.
However OlOw's second test. which is a modification to the original test statistic for the
situation when too few observations exist in the seoond period to enable a second
regression to be performed, can also be used as a test of prediction failure of the model.
This statistic was rejected for the model given in Table S.D. Thil poor prediction
performance after 1982q3. coupled with the unexpected positive coefficient on the
multiplicative dummy variable may cast doubt on this particular specification. when
applied to the full sample period.
Given one of the ex post justifications for the positive bJ coefficient, I dummy
variable representing the relaxation of HP restrictions was substituted for the competitive
dummy variable Dt. The minimum deposit required over thil period only took two
values. 20% before 1982q3 and zero thereafter. A dummy was consuucted taking a value
of I up to and including 1982q2 and zero for the ~maininl observations. The expected
sign of the coefficient on the multiplicative dummy term is negative. Unfortunately as
can be seen from the results labelled model S.2.4 in Table S.D. the estimated coefficient
has a positive sign. although insignificanl Additionally. the model specification looks
suspicious due to the fallure of the LM test for autocomlation up to order 4. A plot of the
CUSUM of the recursive residuals gave further strong evidence of the lack of robusmess
of this model.
The effect of relaxing credit restrictions may only brinl purchases of VCRs by
new owners forward in time.6 In fact the poor predictive performance of model S.2.3
(which picked up a one off positive effect on the advertisinl response coefficient in 1982)
was demonstrated by a systematic over p~ction of the dependent variable after this
period. Consequently. an alternative dummy variable was established such that.
D • o 1978q 1 to 1982q2
6. Cu&hbIr1Ion 1980 iD bit invllli,1Iion or apndibn OIl ~ dlnbillIID .ped IhIlIhe HP
vlrilbla iI.....libIy lID have • II'mIiIDrJ effect on &ha level 01danbIa apmdi ......
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= 1 1982q3 and q4
1983q1 to 1987q4= -I
In this case. a positive coefficient would be expected on the multiplicative
dummy variable. The results are labelled S.2.S in Table S.D. All the variables produce
the expected positive coefficients which are statistically significant. The diagnostic tests
are all accepted. although the test for normality falls very close to the boundary between
the acceptanee and rejection region. LM tests for autoconelation up to order I and 4 fall
well within the acceptance zone. A visual inspection of the residuals and recursive
residuals also indicate a better specified model.
The estimated parameten show that the effectiveness of communication by
social contact on the number of new owners to non ownen is 0.0673 when no advertising
is undenaken. During a period of credit restrictions. this effectiveness increases slightly
to 0.0673S as a result of advertising messages. When the restrictions are removed. the
marginal impact of advertising is increased so that P is now 0.06737. However this
additional positive effect is merely a shift forward in time such that. 6 months after the
removal of the resuictions. the indirect marginal advertisinl response coefficient reduces
to 0.231e-04 so the social contact coefficient after 1982 ls 0.06732. A further exploration
of this model shows that whilst a Chow test indicates no structural break after 1982q3, the
predictive ability of the model. although improved relative to previous models. still
rejects the mill hypothesis that the predictions enon arc insignificant.
5.1.6 PrellmilW'J Conclusion.
The results otWned in this final model (S.2.S) arc c:enainly inleresting. On
balance. taking account of both the statistical diagnostic tests and the economic
plausibility of the results. the alternative specification with current advertising entering
indiredly through the social contact coefficient seemed preferable. It is quite possible
that producers' information needs to be confirmed by the experience of the new product
by an existing owner. especially for a product such .. the VCR which wu a completely
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new good in the sense that no substitute product existed. Whilst the magnitude and
significance of the coefficients on the explarwory variables were fairly robust within a
particular epidemic structure. the magnitude of the P coefficient wu particularly sensitive
to the specification hypothesised for the advertising information channel in the epidemic
model. Consequently. this emphasises that the extent of economeaic testing is important
if reliable estimates of the parameters of the epidemic model are to be obtained.
The final model estimated (!5.2.5), with the indirect marginal effectiveness of
advertising increasing when HP controls were removed but reducing thereafter, did
appear to provide an empirically robust model However it was disappointing that the
predictive ability of this model was suspect. Of course, the economic foundations of the
underlying epidemic framework is limited and it is quite possible that other important
economic variables have been omitted. Some further attempt could have been made 10
incorporate additional economic variaba in an Dd hoc manner. However, the alternative
probit model proposed in chapter 4 which has a richer microeconomic base will be
investigated to see whether more satisfying econometric results emerge. It is to this stage
that the investigation now proceeds.
5.3ESTIMATION OF THE PROBrr STRUCTURAL DEMAND
DIFFUSION EQUATION
5.3.1 EstImation; The Static Equilibrium Model
One of the major shoncominp of the epidemic model is the failure to allow for
the heterogeneity of the population from which the new owners of the product originale.
The probit based model, having as its foundation the recognition of such differences,
enables further eoonomic variables to be incorporated in • more satisfying manner than
simply adding them to the epidemic structure in an Dd hoc and logically inconsiSlCnt
manner. The alternative theoretical model presenrcd in chapter 4 (and developed to
include advertisina) results in the followin, simple structural demand diffusion equation:-
log ( x, I (Nt • Xv ) • - ( z-t )
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and
so the estimating equation assuming 'Z:' t is a linear function of the economic variables is
as follows.
Yt - X() + XI·At + X2·Pt + X3·Rl + li·Xi·Qil + 'It
x.> 0 X2< 0 X3< 0 Xi < 0 .5.3
where
Xl = Stock of VCR in time t
At = Total number of advertising messages in time t
Pt = Relative retail price of VCR in time t
Rt = Real race of interest in time t
Nl = Number ofhousebolds in the population.
TVL, = the number of colour tv owningluisna households in the UK in time t
(A full description of all the variables and data is given in the appendix at the end of this
chapter)
Referrinl back to chapter 4. the appearance of the three economic variables in
equation ~.3 is • consequence of the nature of the model. Individuals possess
characteristic ~ and acquire at the first date when ~ > Z·,. where tt t is the critical value
of Z. This critical value occurs at the pou. where the mUJinal owner's perceived
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discounted total benefit of ownership (dependent upon advenisilll and liven preferences)
is equal to the cost (represented by relative price, given myopic price expectations).'
Diffusion occurs as changes in the explanatory variables move the critical value
along the distribution ofZ. as in the diagram below.
f(Z)
•Z l+1 = Z( A, p, R >t+l
Z-,- Z( A, P. R >t
I
I
I
I
z
The functional fonn of Z·, is not imposed a priori. rather. various empirical
experimelUtions with the specification will be undenaken. For example both levels and
logarithms of the variables will be med, Another imponant area for investigation will be
the lag sttucture of the advenising variable in this function. (for the reasons already
outlined).
Unlike the variables on the RHS of equation ~.3. the precise functional nature of
the dependent variable Yt is imposed at the outset. This results from the assumed sech
squared distribution of Z am consequent mathematical manipulation. This particular
distribution (which is simply the corresponding probability density function of the logistic
cumulative function) has been chosen primarily for practical reasons of mathematical am
7. The 'II....... or 1M.. or the COlI or IICqUiJilian or ,." .. c ..... in tbI empirical imeltiplion hu
.n.dy been d.,M"" in ch.IIpW ~.
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statistical ease.! However. as there are many factors which can influence an individual's
judgement of the relative advantage of the new product (the compensation ratio) such a
distribution would not seem unreasonable.
Initially. equation !S.3(in which z", is a simple linear function of the economic
variables in time t) is estima&ed by OLS and the results given in Table 5.E. Whilst the
price and advertising variables have the expected negative and positive coefficients
respectively. the coefficient on the interest rate variable is surprisingly positive. However
the diagnostic tests provide evidence of the suspect nature of the model's specification
Re-cstimating, using logarithmic transfonnations of the explanatory variables in Z·l
instead. did not improve matters.9
The poor perfonnance of this particular equation is not too surprising. After all.
equation !S.3 is a static equilibrium relationship. It assumes that the adjustment by the
new marginal owner. as indicated by the relative position of the critical value function Z· t
to the distribution fOO. will take place immediately. Yet there are a number of real world
constraining factors which need to be taken into account. Given the objective is to otuin
a statistically robust model. a practical approach will be adop(ed. thus any refmements
will not be derived in a rigorous fashion from the theoretical model.
The budget constraint facing the individual decision maker is onc important
factor to be considered. Diagram AS.4 in the appendix to this chapter cleady shows that
the chosen income variable does not remain constanl over the period. So per capita real
disposable income. MYt• is added to the RHS of the basic equation !S.3. Strictly. as the
model is concerned with diffusion of the product between households. the appropriate
variable should be real disposable houseoold income but data aVailability restricts use to
1 AlumaIi.,. ctilUibutionl could be uaurned how..,. !he reI\Iltina equaDoe would no lana- be UMlYbIe to
OLS fIIlimalion, Oiv ...... relaD.,. ana1l &ampl. lilA ..s limi ...... in .... qwWcy of .... d.&a. \1M of more
~1icaIed ~ is unlibly 10 lad 10 IUpIriar reaWli.
9. AI Ihe real railof w...a took 101M ne.lIiv. vala.l OV8' .... .,.-. iI•• ......, 10 r.. InnIform
dUI v';abM 10 .Iabliah • poIiliv ...... 1bia •• limply daM by IUbnctina Iba real rail of ina.nat fn:lm
101M lfIPIopri1&8 conI&d, ie. 1..1- ~.(10. RR). ObviouIIy, ".1pIdId codiciIna Oft thiI v.-iable will
now be poIiIiv ..
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per capita income instead. 1be relevant household variable is represented by the number
of colour television licences in force TVL,. for the reasons already discussed eartier in
this chapter.
1be outlay involved for a consumer durable is often of considerable size in
relation to an individual's flow of income. Consequently the availability of credit is likely
to be a further constraining factor upon the simple relationship postulated in equation ~.3.
1berefQre a variable representing the minimum legal percentaae down payment is also
included. As previously explained. this variable took only two values over the period.
(20'*1 prior to 1982q3 and zero thereafter). a dummy variable HPD, is used to proxy these
restrictions. Previous studies (eg. Williams 1972) have also included the maximum
monthly repayment period. As movements in this repayment period were correlated with
the percentage down payment. the simple dummy variable wu employed u a proxy
variable.
Perhaps the single most important feature of the epidemic model is the
emphasis upon the lack of information hindering the diffusion process. In contrast. the
majority of probit based models neglect this factor (and u explained in chapter 2. to
allow for this in an empirical model in any rigorous manner can be rather complicated).
The model developed in chapter 4 effectively USWDespartial information. individuals in
the population are aware of the existence of the new generic product. but not of all its
inhererl characteristics. So advenising, by providina peater infonnation about these
specifiC features, leads all individuals to revise upwards their perceived valuation of the
new product. failure to recognise that memben of the population may have no
knowledge about the product at all, is likely to be most severe over the very early period
of the diffusion process. It may therefore be necessary to revise the model in an informal
manner haler on.
The modified estimating equation is u follows:-
"it > 0 'Y3 < 0 "i4 > 0 "is < 0 ~.3.l
Yt = "0 + lCt1og(A>t + lC2.log(P>t + lC3.log(AR>t+ "4.log(MY)t
+ lCS·HPOt+ L"i·Qit + ut
IC4 > 0 5.3.2
where the variables are u previously described in the text and
AR = 10 - R (transfonned to provide a series with only positive values).
The results are given in Table ~.E. The additional variables MY and HPO have
their expected positive and negative effea respectively. However. problems still remain
with the perverse signs of the coefficient on the interest rate variable. Once again the
diagnostic tests indicate serious mis-specification. so little credence should be given to
the t statistics or improvement in R2 and RSS of this particular structure relative to
equation ~.3. Model S.3.2 using logaridunic transformations of the explanatory variables
did not produce any better results (although it is interesting to DOle that whilst still falling
within the reject region. the functional form Reset test statistic is reduced considerably).
5.3.2 Extencllnl the Dynamics; Stock or Goodwill
Given the static nature of models ~.3.t and ~.3.2. the rejection of the OW
statistic and LM tests for autocorrelation may be an indicalion of poody specified
dynamics in the equation. In chapter 4. it wu sugested thal the lagged effects could
enter direcdy into the model using Nedove and Anow's stock of goodwill ooncept.
Consequendy. the effect of advenising will be cumulative on the re-evaluation of the now
benefit of ownership perceived by all individuals. (see fipre 7 in chapCer 4). The
approach to the appropriate lag stnacture on the advertising variable. will be uealed in the
same fashion u in the estimation of the epidemic equation in the previous section.
Initially. additional lalled Idvenisinl variabla are included din:edy into
equaliOll ~.3.t and ~.3.2. Once .. 1in only 4 lap are included II the start due to pnctica1
'lABLI: 5.J:
OLS Estimation ot the Probit Model.
Dependent variable, Yt - l09(~ / ~ - ~)
MODEL 5.3 MODEL 5.3.1 MODEL 5.3.2
CONS -1.7066 -12.1673 CONS 5.4254
(0.6164) ** (3.3415)** (25.6960)
Pt -0.0149 -0.7440e-02 Ut -2.2736
(0 .2645£-02) ** (0 .2002.-02) ** (0.3868) **
At 0.9440e-04 0.2594e-03 LAe -0.0287
(0.1594.-03) (0.1041e-03) ** (0.1185)
Rt 0.3036 0.1130 LIlt -0.8598
(0.0516) ** (0.0421) ** (0.2313) **
MYt 0.0115 LMYt 0.7199
(0.3321.-02) ** (3.4142)
DDt -1.6457 DDt -1.0040
(0.2919) ** (0.2699)** '
;
Qlt 0.3390 0.9578 Qlt 0.1152
(0.5021) (0.3415) ** (0.3536)
Q2t 0.1652 0.6445 Q2t 0.0515
(0.4511) (0.3018) * (0.2119)
Q3t 0.1521 0.6178 Q3t -0.0657
(0.5188) (0.3420) * (0.3205)
NOB 40 40 NOB 40
US 23.8907 8.3883 RSS 5.3330
ow 0.7266 0.6631 OW 0.6884
AJl2 0.8082 0.9283 U2 0.9544
LN4 Reject Reject LM4 Reject
UE'! Reject Reject RS!:'! Reject
NO~ Reject Accept NO~ Accept
BET Reject Reject 0'1' Reject
Standard errors in parentheses.
*, ** denotes significance at 5\ and 1\ respectively.
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considerations. The results are given in Table S.F and labelled model S.3.1b. Relative
price and the HP restrictions variable have the usual negative effect. Likewise, income
and current advenising have an expected positive influence on the dependent variable.
Unfortunately the ru1 rate of interest variable remains perversely positive. Of course, it
may be thai this variable is picking up the macro effects of its use as a policy instrument
Particularly over this period, the interest rate was used to control inflation arising from
excessive demand in the economy. The endogenity of this variable may therefore be
causing problems. Also, previous work on expenditure on consumer durables have found
thai an interest rate variable was insignificant unless account was taken of bank
borrowing with a switching regime to represent periods of supply and demand constraints
(Mean 1979), whilst Cuthbenson (1980) found that a real interest rate variable was only
imponant when a liquid assets variable was also included in the equation. The additional
lagged advenising variables also have an unexpected effect. as shown by the negative
coefficients on these variables. However, many of the unusually signed coefficients of
the economic variables ~ not statistically significant. although the reliability of the
standard errors of the estimated parameters cannot be trusted because of the possible
presence of autocorrelation. The OW statistic falls within the inconclusive region but
doubt is confinned by a LM test which rejects the null hypothesis of no !erial correlation
up to order 4 inthe error terms,
Using logarithmic transformations of all of the explanatory variables resulted in
most of the lagged advenising variables having the expected positive signed coefficients.
However in addition to possible problems with autocorrelation. the failure of the Reset
would seem to indicate that transforming all of the variables in this particular manner way
was not relatively beneficial. The results are therefore not reponed.
It is worth pursuing a model in which the only explanatory variable to enter in
logaed form is advenising. It is interesting to note thai in Ibis model (S.3.lc inTable S.F)
the Reset test is acc:ep&ed. sugaestinl this particular functional speciftcation is superior to
one inwhich all explanatOry variables are lOlled. However it does not necessarily imply
TABLE 5.1'
OLB Z.timatiOD o~ the Probit Mod.l.
D.pendent variabl., Yt - loq(xt I ~ - xt)
.
CONS -2.8249 CONS -8.5613
(3.0655) (4.4436) *
Pt -0.0316 Pt -0.0301
(0.31878-02) •• (0. 331ge-02) ••
~ 0.7260.-04 ~ 0.1927
(0.62108-04) (0.1111)·
Rt_ 0.1651 Rt_ 0.1712
(0.0250) •• (0.0243) ••
MYt 0.3830.-02 MYt 0.8214e-02
(0.2871.-02) (0.28718-02) ••
DDt -0.7550 DDt -0.4434
(0.2943) •• (0.2354) •
Qlt 0.3640 Q1t 0.7282
(0.2561) (0.3631)·
Q2t 0.2232 Q2t 0.1748
(0.2037) (0.2090)
Q3t 0.2036 Q3t 0.5791
(0.2564) (0.3706)
~-1 -0.670.-04 ~-l -0.0844
(0.73508-04) (0.1166)
~-2 -0.464.-04 ~-2 0.1944
(0.1450.-04) (0.1214)
At-3 -0.774e-04 ~-3 -0.1562
(0.68208-04) (0.1139)
Ae-4 -0.448e-04 ~-4 0.1766.-02
(0. 7150e-04) (0.1217)
NOB 36 NOB 36
RSS 1.5939 RSS 1.4414
OW 1.2468 OW 1.2125
n2 0.9756 n2 0.9779
LM4 Reject LM4 R.j.ct
RSET Accept RSET Acc.pt
NOme Accept NORM Acc.pt
DT Acc.pt UT Acc.pt
MODEL 5.3.1b MODEL 5.3 lc
Standard errors 1n parentheses.
*, ** denotes siqnificance at 5' and l' respectively.
that this is the most suitable functional specification. Indeed the failure of the LM test
detecting autocorrelation up to order four could be highlighting this point Leaving that
aside. relative to model S.3.1 b, more of the lagged advertising variables now have a
positive coefficient but still remain statistically insignificant
Tbere seems very little to choose between these specifications. As already
suggested, the failure of the LM test does not mean the error terms ~ tNly
autocOrrelated. It is much more likely a sign of a mis-specified model, in particular, the
dynamics could be wrong. TIle number of lags of the advertising variable so far has been
limited. Thus further investigation of the lag distribution of this particular variable will
be undertaken. Whether the other explanatory variables should have lasting effects also
needs to be consideml. For example the permanem income hypothesis would see a role
for the inclusion of lagged values of income. When convenient these additional dynamic
factors will be incorporated but given the interests of this study, the weight of effort will
centre on the dynamics of the advertising variable.
If the lasting effects of advenising in the z: function ~of an infInite
geometrically declining nature, then after substitution into equation S.3.t. a Koyck
uansformation can be performed. The results are labelled model S.3.3 in Table S.G. The
LM test accepts the null hypothesis of 00 autocorrelation up to order 4. However Dumins
h statistic. (which is the appropriate statistic to use when testing for first order
autocorrelation in the presence of I lagged dependent variable on the RHS of the
equation) rejects the null hypothesis but only at the S .. level of significance. Given the
simultaneOus existence of I lagged dependent variable in the explanatory variables and
serially correlated error terms. the estimaled parameten will be biased and inconsistent.
The Reset test is rejected. casting further doubt on the chosen specification. In
addition to these statistical misgivings. the poor performance of some of the variables in
economic terml. provides further evidence against lbil panicu1u model (subject to the
caveat regardinl the robustneSS of the estimated parameten if lutoconelation is present).
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Whilst cunent advertising has a positive effect and price I negative one, the income
variable and HP dummy variable no longer perform as expected. However previous
empirical investigations of diffusion curves have often found the results unsatisfactory
.when both a price and income variable are included in the model (Chow 1967, Bain
1962).
If the Koyck uansfonnation procedure is appropriate, the estimated coefficient
on the first lag of I variable should equal the coefficient on the respective current variable
multiplied by the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable. In order to obtain unique
estimates of the struCtural parameters, a number of non linear resuictions will apply and
should be tested. This would require use of I more sophisticated non linear estimation
procedure. However an infonnal glance at the estimated size of the ooefficients shows
thal especially for the price and income tenDS, these constraints are unlikely to hold.
A further problem concerns the magnitude and significance of the ooefficient on
the lagged dependent variable. A value of 1 ·0.9803 indicates a very slow rate of decay
on the advertising variable, which given previous results and the existingliteraQlre, seems
questionable despite the durable nature of the product being investigated. The
domination of this variable in the equation is also disquieting, although previous
researchers have found the same effect in their empirical diffusion equations (Chow 1967,
Stoneman 1976) Incidentally, assuming a geometric declining lag structure for all the
economic variables gives an estimating equation in which only the current values of the
explanatory variables enter as well as the lagged dependent variable (model5.3.3B). AI
can be seen. this does not improve matten either statistically or on economic criteriL
The lagged dependent variable eclipses the other more interesting variables and again the
perverse coefficients on the income and HP terms are pertwbinl. Altogether the
conclusion must be reached that an infinitely declinina lal structure either for Idvertisinl
uniquely or common to all variables, is not appropriate.
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The next stage will be to investigate an Almon lag structure on the advenisina
variable. A maximum of 8 lags was included with an assumed third depee polynomial.
As the finite lag suucture must be chosen arbitrarily. it is worth experimenting with the
maximum lags. These were gradually reduced down to 4 lags. In order to choose the
most appropriate specification the equation producina the lowest RSS could be used.
However the diagnostic test statistics indicate the possibility of autocorrelation in the
model. consequently the estimated RSS will be unreliable. So this criterion was tempered
by economic considerations.
On balance. a lag length of 6 quarters looks most suitable and the results for
model S.4 are shown in Table S.G. Most of the explanatory variables have the expected
sign (except for the real rate of interest which is persistently positive). None of the
coefficients of the composite advenisina variables Wi are statistically significant,
including Wo which represents current advertising. Providina all explanatory variables
are exogenous. the possible existence of autocorrelation will render the estimated
standard errors inefficient, but the estimated coefficients will still remain unbiased and
consistent. Given the estimated coefficients. the structural parameters on the advertising
variables are u follows (although the estimated variance of these parameters could be
calculated. it was not considered worthwhile due to the likely contamination).
O.225e-04
12:. -O.673e-04
14 = -O.lle-OS
i6 = O.81ge-04
a3. -O.4SOe-04
O.470e-04
The neptive coefficients on lall 2 3 and 4 do not make economic sense and
coupled with the possibilities of autocorrelation in the model (the DW statistic falla
TABLZ S.Q
OLB Estimation of the Probit Model.
Dependant variable, Yt - l09(1t I ~ - It)
MODEL 5.3.3 MODEL 5.3.3B MODEL 5 ".
CONS 0.7193 0.8305 CONS -3.1915(0.40181* (0.36491* (3.0006)
Pt -0.136ge-02 -0.6320_-03 Pt -0.0386(0.1411e-021 (0.4218.-03) (0.1161e-02)**
At 0.1310e-04 0.1380e-04 MOt o .2250_-04(0.1010e-04) (0.9600.-05) (0.6840e-04)
~ 0.3040e-02 -0.7916e-03 ~ 0.1500(0.6129.-02) (0.5454.-02) (0.0281)**
MYt -0.8942_-03 -0.6903e-03 MYt 0.4498e-02(0.5434e-03)• (0.3511e-03)* (0.2126.-02)
BPDt 0.0681 0.0769 SPOt -0.3467(0.0398)* (0.0310)* (0.3469)
-0.0986 -0.0908 0.2317 ,Qlt Qlt(0.0386)** (0.0336)** (0.1800)
Q2t -0.1030 -0.1040 Q2t 0.1196(0.0306)** (0.0288)** (0.2118)
Q3t -0.0597 -0.0577 Q3t 0.1481(0.0322)* (0.0310)* (0.1981)
Yt-1 0.9803 0.9887 Mlt -0.1071e-03(0.0245)** (0.0216)** (0.1102.-03)
Pt-1 0.4275e-03 "2t 0.3680_-04(0.1984.-03) (0.4260e-04)
1lt-1 -0.3203.-02 W3t -0.2900_-05(0.5383.-021 (0.4600e-05)
MYt- 0.3401e-03(0.5357.-03)
NOB 3i 39 NOB 34
ItSS 0.0538 0.0566 RSS 1.5471
DM 2.0780+ 2.7340+ DM 1.4182
+(h ••tat) +(h ••tat)
AR2 0.99i4 0.9i94 AR2 0.i7S2
LN4 Ace_pt Rej_ct LN4 Reject
ItSE'! Reject Ace_pt RSE'l Accept
NO~ Accept Accept NOIU4 Accept
BET Accept Accept UT Accept
Standard errors ~n parentheses.
*, ** denotes significance at 5' and l' respectively.
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within the inconclusive region but a LM test assuming no serial correlation up to order 4
is rejected) this panicular stJUcturemust be abandoned.
5.3.3 Advertlsinland Competition
When discussing the epidemic model. it wu suUested that the true advenising
response coefficient may have altered during the period 1982 u a result of increased
competitive advertising. In order to capture this effect. a multiplicative dummy variable
was constructed. Repeating this procedure for the probit model gives.
y = (eo+ elDl)Al 0 = I in 1982.0 otherwise
and eo> 0, e1 < 0
'The results were not very satisfactory and so are not reponed. 'The coefficient
on the multiplicative dummy term, el' was positive but insigniftcanL 'The other variables
had their expected signs (except the rate of interest). However the failure of LM up to
order 4, Reset. and hcteroscedasticity diagnostic tests, strongly indicate mis-specification
in the model.
5.1.4 Hire Purchase Restrictions
Similarly, some consideration was given to the HP dummy variable. So far, it
has been included in Ul additive way. However, the effect of HP restrictions could be to
consuain the true marginal response coefficients of the explanatory variables. If so. then.
Z·l= '0+ .1·At +~.P t + .3·Rt + .4·MYt
and
tS9
S.3.5
The results from estimation of this equation are given below.
Y, = -2.99 - 0.44 l.P, + O.443e-04.A, + 0.111.~
(5.4261 (O.OIIl)· (0.11"43) {O.OI7)
+ O.46Se-02.MY, + 0.519.Q1t + 0.204.Q2t + 0.243·Q3,
(O.483e~) (0.342) (0.296) (0.325)
+ 0.03S.PHPDt + 0.365e-03.AHPOt - O.09.RHPOt
(0.104)
- 0.49Se-02.MYHPO,
NOB = 40 RSS = S.8333 ow = 0.746 AR2. 0.945
LM4 = REmer RSET = ACCEPI' NORM • ACCEPT HET = REJEer
The specification looks suspect u indicated by the failure of the autocorrelation
test statistics (DW and LM4) and hetcroscedasticity test. On economic criteria. the
robustness of the model is questionable. When HP restrictions are in force, the marginal
response of advertising should be lower. So the coefficient on the multiplicative dummy
term will be negative but this estimated coefficient is positive. The price variable
behaves beuer, having a negative coefficienl During periods of credit control, the
effectiveness of a fall in price on the dependent variable may be reduced. Thus .2t = (-
0.0441 + O.03S). ~)'0091.
The income variable has a positive coefficient durinl the period of credit
restrictions. However when HP controls apply, the effect of income on the dependent
variable is reduced but to such an extent that the ovenll coefficient .4to becomes
negative. This is economically feasible but hi&h1yimplausible. to It is much more likely
10. This would impIy"'l VCR is .. iAf__ aood. Itha ... qUId NI the recteaIion of teJeoviaian
viewina is • chap formof ~ n..ran .... this poduct Il10.. the IUblliIldion of this e.....
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tha1 the model is mis-specified as indicated by the failure of the diagnostic tests
especially since a positive coefficient on the income variable had been found in the
models estimated earlier.
5.3.5 Preliminary Conclusions
TIle results for the probit model so far. are not very encouraging. None of the
models estimated give oonfidence either in terms of statistical criteria or ecooomic
interpretation. Various ad hoc experiments with lags of variables other than advertising
were tried but without success. The magnitude and significance of the coefficients
estimated were particularly sensitive to the precise probit specification adopted.
Throughout the real rate of interest variable had a positive and strongly statistical
significant coefficient. yet theory would suggest a negative influence on the dependent
variable (although given the qualifications mentioned above). living concern about the
model specification. Inclusion of a lagged dependent variable provokes funher
scepticism. The domination of this particular variable to the deUimeru of the remaining
economic explanaaory factors. ooupled with the implausibility of the implied rate of decay
does cast doubt upon this particular model. Although this variable could be picking up
the word of mouth or bandwagon eff'e~ especially since the epidemic model estimated
suggested thai information passed by existing owners wu particularly importanl
5.3.6 A Stock AdJustment Model
There are various possible reasons for the failure of the models. The quality of
the data being used may be inadequate. Certainly there are problems (u discussed in the
appendix). but this is true of most empirical work. However it is advisable to investigate
the diffusion of another new consumer durable. preferably one for which a better data set
can be established. Then a better judgement can be made about the extent to which the
poor perfonnance indicated in this chapter is partially auributable to III inferior data set.
form of ~ (includin, pre reconled lilma u oppoeed 10 c:irwna vilill) lhiI.tI'ect may be nina·
InWellinaly. JMrk,et ..-h hu Ihown dWOft • demo,,1IphiIC buia. the JNIIIIl propan.ion of
o~ of • va iIamana the ClIOCio ecanomic clua. Thia is .. canII'Ut IDochIr major
~ dunbIM w.... cl .. A and B ha.. the lIra- proportion 01 ownmhip.
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Leaving data problems aside. other difficulties could be arising because the true
theoretical structure hu not been modelled accurately. At the begiMing of the probit
section. the failure to account for the number of individuals in the potential population
who are totally ignorant of the product was noted. Ideally a combination of the two
competing structures would overcome this drawback. Unfortunately such an approach
can only be attempted informally but at the expense of losing much of the detail of the
epidemic and probit models. For example. by using a stock adjustment equation
where
Xl = stock of VCRs in time t
X· , = f(A. P. MY. R. HPD). the equilibrium stock of VCRs. justified on the grounds
described in the derivation of the probit model in chapter 4.
A. = an adjustment parameter. required because of lICk of information in the
population. This will in tum be I function of the existing stock of the product
(based on the usual epidemic reasoning). Ideally advertising should also be
included but this adds to the complexity of the model and it is unlikely that the
two effects of advertising in A. and X·,. can be disentangled by the data.
If the assumption is made that A. = L.X'_l' and X·, is I simple linear function of
the eoonomic variables. then the equation becomes,
Xl - X,_l = dol + d1L.Al + d2L.P, + d3L·Rt + d.tLMYl
Xl-l + dSL.HPD- L.",_}
The results for this equation (including seasonal dummies) aiven in Table 5.1.
are not very promising. The diagnostic tests indicate mil-specification and many of the
economic variable have a pervene sip. In thil form of course, the equation is equivalert
to the loJistic baled model used by Clow (1967). or BalD (1962). FoUowinl the Clow
TABU 5. I
OLS Zattm&tion of a Stock Adjuatment MOdel.
Dependent variable, GROt - (~ - ~-l) I ~-l
. .
CONS 0.9011 CONS 10.8751
(0.6690) (2.5277) **
Pt -0.4981e-03 LPt -0.1737
(0.2996.-03) (0.0704) **
~ -0.1000e-06 ~ -0.0157
(0.1100.-04) (0.0171)
~ -0.5900e-03 ~ 0.3874
(0.6004.-02) (0.0301)
MYt -0.6837e-03 LMYt -1.4063
(0.7331e-03) (0.3246) **
HPDt 0.0989 HPDt 0.9204
(0.0398) ** (0.0307) **
Q1t -0.1051 Qlt -0.1208
(0.0422) ** (0.0335)**
Q2t -0.1214 Q2t -0.1260
(0.0348) ** (0.0270) **
Q3t -0.0867 Q3t -0.0990
(0.0369)* (0.0308)**
~-l -0.970e-05 ~-l -0.0328
(0.9400.-05) (0.0223)
NOB 39 NOB 39
RSS 0.0766 RSS 0.0441
OW 1.3536 OW 1.3638
g2 0.7719 AJl2 0.8155
LM4 Accept LM4 Accept
RSZT Reject RSET Reject
NORM Reject NORM Accept
BET Reject BET Accept.
MODEL 5 4A MODEL 5 4B
Standard errors ~n parentheses.
*, ** denotes siqnificance at 5% and 1% respectively.
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approach further. using logarithms of the explanatory variables. based on a Gompenz
hypothesis. gives slightly better results as shown in Table S.I. However the diagnostic
tests still give cause for concern regarding the model specification. Once again the
advertising. income and HP variable behave badly. having unexpected signs. Allowing
the adjusttnent function to be a function of advertising too, could be pursued. however. as
indicated above (and based upon some provisional and unfruitful results for another
product, not reported here), such a refinement was not corwidered worthwhile.
5.3.7 Simultaneous Equation Bla
Finally some consideration must be given to the potential simultaneous bias in
the estimated equations. The estimation of the structural demand diffusion model in this
chapter, whether based upon the epidemic or probit stnacture, effectively assume away
any simultaneity between the advertising and stock variable. Yet the models developed in
chapters 3 and 4 assume that advertising is a decision variable. Ignoring this endogenity
in the OLS estimation, will lead to biased and inconsistent estimates. If the bias is
positive. this will result in an over estimation of the advertising coefficient. However
Schmalansee (1972) points out that advertising decisions may take place before the level
of sales are known, so expectations of sales will be the appropriate variable to include in
the advenising equation. In this case, the direction of the bias may be negative (as the
covariance between the two structural equations in the model will be negative). so under
estimating the true effect of advertising.
Consequently a simultaneous equation model should be established using the
additional advertising appropriations equatioo derived in the earlier chapten.11 This
procedure is not adopted for this particular product due to data limitations. However
some attempt is made to estimate a simultaneous model in the next chapter. Further
discussion will therefore be reserved until this time. exc:ept to ooce that given the use of
11.Sll'it;dy, III equaDan IhouId alIo be .. Iabliahed For price bu& u the foeuI 01 .... _ in thia Iheaia ia
direcled lOWadllhe IItvtrilina vGiab&e, me added complicaIion wiD be ipand.
163
quarterly data. assuming away the simultaneity between advenising and current sales may
not be too implausible. thus allowing the use of OLS estimation.
5.4 CONCLUSIONS: THE VIDEO CASSETI'E RECORDER
The epidemic based model. especially with advertising entering indirectly
through the social contact coefficient. produced some interesting results. The magnitude
of the coefficient on the existing ownership variable was sensitive to the choice of the
advenising infonnation channel adopted. This emphasises how important it is to
empirically investigate the chosen ~cture if accurate estimates of the effect of the
variables are to be obtained. However. within a Specification. the perfonnance of this
variable. in terms of magnirude and statistical significance. was consistent and did appear
to be an important explanatory factor in the diffusion process. Similarly. the current
advertising variable also appeared to be important but its effect was indirect by
temporarily increasing the social contact coefficienL Given that the VCR was a radically
new good in the sense that no previous substitute existed. the importance of the spread of
infonnation as indiclled by the epidemic model may be quite reasonable. especially in the
early period. However the predictive ability of the epidemic model proved disappointing.
It is quite likely that this is due to the failure to incorporate other economic variables
which may take on added importance later in the product life cycle. The berefit from
including a HP interactive term in the epidemic model could be hinting at this omission.
Unfortunately. the alternative probit based model did not perform too well. The
magnitude and statistical significance of the coefficient on the economic variables was
particularly sensitive to the model structure. Once. lagged dependent variable was
included. this variable dominated the equation (of course the model structure still
remained suspect given the failure of one of the diagnostic statistics). In fact. this
explanatory variable could be picking up the word of mouth effect. especially given the
success of the existinl ownership variable in the epidemic model.
APPENDIXA5
THE VARIABLES AND DATA
BACKGROUND
The first year in which the Video Cassette Recorder (VCR) was sold in
significant nwnbers to the UK consumer martet was 1978. Prior to this. most VCRs sold
were primarily for institutional users and the relative price of this product was some two
to three times that of the VCR designed and introduced for household use. However it
would be unrealistic to assume that 00 stock existed amongst households at the beginning
of 1978 since this completely new product had been available from the mid 19705.
Therefore in the empirical investigation presented in the chapter. the initial opening stock
of VCR in 1978 quarter 1 in the UK was estimated, using various martet research reports.
to be approximalely 43000 seta.
Initially there was no produet standardisation. with mree competing types of
VCR. namely Betamu. VHS and Philips VCR (this became V2000 fonnat in 1979).
lbis paper assumes a homogeneous product as 00 anempt is made to examine the
diffusion of the various types of VCR. However it is quite possible that this lack of
unifonnity in industry standards slowed down the diffusion process especially in the early
years. In such circumstanceS. a consumer's purchase decision would lock him into a
specific technology and any change would involve switchina casu (Poner 1976).
Consumers would have to form expectations about the likely winner of the standards race
and this would add to their uncertainty. especially before a clear leader wu established
(Grindley and McBryde 1988. Anhur 1989. Stoneman 1989). In faet the VHS fonnat
was always the market leader and by 1982/3 the trend in the share of the other two rival
technOlogies was downwards. Industry estima!eS in 1983. pve the VHS standard 6()t, of
market volume. whereas Betamu held 28,*,. Philips bepn selling a VHS format
machine in the UK in 1984 and Sony finally acquiesced to the VHS format in 1988.
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VCR CUMULATED STOCK (X)
The basic source of data on VCR sales, that is consumer offtake, was obtained
from BREMA (The British Radio and Electtonic Equipment Manufacturers' Association).
The original data is UK martet availability (UK production + imports - exports). This
has been adjusted for changes in suppliers stock (trade deliveries) and retailers stock
(from BREMA) to arrive at estimates more closely in line with true consumer offtake
during the period and includes purchases by consumers and rental companies. During the
early yean prior to 1982, supply of VCR originated from overseas manufacturers. After
this period, a fledgling UK production base was established, although predominantly of a
'screwdriver assembly' character, usually in Japanese owned plants.
Quarterly data on consumer offtake was available for 1980q 1 to I98.5Q4.
Annual figures only were available in 1978 and 1979. These yearly observations were
adjusted using a seasonal factor calculated from the available quarterly series.
Unfortunately BREMA were unable 10 supply consumer offtake figures for the final two
years 1986 and 1987. Instead trade deliveries were used for these later observations.
1987 data was available on a quarterly basis, however the annual 1986 figure had to be
adjusted using the seasonal factor described above. 1bere is no a priori reason to expect
retailers saock chanles 10 move systematically in anyone direction over a length of time
(it is of course likely that these stocks would respond temporarily to cycles in consumer
expenditure). No adjustment was made 10 these later observations for changes in
retailer's stock. allowing instead any measurement error in the dependent variable to end
up in the equation residual and have no effect on the estimated parameters.
The purpose of the empirical model is 10 explain the diffusion of first sets of
VCR (whether purchased or rented). The consumer offtake data will include both
replacement and multiple set purthascs. No adjusUDent to the data hu been made to
alleviate these phenomena. It is likely that multiple set ownership durina the period
investigated wu still fairly neglipble espedally since martel research estimates of
multiple tv ownership were still relatively low. Replacement purchases durina the first S
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to 7 years are also unlikely to be significant However after 1982/3. it is probable that the
older units would be wearing out and coupled with technical obsolescenc:e and updating
to the standard winner. lead to some replacement demand within the data over the later
period. Estimates of true household penetration are the~fo~ likely to be lower than
indicated by the data.
Figure AS.I shows the cumulated consumer offtake of VCR u a proportion of
UK households. By the end of 1979. the proportion of UK households renting or owning
a VCR was only about 1'II. by the end of 1987 this had increased to 60%. The consumer
offtake data in figure AS.2 shows that this reached a peak in late 1982 carty 1983. The~
are some indications that sales in 1987 are once again on an upward trend. This could be
due to the inclusion of ~placement and multiple purchases within the data. The
seasonality of the data is clearly evident with quarter 4 showing the highest level of sales
within a year. The rate of growth in stock also confirms that by 1982 the rapid spread of
this product had ceased and a falling rate of growth was established. Strictly. the ~levant
potential population for this product is colour TV households due to the complementary
nature of the products. Although if the purchase decision is simultaneous, then the
proportion of demographic households will still be of interest. Figure A5.1 also shows
the proportion of VCR ownership in colour TV households. The absolute ownership
level will be higher since colour TV penetration was not 1~ of households. However
the trend in the two ownership graphs are very similar. as the growth in colour TV
households was more or less constant over the period considered in this chapter (see next
chapter for more detail).
TIle major explanatory variables in the investigation are each described in tum.
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ADVERTISING EXPENDITURES (A)
'The basic source of data for total nominal advertising expenditures on VCR by
the retail and rental sectors is MEAL. It is possible to disaggregate the data to remove
expenditures upon associated products such uLaserdisc. videograms. blank tapes etc and
this has been done. Only data which explicitly refers to expenditures on VCRs has been
used. Where an aggregate category such u 'other brands' appeared. such data was
ignored. It is therefore possible that some advertising expenditures on this product has
been overlooked in the variable.
TIle nominal data was deflated by a media cost index constructed by the
Advertising Association. TIlesc indices show changes in the price of advertising in TV
and Press media and alterations in audience size. The deflated advertising expenditures
should therefore represent the real volume of expenditures in these respective media. A
simple average of both the separate Press and TV indices was taken. Some limited
information was available on the share of VCR advertising in press and tv. On the whole
the rental sector ha a tendency to allocate a higher share of advertising expenditure to the
Press sector. whereu the opposite is tnae for the retail sector, Given the limited nature of
this information. a simple average of the two indices was taken.
Figure A.5.3 shows total real advertising expenditures on VCR over the period
1978 to 1987. The seasonality of the data is clearly evident with highest expenditures in
quarter 4. TIlere seems to be a slight upward trend until 1982 with the spending tailing
off afterwards. After 1982 the data appears to be far more variable. In tenns of IOtal real
advertising expenditures. 1982 is a peak year U1d is nearly 7()C1,higher than the previous
year and some ~~% higher than the following year. Generally expenditure in all quarters
of this peak year is larger than in 1981. however much of the annual increase is accounted
for in quarter 2 (almost 328% higher than 1981q2 and 239% hipr than in this quarter in
1983).
REAL ADVERTISING MESSAGES ON VCRs
Total Real AdverUslng Messages on VCRs
by the Rental and Retail Sectors
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vA closer inspection of the raw data reveals that in 1982q2 especially. not only
are larger sums being expended on individual brands 1 but the overall number of brands
being advertised is also higherl. This pattern is generally true for the whole year and
such features are more dramatic in quarter 2. It may be that expectations of a relaxation
in credit restrictions prompted firms to advenise fiercely. Alternatively there might have
been an attempt to lock consumers into a panicular industry standard. In fact the top
three advenisers in this quancr had competing video format products. Of course this
factor would only be of significance to the retail sector as corsumers can avoid expensive
switching costs if the possibility to rent a machine exists. Real advenising expenditures
in the rental sector also shows a rapid increase of 168t11 in 1982. However these
expenditures peak one year later in 1983 but the rate of increase is much slower at 23t11.
Like the retail sector quancr 2 in 1982 has by far the largest annual rate of increase.
Given the unusual increase in advenising is repeated in the rental sector too. it seems
likely that the removal of hire purchase restrictions is the more imponant factor as this
would affect both sectors.
RELATIVE PRICE INDEX FOR VCR (P)
An average producer price index was constructed using as the base data.
Overseas Trade Statistics on import revenues and quantities (APO and 1980 as the base
year. In order to obtain a retail price series. the index was adjusted for the appropriate
VAT rate (T) and retailers malt up on cost (MU), so API( 1 + T + MU). This index was
deflated by the Retail Price Index for all items. The appropriate mark up on cost was
determined from the retailers gross margin as a percentage of total turnover (wages and
salaries treated as overhead, Holton 19S7) for the Radio and Electrical Goods Retailers
excluding Hire3. The gross margin data was obtained from Retailing. initially on an
1 Philipl ia &he IMIbt 1__ in tamI of Idvertiaina. wilh .2'4 of upmdilun in this quaner COIIII*ed 10
W" in Ihe ume quaw in &he previOUI yet6.
2 16 idlntifilble VCR bnnda COIftpll'ed to 6 in cM pnvioua yqr. The lOp line br .... PhUipi. Sony Ind
SIIlYO ~ for 101M so. of 1dv.niJin& apcndilun in 1982q1.
3. Since poll marlin ~ • (p.cyp lind nun up on COlt MU • (P~, &MIl MU • 1/(1-~) -I.
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annual basis but latterly on a biannual basis. Missing quan.erly observations were
therefore estimated by interpolation.
TIle constructed average price series may not give a true indication of the
average price of VCR, since the original impon data includes sets imponcd in kit fonn for
assembly in the UK. (this is obviously more significant from 1983 onwards) and it was not
possible to disaggregate the data to remove this effect. However movements in the series
will reasonably accurately reflect the trend in the relative price of VCRs.
Since the series is an average measure, changes in the sales mix of the product
model range will not be distinguishable from an overall change in the price of the
product. In other words, no account has been made for the fact that the 'bundle of
characteristics' represented in models may be significantly changing over time. An
observed higher unadjusted relative price may therefore be misleading, if the level of
charaCteristics of the product has simultaneously increased. However over the ten years,
any significant trend in the products overall relative price should still show up.
The graph in Figure AS.3 clearly shows a fall in the relative price of the VCR.
The change is quite dramatic up to the end of 1980. Thereafter the trend is still
downward but at a slower rate, with a sharp temporary fall in 1982. The reasons for the
fall could be similar to those suggested for the increase in advenising in this period
(especially the relaxation of credit controls) or it may be due to the inaccurate data
mentioned earlier, as there was a change in situation with respect to the importation of kit
fonn VCRs for assembly in the UK..
REAL INTEREST RATE (R)
The nominal 3 month treasury bill yield was the basic source of this series.
This was then adjusted by the rate of inflation to give the real interest rate. Figure 4
shows the high positive rate of interest and its upward trend. The negative real rate of
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interest in late 1979 to early 1981 is clearly a result of the high rate of inflation during this
period.
PERSONAL DISPOSABLE INCOME (MY)
The seasonally unadjusted personal disposable income series in constant 1980
prices wu divided by the defacto UK population aged over IS years. This wu done in
order to capture the real expenditure budgets of those individuals directly involved in the
VCR martet tranSaCtion. This of course neglects the fact that children under this age may
influence the 'decision maker' who actually purchases or rents a VCR. Strictly, the
budget constraint should be household income to be consistent with the dependent
variable being investiga&ed. rwnely the diffusion of VCRs amongst UK households. The
data series used wu readily available on a quanedy basis and wu therefore employed u
an approximation. figure ~.4 shows that the variable exhibited an upward trend, except
for the recessionary effect of 1981/2.
A full description of all the variables used in the empirical investigation is given
in the next pages.
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DEFINITIONS AND DATA SOURCES
Quarterly observations for the period 1978q 1 to 1987Q4. All data are seasonally
unadjusted and constant price da1a are in 1980 prices. Standard errors are in parentheses
beneath the coefficient estimates. Natural logarithmic transfonnation of explanatory
variables are denoccd by L(variable name).
Xl Stock of VCR in thousands. Cumulated consumer offtake (BREMA). 050 +
I1.Ct where C is consumer offtake. Initial opening stock 050 is 43 dK>usand
units. See text for more detailed description.
Nl Number of households in the UK in thousands (Census of Population and Social
Trends). Quarterly observations from interpolation of growth rate.
TVLt Stock of colour tv rec::eiven. Broadcast receiving licences in force for colour tv
in the UK in thousands (Monthly Digest). Adjusted for licence evasion. an
average underswement of approximaaely 16,. when ClOSS filed with BREMA
da1a estimates of sets in use. See next chapter for more detail.
At Real advertising expenditures on VCRs. Nominal advertising expenditures by
both retail and rental sectors on VCRs (MEAL) in thousand pounds deflated by
the average weighted press and tv media index (Advertising Association).
Qit Seasonal dummy quarter i
R
t
Real rate of interest. Nominal 3 month Treasury Bill yield. average discount
rate expressed as a rate per annum (Economic Trends) Jess the rate of inflation
as measured by Retail Price Index all items. RPI. (Ewnomic Trends) .
• 101e(1~R)
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Pt Relative average price of VCR that is average retail price index of VCRs. ARP.
deflated by RPI. Where ARP is constructed using the average producer price of
imported VCRs (Overseas Trade Statistics). Retail series established by
multiplying producer price index by rate of VAT and retailers mark up on cost
as described in the text
MY t per capita real disposable income. Real personal disposable income deflated by
defacto UK bome population over IS years (Monthly Digest) in thousands.
HPDt Hire purchase restrictions dummy variable. lbis variable lOOk two values over
the period considered. 2()41,before 1982q3 and zero there after. So a dummy is
set equal to 1 when hire purchase minimum legal deposit required on VCR is
positive, that is 1978q 1 to 1982q2. otherwise set equal to 0 for 1982q3 to
1987q4 (BREMA).
NOB Number of obscrvatiom.
RSS Residual Sum of Squares of the equation.
DW Durbin-Watson statistic for 1st order serial correlation.
LM4 Lagrange Multiplier test for residual autocorrelation up to order 4.
RSET Ramsey Reset test using the squ~ of the fitted values.
NORM larque-Bera test for nonnality.
HET Heteroscedasticity test based on regression of squared
residuals on squared fitted values.
CHOW Olow test for stability of the regression coefficicn&s.
PRED Predictive Failure Test. ie. Olow's second test of
adequaCy of predictions.
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CHAPTER6
AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE ROLE OF ADVERTISING
IN THE DIFFUSION OF COLOUR TELEVISION RECEIVERS IN THE
UK
6.1 INTRODUCTION
Attention is now turned to undertaking a similar investigation to the one in the
previous chapter, but using data on the diffusion of colour television (tv) receivers in the
UK. This panicular product is attractive in itself, being a good example of a venically
differentiated product. This new technology has almost completely replaced the older
monochrome product as can be clearly seen in diagram A6.1 in the appendix to this
chapter. Moreover, previous empirical studies have looked II the television receiver
(though mostly confined to the monochrome product) and it will be intriguing to make
comparisons with the results obtained here and see whether the ne&1ea of advertising in
these earlier television studies, has been a major omission.
On practical grounds, estimation of a diffusion model for this product also has a
potential advaruF in terms of data quality and availability. A longer time series exists
(almost double the obIervations) u the product wu first commercially introduced into
the UK in 1967. Furthermore, the raw dala represents the number of colour TV licences
in force (with a suitable adjusanent for licence evasion) and this series will more
accurately reflect acquisition of the first colour tv set. Consequently, the problems of
multiple and replacement purchases are avoided. Of course, the data will not be
completely immune from problems and a full description of the variables employed and
data series is given in Appendix A6 at the end of this chapC.er.
6.2 ESTIMATION OF THE STRUCTURAL DEMAND DIFFUSION
EQUATION
TIle estimating procedure will be identical to that adopted in the previous
chapc.cr. Acwrdinpy. initial estimation will begin with the epidemic sttuctural demand
diffusion equation u follows:-
16S
H -TVLt.l H
6.0
whe~ P > 0 Xi < 0
TVLt = Stock of colour tv receivers in time t
qit = Seasonal dummy variable in time 1. i-3
H = Potential population
a - External channel of infonnation
P = Internal channel of infonnation coefficient (Word of Mouth)
ut = Error term in time L
(A full description of the data and variables used is given in Appendix A6 at the end of
this chapter)
6.1.1 Potendal Population
This equation explains the proportion of non owners who become ownen of I
colour TV set in the time intervalt-l to L From the litel'lllR survey in Chapter 2, it was
clear that differenl approaches to the potential population panmcter H have been used in
the empirical wort. Some studies have taken H as constanl and its maanitude estimated
from the data (eg. Horsky and Simon 1983), other writen have used an appropriate
demographic variable, recognising that when usinl a lonl time series, this will obviously
change over time (ea. Simon and Sebastion 1987) and others. mainly in the economics
field, have explained H in tenns of relevant economic: variables (el. BaiD 1962, and
similarly Chow 1967 and Williams 1972).
The method adopted here, as in Olapter', is to maintain the saturation concept
but replace H with • relevant demographic variable Ht. Althoulh the number of
households in the UK (Ht) seem. approprillC, it is nec::aSIl)' 10 n:c:opiae thal colour
uansmission availability wu resuic:t.ed in the early period. This i. likely to be an
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important dampeninl factor on the colour TV acquisition decision. There is linle point in
purchasing the new ICChnology if colour transmission facilities are not available in the
areal Of course. consumer's expectations may lead to purchases ahead of the
inuoduction of the transmission service. but this lead effect is unlikely to be of any
significant duration. There was a gradual spread of this service for both BBC and ITV
over the period. So the number of households in the UK was adjusted to take account of
this factor (AHt). In addition, colour service was only available on BBC2 from its
inception in 1967 until November 1969, when transmission also commenced on BBCl
and ITV. A dummy variable was established to take account of this extra restriction.
6.1.1 EstImation; The Basle Model
Estimation of the simple epidemic model. in which the only source of
information flow is social contact between existing ownen in the population. is based on
the following model (results shown inTable 6.A);
6.1
where p > 0 e < 0 Xi < 0
TVLt - TVLt-1
AH, -TVLt-l
'TVLt-l
AlIt
BBC2= dummy variable, takes a value 1 when colour transmission on BBC 2 clwmel
only
= Internal channel of information coefficient (Word of Mouth).
qil = Seasonal dummy variable in time t. i-3
I. ThiI cc:nlrlinl Oft dIIlCqIIiIilion dec:iIion will be or moea.ipif"~ durina Ihe..ty yem II by 1M
beFminI or 1973. ipIII'OlimaIely ~ of UK houMholda coWd receive co_1rInIm.iIIian Oft bodl BBCt
IIId rrv chIaneII.
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Ut = Enor term in time L
The explanalOry variable OWNt shows the number of existinl ownen in the
potential populadon. This variable has the expected positive coefficienL Actually. by
usinl adjusted households in the denomina&or. an assumption is beinl made that the
currera ownen only come into contact with non-ownen belonginl to the potential
population for which colour service is available. ie. ABr Since the extension of the
tranSmission service was inuoduc::ed on a reJional basil and individualJ will generally
come into contact with people in their immediate locality. thil may not be an
unreasonable assumption. 2
The BBC dummy variable. indicatinl restricted access to the colour service.
has the expected deflationary effect on the dependent variable. The seasonal pauem of
the raw data indicared that quarter 4 was most important. probably reflectinl the effect of
ChrisUDas holiday viewinl. The remaininl seasonal dummies qt. q2. and q3 are included
in the model and have their expected nelative coefficiellll. Althoup a LM test for serial
correlation up to order 4 accepts the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. the failure of
the Reset. Normality and Heteroscedasticity diagnostic teItI sullest that the simple
model is mis-specified.
6.2.2.1 Social Cootaet/lnternallnfonnation Parameter P
Before extendinl&he model to include advenisinl. it ia appropriate to consider
previous studies which have investilated the diffusion of TV receiven. There are a few
studies from &hemanageme.. literature which are very simUar to the simple model
suucture given in equation 6.1 above. Bass (1969). usinl annual data for monochrome
TVs in the USA. found P to be 0.25 11. Neven (1972). usinl annual data for oolour TV
SdI in Ihe USA. obtained a value of 0.8369 for the social oomact coeflk:ienl p. These
studies used very few observations (16 and 7 respecdvely) to obtain the stnIctural
2. ID..,elM.UI", uudjulMd houIeholda in IhiI upllnalDry ...... il,1'V'4-11llt ..... frI liall
diff..... 10 che .......... INJCW.
'rABLI: 6.A
Ordinary Lea.t Square. E.t~tion
of the Epidamic Model.
Dependant variable i. ('rY'Lt - 'l'YLt.-1) IAlIt - 'l'YLt-1
MODEL 6.1 MODEL 6.1 .lA MODEL 6.1.1B
CONS 0.0357 0.0232 0.0208
(0.8716.-02) ** (0.0136) • (0.0145)
OWt 0.0484 0.0401 0.0231
(0.0104) ** (0.0125) ** (0.0202)
BBC2 -0.0167 -0.0176 -0.0180
(0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0135)
qlt -0.1313e-02 0.9094e-02 -0.0250
(0.8632.-02) (0.0123) (0.0134) *
q2t -0.0283 -0.0199 -0.0268
(0.8481.-02) ** (0.0110) * (0.0128) *
q3t -0.0260 -0.0151 0.6754e-02
:
(0.8485.-02) ** (0.0124) (0.0134)
At 0.3558e-05 0.3500e-05(0.2992.-05) (0.3222.-05)
At-l
0.1240e-04
(0.2850.-05) **
At-2 0.1156e-05(0.2163.-05)
At-3
-0.6130e-05
(0.2951.-05) *
At-4
0.1525e-06
(0.3320.-05)
NOB 71 71 68
RSS 0.0421 0.0412 0.0287
DW 1.7372 1.8284 1.8264
g2 0.4476 0.4511 0.5585
LM4 Accept Accept Accept
RSET Reject Reject Reject
NORM Reject Reject Accept
UT Reject Reject Reject
Standard errors 1n parentheses.
*, ** denotes siqnificance at 5' and 1\ respectively.
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parameten from the OLS estimation. No diagnostic tests were performed. Later, Bass
(1980) re~stimaled the demand diffusion equations for both colour and monochrome seta
in the USA, after incorporating a price effect component He obtained estimates of
0.S298 and 0.131S for the ~ coefficient respectively. Again very few observations were
used and no diagnostic testing of the model undertaken. However the author informally
notes that in the case of monochrome tv receivers there is some indication of mis-
specification because the eluticity of demand parameter is undefined. Althouah referring
to a different country, the size of the ~ coefficient in equation 6.1 when adjusted to take
account of the different observation intervals, is approximately 0.16 and would seem
closer to that found by Bass in his earlier work (but of course, this referred to the
monochrome product).
However very little faith should be placed on any of these estimates u the
probability of mis-specification in these other studies looks high. liven the results found
for model 6.1 above and the obvious variation in the estimates from models of very
similar constrUction. Although no( saictly equivalent to equation 6.1, there are two
studies from the economics literature which have empirically investi,ated the diffusion of
the monochrome tv receiver in the UK. Bain (1962) usinl quarterly data (the saturation
parameter in his model is explained by economic variables), found the ~ coefficient to
range between 0.15 and 0.277 for various television relions. However, the author does
not have too much confidence in the parameten since the estimated powth curve did not
perform well over the two extremes of the process. The stock adjustment model of
Williams (1m), again is not strictly comparable to equation 6.1 above, however the
estimated parameter can be transformed to give III approximate coefficient value of 0.23
on the existin, ownership variable.3 The author found autocorrelation to be a problem
and tranSformed the model accordingly. However there were stroIll indications 1hat the
non linear resuictiona imposed Q priori, were not accepted by the data.
3. Which 01COUI'II it ........ II .. ldjullmlftl coeft'1CiInI inWUlilml'(l97l) modII w'_ __ .. no
short ... flClOl'l ., Iff.. iL
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6.l.3 Advertisinlin the Epidemic Model; A Direct Route
The theoretical model presented in O\apter 3 and previous empirical work
would suggest that allowing advertising to provide an additional and external direct
source of information flow (through a in equation 6.1 above) could improve matters. As
before. the exact form of OP/(A) must be ascertained from the data. To begin with. only
current advertising is included. The results are given in Table 6.A for Model 6.1.1A in
which.
and al >0 6.1.1A
Again all the variables have their expected signs. Advertising has a positive but
small effect on the dependent variable. However. there is very little improvement in the
diagnostic test statistics. Therefore some further experimentation with the number of lags
and functional form of the a function was undenakcn. The failure of the Reset test alone
would suggest thal some other functional form may be appropriate. However when a
combination of diqnostic tests fail. these statistics are most likely indicating mis-
specification in general. rather than anything in particular. Usinl I logarithmic
uansformation of the curreru advertising variable (like H&.8 and S&.8). did not improve
matters overall. The Reset test still rejected the Null Hypothesi •• u did the Normality
and Heteroscedlsticity test. The adjusted R2 fell slightly oom~ with Model 6.1.1A
and although little confidence should aaach to this and the individual t statistics. on
balance using advertisinl in levels seemed more appropriate.4
There are obviously still problems with the model and so additional lagged
values of the advertising variable were included in the a functicn A maximum of 4
quarter lags were used. for the reasons already explained in Chapter S. The results for
Model 6.1.1 B are aiven in the table. As in the earlier estimation. the existina ownership
variable OWN, renectinl the effectiveness of the word of moulh information now, has I
positive coefficient. although its statistical significance i. much reduced. Of course.
... The ..... conclulianl ... re8Ched in aD or chi roUowina rpecific:IIiDnI whin t.bI .... _ 10....
IIIIvlltilina • .;.a,a. •• 1Ubeti&u1Ml inID thI eqUIIion. 0..Il10 occ.... did dUI impIoY. chi ~ or
1Mmodel_1O .... ..wll wiD not be nportM.
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reliance on the standard errors must be tentative unless the model meets the classical
assumptions underlying the OLS estimation procedure. Compared to earlier
specifications. there has been some slight improvement, with only the Reset and
Heteroscedasticity test now failing to accept the null hypotheses. Bearing this in mind. of
the additional lagged advertising variables included. the one quaner lag is most important.
both in magnitude and statistical significance. One of the problems of including the
lagged variables direcdy. is the possibility of multicollinearity. which would increase the
variance of the estimated parameters. It is therefore advisable to test the significance of
the advertising variables jointly (given the reservations regardin. the trustWonhiness of
tests baled upon the estimated variances of the coefficients). The null hypothesis that the
2nd. 3rd and 4th quaner lags are jointly insignificant from zero fell well within the
acceptance region. 'The model was re-estimated including current and the first lag of the
advertising variable only. As can be seen in Table 6.8. this revised model specification
6.1.1 C still looks suspect.
Given the relative dominance of the lagged advertisin. variable, current
advertising was dropped from the equation. Wbilst alllhe variables in 6.1.10 have their
hypothesised effect on the dependent variable and are all statistically sipiftcant at the ~'*'
level. the failure of the diagnostic statistics other than the LM test for autocond.ation
must cast doubt on Ibis structure. There is little to choose between models 6.1.1 C and
6.1.10. Further experimentation with a longer lag distribution is probably superfluous
sila throughout. the autocOrrelation test statistic feU weU within the acceptance region.
Generally in time series data. the ~ of autoc:orre1adon u indicated by the
appropriate diagnostic test is not unexpected. It can be a sian of dynamic mia-
specification ralher than true serial correlation of the enor terms (SIrJan 1964. Hendry cl
Mizon 1978). However as the epidemic based equation in model 6.1 already includes
some form of dynamica, justified on lheoretical grounds. IICceptance of the null
hypochesis of no serial correlation does not appear unreasonable.
'lULl: 6.B
OLB Z.timation of the Epid ..ic Model.
Dependent variable,
TOP • ('lYLt - 'rY'Lt -1) IAlIt - 'l'YLt-1
. .
CONS 0.0122 0.0322
(0.0123) (0.1954.-02)**
ODt 0.7618.-02 0.0230
(0.0134) (0.0115) *
BBC2 -0.0259 -0.0239
(0.0106) ** (0.0108) *
q1t -0.0201 -0.0335
(0.0128) (0.0114) **
q2t -0.0173 -0.0304
(0.9816.-02)* (0.7114.-02) **
.q3t -0.0167 -0.0332
(0.0110) (0.7914.-02) **
At 0.5604e-05
(0.2696.-05) *
At-1 0.1150e-04 0.1050e-04
(0.2687.-05) ** (0.2112.-05) **
NOB 71 71
US 0.0319 0.0341
OW 1.8760 1.9512
AR2 0.5682 0.5458
LM4 Accept Accept
UZ'1' Reject Reject
NORM Reject Reject
0'1' Reject Reject
MODEL 6. 1 • le MODEL 6 1 10
Standard errors in parentheses.
*, ** denotes significance at 5\ and l' respectively.
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6.2.4 Simultaneous Equation Blu
As pointed out in the previous chapter. the possibility of simultaneous equation
bias needs to be addressed. In c:hapcers3 and 4 attention was siven to advertisinl as an
endogenous variable. ootinl that the demand diffusion equation will then fonn part of a
simultaneOUS system. Consequently. if simultaneous equation bias in the OLS estimlleS
is to be avoided. the derived advenising appropriations equations will need to be
incorporated into the estimation procedure.
As already mentioned in the previous empirical chapter. the flCt that price may
also be a choice variable is still being ignored. However there may be some justification
in assuming that an oligopolist would prefer to engage in advenising as opposed to price
competition. Additionally. in the case of VCRs it wu argued that the supply side could
be considered exogenous due to the relative importance of imports. For colour tv
receivers this could be a more tenuous position. It is certainly true that durilll the early
197(15UK producers were unable to keep pace with the boom in demand due to limited
production facilities. As a consequence. impons increased dramatically. accounting for
approximately one quarter of all sales in the UK martet in 1973. Tbe outcome was Ul
agreement with Japanese mUlufacturel'l to restrict expolU to the UK martel It may
therefore be just as appropriate to consider the endoaenity of the price variable for this
particular product. Despite this. the followina estimation will still concentrate upon
advertising as the main decision variable.
Referrinl back to chapter 3. it is clear from 1he fint order conditions for profit
maximisation that the industry advertisinl decision equation can be summarised as
follows.
At = !(PCMt. PO\+I' Rt·APt·St·Dt) 3.22
where
PCM
t
= Industry price cost margin in period l
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PCMt+t = Industry price cost margin in t+1.S
Rt = TIle time discount raIe.
APt = TIle average retail price of the product
Dt = TIle number of suppliers of the product.
St = 'TVLa - 'TVLa-t. the number of new acquirers of the product udescribed in the
demand diffusion equation.
Using the demand diffusion equation 6.1.1 C. the system is u follows
s, = /(At• Aa-t· 'TVLa-l' Alit)
At = /(POdt. PCMt+l' Rt· APt· St·1\)
6.1.IC
3.22
Both the advenising decision equation and demand diffusion equation are over
identified. TIlerefore Two Staae Least Squares (TSLS) estimation will be appUed to the
demand diffusion equation 6.1.1C. Most of the identifyina restrictions on the demand
equation do not look unreasonable. except for the exclusion of the price and interest rate
variables. However. even if these variables were incorpora&cd inI.o the demand diffusion
model. the price cost margin variables and number of producers would ensure the
identification of the demand diffusion equation. UnfortwWely. the advertising decision
equation looks more suspect. It is quite feasible that previous advenisinl <At-I) and the
existing stock of owners could enter into the equadon. in which cue. the advenisinl
appropriations equation would not be identified. Eadmadon would then be nonsense
witmut additional exuaneous infonnation. Still. the focus of auention in this chapCer is
the empirical investigation of the demand diffusion equation and the need to overcome
S. slricdy. Ihia IhouId ba .apecellinnl ol eM I8CIDIId s-iocI price 00II_", A popabr ~ in the
CWIIOIftIIric Ii hII t.D ID .une1dlpCi¥. apPC'MioN behaviour in whidl CUI 1M lIatd vllue of
PCM would in equaIian. The rIIianaI apectalionl hypom.iI crilic:illd 1UCh"". blhaviour. In
!he foUowiJtc ..am eapecl&lionl or PCM illimply npllC8d by ill0IIII qUIIW Iud value .- 1M
..... it required bIIl'1IInI& U thlltnlCUll equIIiDa 3.22 wu -. ........ ..,...ay.more
c:ona woWd IDbe aiv- IDthI ..... api... apecwianl bIbav_ of"""""
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any potential simultaneOUS equation bias that may be present in the OLS estimated
parameters. Estimation of the suuctural advenising appropriations equation itself. will
not be undertaken. Therefore the plausibility of the identifying restrictions do not need to
be considered funher.
The TSLS estimates for model 6.1.1C are given in Table 6.C. The variables
have their expected coefficient signs except for CUJ"I"eI1l advenisina. However the null
hypothesis that this variable is not significantly different to zero falls well within the
acceptance region. In comparison to the OLS parameter estimates. the magnitudes are in
fact very similar to model 6.1.10. which only contains the lalled advertising variable.
The exclusion of CUI'I'eIU advertising from the specification means the OLS estimates in
model 6.1.10 will not suffer from simulWlCOus equation bias because the demand
diffusion equation will form part of a recursive system.
Using the estima1ed parameters in model 6.1.10, the direct effectiveness of
lagged advertising on the number of new acquirers of a colour tv receiver in the current
period can be evaluated. In 1968q2. an increase in real advertisinl messages by £I(XX)in
the previous quarter. will ~ in an extra 92 new acquirers of a colour tv receiver. At
the end of the sample period in 1985q4. the same increase in real advenisinl messages in
the previous quaner will stimulate l' new aCquirers of the product. 6 This diminishinl
effectiveness overtime is a particular feature of the epidemic model as explained in
chapters 3 and S. Unfortunately. the diagnostic tests for model 6.1.1 D indicalCd problems
still remained in the specification. Of course this direct route is not the only way in which
advertising can emer into the epidemic framewort. So the study will now proceed to the
altemative epidemic model specification where the ~ coefficienl of the existina
ownership variable in equation 6.1 above. is a function of advenisina expenditures.
TABLE 6.C
OLB &Dd TSLB Zstimation of the Epid_ic Model.
Dependent variable,
TOP - ('rYLt - 'l'YLt-l) IAIIt - ~-l
MODZL 6.1.1C
OLS Estimate. TSLa E.timateS
CONS 0.0122 0.0403
(0.0123) (0.0335)
OWNt 0.7618e-02 0.0292
(0.0134) (0.0271)
BBC2 -0.0259 -0.0231
(0.0106)** (0.0177) *
qlt -0.0201 -0.0389
(0.0128) (0.0248)
q2t -0.0173 -0.0358
(0.9816.-02) * (0.0228)
q3t -0.0167 -0.0398
(0.0110) (0.0280)
~ 0.5604e-05 -0.2272e-05
(a .2696.-05) * (0.9122.-05)
~-l 0.1150e-04 0.1010e-04
(0.2687.-05) ** (0.3245.-05) **
NOB 71 71
RSS 0.0319 0.0362
OW 1.8760 1.9794
Al\2 0.5682 0.5098
LM4 Accept Acc.pt+
RSK'1' Reject Accept+
NORM Reject Rej.ct+
0'1' Reject Acc.pt+
Standard errors in parentheses.
*, ** denotes significance at 5\ and 1\ respectively.
S List of instruments PCMt, PCMt+l' Rt, APt' OWNt, At-l'
dummies and constant te~. Sargan's Test statistic (1964)
accepts the null hypothesis that the equation is correctly
specified and the instruments are valid.
+ Diagnostic tests applicable to TSLS estimation, using
instrumental variable fitted values and residuals as
appropriate.
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6.2.5 Advertlslnlln the Epidemic Model; An Indirect Route
In this alternative specification. advertising has an indirect effect on the
diffusion process. This may occur if consumen perceive bias in the information
tranSmitted by producen of the new durable. Further impanial information will be
required before potential consumers are convinced of the accuracy of the advertiser's
claims. The alternative and independent source of infonnalion will be an existing owner
and consequently this channel of communication will be relatively more effective (Porter
1976). This line of reasonina would seem panicu1arly appropriaae for new consumer
durables. The inherent characteristics of such products make purchase an uncenain and
potentially costly exercise. especially since there may be questions over the technical
reliability that often accompany new and relatively complex products. Of course there
are some consumer durables for which an established rental sector exists (colour tv and
VCR being examples) and this facility would tend to mitiaate these neaative facton. On
this same poi... the existence of a rental sector may help overcome the problem of
consumer expectations of future technological advance slowing the diffusion process.
To begin with. the social contact coefficient ~ in equation 6.1. is assumed to
depend linearly on current advertising. So that
~ = bo+bl·At
where bo > 0 and bl > 0 6.1.2
The results for model 6.1.2 are given in table 6.0. All the economic variables
have their expected sign. However the statistical significance of bl looks dubious.
Compared to the model in which advenisinl enten directly. there seems little
improvement. II once again all the diagnostic teS1S oCher than the LM statistic fail. Also
the adjusted R2. which was relatively low in the eartier models. is now even lower.
Addinl the first quarter lal of advertisinl into the model (6.1.2A) did improve mallen
sli&h11y.increasinl the adjusted R2 from 0.447 to 0.591. Bodl the LM and Reset test
swistica are ICcepced yet the failure of the Heteroscedutidty test still lives some reason
to doubt the specification. However. &he standard erron (SE) were adjusted. II suUested
TABLE 6.D
OLi E.timatioD of the Epidemic Model.
Dependent variable,
'l'DP • ('1'YLt - TV'Lt -1) I~ - 'l'Ylat-1
. .
CONS 0.0321 0.0431 0.0489
(0.9467.-02) *. (WO.809ge-02) ** (0.8382.-02) **
OWNt 0.0372 -0.0281 0.361ge-03
(0.0156) * (WO.0259) (0.0141)
B8C2 -0.0173 -0.0261 -0.0237
(0.0118) (wo. 5848.-02) ** (0.0106)*
q1t 0.4981e-02 -0.0173 -0.0272
(0.0108) (wo. 8792.-02) * (0.9853.-02) * *
q2t -0.0233 -0.0191 -0.3000
(0.9957.-02) * (WO.1727.-02) * (0.7577.-02) **
q3t -0.0193 -0.0186 -0.0323
(0.0109) * (wo. 9028.-02) * (0.7712.-02)**
~ 0.3036e-05 0.6735e-05
(0.3145.-05) (WO.5079.-05)
AXlt 0.1370e-04 0.1190e-04
(WO.3535.-05) ** (0.2816.-02) * *
NOB 71 71 71
RSS 0.0415 0.0302 0.0330
CW 1.8051 1.8338 1.9397
.aa2 0.4470 0.5912 0.5608
LN4 Accept Accept Accept
RSK'!' Reject Accept Reject
NORM Reject Reject Reject
0'1' Reject Reject Accept
MODEL 6.1.2 MODEL 6.1.2A MODEL 6 1 2B
Standard errors in parentheses, W-White adjusted.
*, ** denotes siqnificance at 5\ and 1\ respectively.
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by White (1980). in order to be consistent in the presence of a non constant variance of
the disturbance tenns. The White adjusted SE on the tilled advertisinl variable
coefficient increased but still remained statistically significam. The current advertising
variable also had a positive coefficient but was no longer significant. However a joint test
of significance usinl the White adjusted enol'S, shoWI thal the two advenisinl variables
are significantly different to zero II the 5if, and 1if, level The estimated coefficient on
the emtinl ownership variable is unusually negative. allhough statistically insignificant.
This is some what surprising as it suggests the existing ownership variable hal no effect
in the absenCe of advenisina.
Model 6.1.2 was re-estimated using TSLS procedures and the information from
the advertisinl appropriations equation 3.22. The results are shown in Table 6.E. The
existing ownership variable had a positive but statistically insignificant coefficient. The
current advenisinl variable had a negative but insignificant coefficient. whilst the lagged
advertising variable had a positive effect and although reduced. it was still significant at
the 5if, level. The results would suUest that dropping current advertising from the
equation and re~atinl usinl OLS procedures would be appropriate. The results for
model 6.1.28 are displayed in table 6.0. The benefit of this step wu ambiguous.
Although the He&crosecedasticity test is just accepted, the Reset test now fails. The
magnitude of the coefficient on the existing ownership variable seems very low II0.0036
but in any case is sutistically insignificanl However the lalled advertising variable has
a positive and statistically significant coefficient at both the '" and 1" levels. Its
magnitude of 0.11ge-04 is very similar to the TSLS and the OLS estimate in model
6.1.2A.
Establishinl a combined model in which advertisinl enters duouah the social
contaCt coefficient ~ and directly as an external channel of information a. did ROC produce
any better resulli. When both current and lagged advertisinl were included in the
combined model. none of the economic variables were signiftcant and some had the
wronl signs. TbiI confirms the experience of S &l S. These authon also obtained several
TABLE 6.1:
OLS and TSLS E.timation ot the Epidemic Model.
Dependent variable,
TOP • ('r'ILt - 'r'ILt -1) IAlIt - 'r'ILt-1
MODEL 6.1.2A
OLS E.timate. TSLS z.timate.S
CONS 0.0431 0.0568
(wo. 8099.-02) * * (0.0137) **
OWNt -0.0281 0.0464
(WO.0259) (0.0536)
BBC2 -0.0261 -0.0204
(WO.5848.-02) ** (0.0132)
q1t -0.0173 -0.0407
(WO.8192.-02) * (0.0198) *
q2t -0.0191 -0.0447
(wo. 1721.-02) * (0.0196)*
q3t -0.0186 -0.0507
(WO.9028e-02) * (0.0238)*
AXe 0.6735e-OS -0.908Se-OS
(WO.5079.-05) (0.1080.-04)
AXlt 0.1370.-04 0.9395e-05
("10.3535.-05) ** (0 .. 4474.-05) *
NOB 71 71
RSS 0.0302 0.0454
DW 1.8338 2.0468
02 0.5912 0.3854
LM4 Accept Accept+
RSZT Accept Accept+
NORM Reject Raject+
UT Reject Accept+
Standard errors in parentheses, W-White adjusted.
*, ** denotes significance at 5\ and 1\ respectively.
S List of instruments PCMt, P~+l' Rt, APt' OWNt, AXlt'
dummies and constant term. Sargan's Test statistic (1964)
accepts the null hypothesis that the equation is correctly
specified and the instruments are valid.
+ Diagnostic tests applicable to TSLS estimation, using
instrumental variable fitted values and residuals as
appropriate.
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wrong parameter signs and rejected the combined model on grounds of econometric
intraetability. The two competing epidemic models are obviously nested within the
combined model and some attempt wu made to distinguish between the two on statistical
grounds using an F test. Both current and the first quarter lag advertising variables were
included in a and I!. Deleting the advertising variables from the a route accepts that they
are not significantly different to zero. Unfonunaaely. the same conclusions are reached in
respect of the advertising variables in the I! coefficient. Thus there is no clear statistical
preference for either sttucture.
6.2.6 Preliminary Conclusions
The lack of statistical guidance on the best epidemic specification is unfonwwe
since the magnitude and significance of the existing ownership variable is very sensitive
to the specification adopted and the econometric technique used. This would suggest that
previous findings need to be treated with great caution. especially when little if any
diagnostic testing has been undertaken. The role of advertisinl in the epidemic demand
diffusion equation looks slightly more convincing. Unfonwwely the data cannot
distinguish whether advertising enten directly or indirectly into the equation. However
the fU'Sl quaner 181 of advertising appean to be an imponant explarwory variable in the
epidemic demand diffusion model for this panicular product. It is also satisfying to note
that the magnitude and statistical significance of this variable remained consistem
throughout. Yet these preliminary conclusions must remain tentative u the statistical
performance of all the models estimated indicated further improvement wu necessary.
Thus the epidemk: model. even with advertising included is not altogether satisfactory.
6.1.7 Restrict1nl the Sample Period
The central issue in the epidemic framework is the lack of information about the
product. Such a deficiency is likely to be most acute in the early period immediately after
introduction. consequently the epidemic specification may only be rusonable for a
In
relatively short length of time.7 This may be particularly true for colour television
receiven since a similar (although generally agreed inferior) product had been in
existence for some time. so it is reasonable to expect thal consumen had some knowledge
about television sets. In contrast. the VCR wu a totally new innovation and potential
consumers may require a greater stock of information before acquisition. To investigate
further. the sample period wu broken into two periods 1l19niv. Some absorbing results
emerge (only the preferred model results are given in table 6.F and G). Generally the
second period samples appear to have reasonable structures u most of the diagnostic tests
accepted the null hypotheses. although there are of course fewer degrees of freedom and
these test statistics are asympcotic. However the explanaaory power of the equations in
the second period are very low (adjusted R2 statistics around 0.4). Further. hardly any of
the economic variables were statistically significant. But before too much is placed upon
the second period sample it is worth rememberinl thai by 1979 some 73~ of all
households had acquired their first colour tv receiver and the growth rate of the stock of
first tv sets had more or less settled at a constanl and very low rate. So it may be
~nable to expect the data to explain much over this Iller period.
1'uminI to the early period. which covered the first 10 yean of the diffusion
process. the diagnostic teSlS indicate thai autocorreladon was a panicular problem.
Ideally the stJUCture should be investigated further to see if the reason can be found.
Nonetheless. in order to obtain an indication of the estimated coefficients and statistical
significance. the equations were transformed and re-estimated. Whilst the LM test
statistic indicaced autocorrelation up to order 4. on closer inspection. first order serial
correlation looked mostly to blame. so a first order autorearessive process was usumed in
the re-estimation stage. The explanatOry power of the equation was much higher than the
second sample with the adjusted R2 statistics uound O.B. Apin it is deba&able as to the
preferred route for advertising in the epidemic model. In the shoner period. current
7. In dUI caM. &hi .timIIed epidemic model will be of hialDrical .... anly Iftd idIaOy ..... 11model
should be able., aplaia &hi who&. cilfuIion proc:ea. not juIt ICmII .....-' of iL
TABLE 6.1'
OLS and Maximum Likelihood Zatimation of the
Epidemic Model.
Dependent variable,
'l'DP - ('1'YLt. - 'l'YLt -1) / AlIt - 'l'YLt -1
MODZL 6.l.lA
$1968ql to 1977q4 1978ql to 1985q4
CONS 0.0133 0.0163
(0.914~.-02) (0.0753)
ODt 0.0444 0.0492
(0.0174)** (0.08'74)
BBC2 -0.0172
(0.9320 • .,02) *
q1t -0.1381e-02 0.0255
(0.5124.-02) (0.0322)
q2t -0.0109 -0.0278
(0 .4971e-02) * (0.0282)
q3t -0.4550e-02 -0.0241
(0.5018e-02) (0.0342)
At 0.6625e-05 0.3069.-05
(0.2219.-05) ** (0.6253.-05)
NOB 39 32
US 0.2864e-02 0.0304
DW 1.6410 1.8164
n2 0.8107 0.2402
LM4 Ileject+ Accept
UZT Accept Reject
NORM Accept Accept
UT Accept Accept
Ut - O.5703Ut_1 + Vt
(0.1506)**
$ Re-estimated by Maximum Likelihood Estimation subject to
autoreqressive error specification.
+Diagnostic tests from oriqinal OLS estimation.
Standard errors in parentheses.
*, ** denotes siqnificance at 5\ and 1\ respectively.
TABLE 6.G
OLB and Maximum Likelihood Zatimation of the
Epidemic Model.
Dependent variable,
TOP • (~ - ~-l) lASt - ~-l
MODEL 6. 1 . 2A
Iq. to 7 'q4 1 78ql to 1985q4
CONS 0.0276 0.1056
(0.0112) ** (0.0695)
OWNt -0.0324 -0.1000
(0.0354) (0.0949)
BBC2 -0.8795e-02
(0.9297.-02)
qlt -0.5693e-02 -0.0387
(0.3344.-02) * (0.0350)
q2t -0.0102 -0.0273
(0.3535.-02) ** (0.0239)
q3t -0.4705e-02 -0.0335
(0.3216.-02) (0.0288)
AXt 0.1940e-04 0.1740e-04
(0.3680.-05) ** (0.5953.-05) **
Altlt 0.1090e-04 0.5388e-05
(0.4726.-05)* (0.6007.-05)
NOB 39 32
RSS 0.1966e-02 0.0226
DW 1.7173 2.1919
02 0.8656 0.4124
LM4 Reject+ Accept
RSE'1' Accept Accept
NOme Accept Accept
0'1' Accept Accept
1968 1 19 7 $ 9
Ut - O.7764Ut_l + vt
(0.1385)**
$ Re-estimated by Maximum Likelihood Estimation subject to
autoregressive error specification.
+Oiaqnostic tests from original OLS estimAtion.
Standard errors in parentheses.
*, ** denotes siqnificance at 5\ and 1\ respectively.
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advertising rather than lagged advenising appears to be more important. such transience
is disquieting.
The findings of a TSLS estimation procedure (subject to a first and fourth order
auto regressive error specification) were disappointing with none of the variables being
statistically significant and are not reponed. Of course the advantages of the TSLS
procedure can be at the expense of increased variance in the estimated parameters. But
given the volatility of both the parameter estimates and statistical significance of the
existing ownership and advertising variables in this earner period. coupled with the
autocorrelation problem. some doubt must be cast on the adequacy of the epidemic
framework for this product.
6.2.1 Preliminary Conclusion. Revisited
When using the whole sample period. the laued advertising variable appeared
to give promising results. The statistical significance and magnitude of the coefficient on
this variable was consistent throughout However the data was W18ble to distinguish
whether advertisinl enaered direcdy through the internal channel of information fI or
provided a direct channel of information a. This fallin, was serious because of the
sensitivity of the coefficient of the existing ownership variable to the alternative
specification chosen. Funher ambiguities arose when the sample size was restricted to
the first ten years of the diffusion process. Ideally the model should explain the whole
period rather than • segment of it but given the relative lack of variation in the growth
rate in later yean. this may not be feasible for this particular product. In the shorter
period. current advertising emerged as the more important of the advertisinl variables yet
its statistical performance was more debatable. especially when the possibility of
simultaneOus equation bias was corrected for.
It is clear dlal the epidemic model produced some inlriauina resuill. especially
for the complete sample. However lIS reliability as an IdequaIe framewort to describe
the demand diffusion process is debitable. paniculuty Jiven me inSlIbWty of the
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estimated paruneters over the early period when the epidemic model should have been
most appropriate. Perbapl this conclusion is not too surprising u even with the inclusion
of advertising, the model is a relatively simple specification. Many variables are missing,
which from an economic point of view, could be very influential on the diffusion process.
In order to see if this is the case, attention is now turned to the alternative probit based
demand diffusion equation presented in chapter 4.
6.3 ESTIMATION OF THE PROBIT STRUCTURAL DEMAND
DIFFUSION EQUATION
6.3.1 Estimation; the Static Equilibrium Model
Using the infonnation contained in chapter 4, the basic estimating equation is U
follows;
log ( ~ IAHt • ~ ) = • ( 'Z! t ) + ",.BBCt + I;.9i·CIit + 'It
6.3
where
TVLt = 5coc:k of colour tv receivers in time t
At • Total number of advenising messages in time t
Pt = Relative retail price of colour tv receiver in time 1
Rt =- Real rile of interest in time t
AM, = Number of households in the UK. adjusted for colour service b'InSIIlission.
BBC2= dummy variable, takes a value 1 when colour transmission on BBC 2 channel
only
qil = Seasonal dummy variable in time t, i -3
(A full descripdon of all the variables and dala is given in cbe appendix at cbe end of this
chapcer)
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The results for thil simple specification are not recorded but not swprisingly. all
of the diagnostic tests calculated fell well within the reject relion. indicating strongly that
model 6.3 was mis-specified. so little attention should be given to the individual
coefficients estimated. However. of the interesting variables. only the price term and
BBC2 dummy had their expected coefficient signs. The Iarae adjusted R2 should not be
given too much emphasis as thil is quite common with time series data.
In the last chapter. additional economic variables were included in an ad hoc
fashion to the basic estimating equation in an attempt to improve the specification. This
is obviously also required here. Per capita income (MY) il included in the above
equation as the income constraint will be just as importaN to the colour television
acquisition decision. Likewise. credit restrictions are also bound to be relevant for this
particular product. In the VCR model. the relevant variable used was a dummy to reflect
the minimum legal proportion required as I deplsiL AI the time series for the colour tv is
longer. this proportion varied far more and the deposit variable DPST IIincluded directly
into equation. thus
Vt• ~ + "-Pt + "'(·At + p·Rt + ~t + ".DPST, + ",.BBC2t
+ li·9iQil + Ut
6.3A
where
K < 0 "'( > 0 p < 0 ~ > 0 " < 0 VI < 0 9· < 0I
The results for modd 6.3A are liven in Table 6.H. There il no improvement in
the interpretation of the diagnostic test statistics. with only the Reset test accepting the
null hypolhesil. The additional variables, MY and DPST do have their respective
positive and neptive ooemcients but the interest race variable and advenising variable
still behave pervenely. havinJ incorreCt coefficient Iiana·
TABLJ: 6.B
OLB EatimatioD of the Probit Nodel.
Dependant variable, Yt - 109 (~ / Ut - 'l'VLt>
MODEL 6.3A MODEL 6.38 MODEL 6.3C
CONS 4.0290 3.2916 3.8140
(1.3787) ** (1.1164) ** (1.1317) **
Pt -0.0163 -0.0158 -0.0163
(O.8377E-03) ** (0.6863.-03) ** (0.7296.-03) **
~ -0.6300e-04 -0.4830e-04
(0.3140.-04) * (0.2630.-04) *
~-l -0.2470e-04 -0.3520e-04
(0.2590.-04) (0.2610.-04)
~ 0.2158.-02· 0.9417e-03 0.2743.-02
(0. H40E-02) (0.6090.-02) (0.6055.-02)
MYt 0.6903e-03 0.1107e-02 0.9188e-03
,
(0.1368.-02) (0.1126.-02) (0.1109.-02)
DPS'!'t -0.1527 -0.2766 -0.2036
(0.3030) (0.2498) (0.2483)
BBC2 -0.5926 -0.4247 -0.3930
(0.1485)** (0.1280)** (0.1268)**
qlt -0.2404 0.1036 -0.9015e-02
(0.1311)* (0.1117) (0.1256)
q2t -0.2548 -0.0933 -0.2080
(0.1177) * (0.OH5) (0.0962)*
q3t -0.2764 -0.0646 -0.2053
(0.1313) * (0.0759) (0.1069) *
HOB 72 71 71
ass 4.2993 2.8751 2.7222
OW 0.5101 0.4884 0.4790
AJl2 0.9864 0.9900 0.9904
LN4 Reject Reject Reject
ItSE'!' Accept Accept Accept
NORM Reject Accept Accept
BJ:T Reject Reject Reject
Standard errors in parentheses.
*, ** denotes significance at 5' and l' respectively.
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The precise functional rwure in which the economic variables enter the z·
function wu not given a priori and SO needs investigating. The equation wu re-
estimated using logarithmic transfonnation of the explanatory variables. Unfonunately
this did not give any better results. Some diagnostic test statistics improved (eg. the
Normality test accepcs the null hypothesis) but at the expense of the failure of others (eg.
the Reset test now rejects the null hypothesis). Also the results are disappointing in
economic terms, advenising still has a negative coefficient and althoup the interest rate
variable is now negative u expected. the hire purchase deposit variable did not have its
correct coefficient sign. The results are therefore inconclusive between these two
alternative specifications.
6.3.2 EstImation; A Dynamic Model
Of course. the probit model derived in chapter 4 is a staDCequilibrium concept.
Consequently it is not surprising to find the diagnostic tests (OW and LM4) indicating
autocorreladon, Dynamic mis-specification is likely to be the cause. Fwther
investigation must focus on this aspect first It may be that once the correct dynamics are
discovered the other problems (as indicated by the remaininl diagnostic tests) disappear
since they may merely be symptOms of the same root cause.
Of all the explanatory variables, advertising is the prime candidate for including
lagged values II WII suggested in the theoretical chapters. Given the earlier estimation of
the epidemic based model. the first quancr lag WII substituted for current advertising in
the equaDOIL There is some slight improvement compared to model 6.3A but in
economic terms the negative coefficient on the lalled advertisinl variable and the
positive one on the rate of interest is still disquieting. The LM4 and OW statistic seem to
sugest that first order autocorrelation is the main problem in the spedflcation. If serial
conelated disturbance terms exist in the model. the estimated parameters will be unbiased
and consistenl but not minimum variance Therefore the stadsticalsipiflcance of the
coefficients should be treated with caution.
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These simple dynamics are obviously not sufficienL The importance of the first
quarter lag may reflect the fact that a peak effect in a longer lag structure is required. so
an Almon lag distribution on the advertising variable was investigated. Both a second
and third order polynomial was tried. along with various lag lengths up to a maximum of
8 quarters. Unfortunately thiJ avenue of research did not prove fNitful and the results are
therefore not reponed. 'Iluougb>ut, the autocorrelation test statistics strongly indicated
serial correlation (mostly of the first order) was present Since there were also
suggestions of a non constant variance and some of the advertising coefficientJ behaved
perversely. the overall conclusion must be that the model specification is incorrect.
1berefore simply transforming the equation to remove the serial correlation would not be
appropriate. Instead the specification of the model must be reappraised.
6.3.2.1 Distributed Lags vs Partial Adjustment
1be disappointing results could have emelJed because the form of the lag
distribution was mis-specified. An infinitely geometrically declining lag structure on the
advertising variable alone was investigated. but this did not prove successful. However it
may be more relevant to include dynamic terms for the other economic variables too. If
they all have a common ralC of decay then estimating equation 6.30 in Table 6.1 is
produced. Actually the same estimation equation would result from assuming. panial
adjustmcm behavioural hypothesis on the equilibrium relationship described in equation
6.3 and this type of behaviour could be just as relevant. Although equation 6.3 describes
the equilibrium stoCk of colour tv as the economic variables change over time. there may
not be immediate adjustment. perhapl because individuals already own • recently
purchased monochrome set. It could be some time before the existinl owner ilprepared
to discard the mono receiver in favour of the new technology. for III individual who
does not currently own • tv set, adjusanent would be immediate once the ownership
condition (equation 4.3 in Cl1apter 4) holds. but as noted in the appendix to this chapter.
by 1967 some 86,. of UK househOlds already hid 1CqUircd. monochrome seL
'l'ABLI: 6. I
OLB Eatimation of the Probit MOd.l.
Dependent variable, Yt - l09(~ I ABt - ~)
.
CONS 0.5084 0.3379(0.2409)* (WO.21??)
Pt -0.1830.-02 -0.1422e-02(0.3971e-03)** (WO.381Se-OJ)**
At -0.6336e-05(0.5289.-05)
At-l 0.1310e-04(WO.S422.-0S)**
Rt 0.3710e-03 -0.8570e-04(0.1222e-02) (WO.1164.-02)
MYt 0.1864e-03 0.2100e-03(0.22Sge-03) (WO.1924.-0J)
DPSTt -0.1846 -0.2048(0.0499)** (WO.OH?)**
BBC2 0.0273 0.0193(0.02?8) (WO.OHS)
qlt -0.0323 -0.0541(0.0222) (WO.0223)**
q2t -0.0830 -0.0696(0.019?)** (WO.0146)**
q3t -0.0779 -0.0671(0.0220)** (WO.0136)**
Yt-1 0.8554 0.8705(0.0225)** (WO.0215)**
NOB 71 71
RSS 0.1122 0.1032
D-h 2.1459 1.7339
02 0.9996 0.9996
LM4 Reject Accept
RSET Accept Accept
NORM Accept Accept
UT Rej.ct Reject
MODEL 6.3D MODEL 6 31:
Standard errors ln parentheses. W - Whlte adjusted .
•, •• denotes siqnificance at S\ and 1\ respectively.
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Tbe overall effect of CW'1'eIU stocks of monochrome tv receiven on adjusunent
to the new equilibrium. will depend partially upon the age distribution of the
monochrome sets. Tbe older the average age of existing monochrome sets. the more
likely it is that individuals will be prepared to undertake premature scrapping. thus
reducing the constraining factor on the acquisition of the new technology. Tbe age
distribution over the sample period was not known. but it is likely to decrease over time
once the new product was introduced. Consequently. the rate of adjustment to the desired
equilibrium position given in equation 6.3 could change over time. However in the
estimation model. the adjustment will be assumed constant for simplicity and 6.30
results.8
Some attempt was made to include the stock of monochrome sets in the
equation directly without recourse to the panial adjustment hypothesis but the resulting
equation did not perform too well. Incidentally. the partial adjusunenl should really apply
to the colour tv variable equation rather than the tranSformed equation 6.3. However if
this was followed rigorously. then a complex non linear model would result and it is
unlikely that any better results would emerp. Consequently the estimated adjustment
parameter in model 6.30 is related to the true adjustment parameter but is only an
approximation.
In terms of the diagnostic teSlS for model 6.30. only the heteroscedasticity
statistic is rejeaed. One reason for the probable non constant variance could be a
difference over time in the accuracy of the advertising variable. AJ explained in the
apperxlix A6. by necessity the time series for this variable included expenditure on both
colour and monochr'ome tv receiven. The resulting problems are likely to be most severe
in the early period when the volume of advertising on the existin. and established
monochrome product. would tend to dominale. So in the beginning. the true level of
advertisin. expenditure on colour tvs will be lower thm meUURd. Laler on. the data is
8. Since Y, . Y,.1 • )..(Y., • Y,.1). w.... y., will bep-~......6.3 .. ~ illhi 'lia 01 edjullment~---.
1&4
more likely to reflect the variable required. Unfortunately, nothing could be done to
improve the accuracy of the advertising data so White adjusted standard errors are given.
since these estimates will be consistent in the presence of heteroscedasticity.
Although the LM test showed no autocorrelation up to order 4, Durbins h
statistic (which is appropria&e when one of the explanuory variables is a lagged
dependent variable), conflicts with the LM statistic and it is surprising that the LM
statistic did not pick this up. Knowing which gives the truer picture is very important
since the OLS estimates will be biased and inconsistent if autocomlation is a problem.
However a plot of the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ recursive residuals does not give any
particular reason to doubt the specification.
The price and hire purchase variable are negative and statistically significant at
both the .5 and 1" levels. The income variable and BBCl dummy variable have their
correct signs but are not statistically significanL The advenisinl variable has an
unexpected negative coefficient and although it is statistically insignificant. this is
perplexing. The rale of interest variable also has the wrong sign from an economic point
of view but once again it is statistically insignificant. The lagged dependent variable
which has resulled from the Koyck or partial adjusaDent transformation process is
positive and stronaly significant. In fact. as in the last chapter, this variable dominates the
equation. The magnitude of its coefficient implies a rale of decay of 0.1446, translated in
partial adjustment terms, this means that it will take about three and a half years to
accomplish 90'1 of the desired adjustment to the new equilibrium position. Given the
narure of the product under investigation. this may not be too unreasonable Of course this
variable may be relevant in its own right. piekina up a bandwagon or word of mouth
effect.
Not too much attention should be given to these resulu because the possibility
of first order autocorrelation should be further invesdglled. Oiven earlier results, the first
quaner lag of advertising was used instead of cwrent Idvertisinl {there will still be an
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infinitely declining lag stnIcture on this variable. but current advenisinl is no longer
Important in the current period). The results for model 6.3E in Table 6.1 are far more
encouraging. from an economic viewpoint. all the coefficients on the variables other
than the BBel dummy are correct. Boch the Reset and Normality test are accepted and
LM4 also accepts the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation up to order 4. Durbins h
statistic is unbiguous. accepting the nuB hypothesis at the 1,. level but not at the s%
level. A LM test up to order 1 wu therefore calculaled. The LM test statistic feU weU
within the acceptance region u did the individual t statistic on the first quan.er lal of the
residual. On balance. it is probably safe to conclude thal this specification is free from
serial correlation. This is encouraging u the estimated parameten can be considered
unbiased and consistenL
However the variance will not be efficient u indicaled by the failure of the
Heteroscedasticity test. As mentioned earlier. this could be due to the changing accuracy
of the advertising dau over time. The SE were therefore adjusted u suggested by White.
Compared to the White adjusted SE. the OLS standard erron were generally very close
except for the BBCl dummy variable. Its variance increased considerably. serving to
reduce the t statistic. thus confirminl its statistical insianificana:. The relative price. hire
purchase depoSit and lagged advertising variable were all statistically significant at the S
and I,.levels. The coefficients on the income and real rate of interest variables. although
of correct economic sign. were not statistically significant. Once again. it is the lagged
dependent variable which is dominating the equation. although both the price and deposit
variables also appear impoftallL
As model 6.3E looks promising. it is worth testing this stNcture fwther. A plot
of CUSUM and CUSUMSQ recursive residuals did not give lilY particular reason to
doubt the specification. A further investigation of the structural Slabillty of the model
would normally entail calculatinl a (lx)w test. However given the pretence of the BBel
dummy variable. estimation of a second sample, which's required for the tat statistic. is
not feuible due to sinaularity of the data. Simply droppinl this dummy variable in the
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second period only would mt be appropriate for the calculation of the test statistic. The~
are two approaches to this problem. Firstly OlOw's second test (which is also used as a
predictive failu~ test) can still be calculated. as it avoids the need to estimale the second
sample separa&ely. A break point of 1978q4 was chosen on I number of economic
grounds. In 1979 a newly elected conservative government led to changes in the taxation
and social benefiu policy. which in tum affected the distribution of income. The upsurge
in unemployment during this period was also likely to have affected the variance of the
income distribution. Funhennore, the recently introduced complementary VCR product.
could have had a positive influence upon the perceived benefit of colour tv acquisition.
The tv product itself changed over time and in particular the Teletext facility was
incorporated into some tv models. This effectively increased the quality of the colour tv
~ceiver.9 Actually this extra featu~ had been available prior to this dale but I national
teletext awareness campaign was undertaken in lale 1978 leadina to increued consumer
knowledge on this facility. Ideally. the price variable should incorporate such quality
improvements (Chow 1967 Stoneman 1976) but the basic producer price index used in
the consuuction of this variable assumes the quality of the product is constant. 10 The
test statistic accepted the null hypothesis that the prediction erron we~ nee statistically
different to zero. This is surprising given the suggested ~asona for I stNctural change
after this dale. unless of course these factors were of minor importance.
The second approach to the singularity problem. was to drop the BBC2 dummy
variable from the full sample (and since it was statistically insignificant this may not be
unreasonable) and conduct a Olow structural Iftat test (after confU'llling that the
differences in the two sample variances were not statistically significant. this beina
necessary before the OlOw lest is appropriate AmemiYI 1989). The Olow test statistic
accepted the null hypothesis of no stNctural b~ak after 1978q4.
9. The dati coukI not .. diIa&IJeI.... 1OdiIlinpiIh betw.. MIl wiIh ... wilhaut .. leIat ~b..
10. Aa Iha price v.w.. I*ronned reladvely weD dnuahouI aha ~ it iIunIibIy thlllUCh 1ft
Idj\llllnMl would be wonbwlWl. ThiJ proved the CUIwhin 1ft alr.naDve ralllive price V.wM wu UMd
wNch Ihowed Iha rei•• proctuc. price indiceI £or eokM' ...smOb..daCIIM'" Thilvlriabllwu.till
nee." and .~ bill Iba ...,.seIy included luxuryaoodI purcbIM tu or VAT fila tooUd more
irn~
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6.3.3 Restrictina the Sample Period
Since model 6.3E does not include current advertising. there is no need to
undertake TSLS estimation u the OLS estimates should be unbiased as the equation will
form pan of a recursive system.1t However. given the results for the epidemic model. it
will be interesting to take a closer look at the two samples separately. The first sample
will include the 8BC2 dummy variable. whereas the second one will obviously not The
results are given in table 6J and raise some questions on the above analysis. In the
second sample. the diagnostic tests all fall well within the acceptance region. The
economic variables all have their correct signs but none other than the lagged dependent
variable is statistically significant Most of the explanatory power of the equation is
coming from this variable. Of course as already pointed out. there is very little variation
in the dependent variable over this period. so it is not surprising that the economic
variables do not appear to contribute to the explanatory power of the equation.
The early period shows strong signs of mis-specification given the failure of all
of the diagnostic tesIS other than the Reset test. Due to the presence of a lagged
dependent variable coupled with autocOrrelation. the RSS of the equation will be
contaminated. This might explain why the O1ow test acceptI the sauctura1 stability of
the model even though a closer inspection of the individual coefficients across the two
time periods would seem to contradict this conclusion. The early period model was re-
estimated subject to a first order autoregressive error process. Compared to the OLS
estimates. the variables which are statistically significant and have their expected signs
are once again the relative price. hire purdwe deposit and lalled dependent variables.
However the incOme variable which has its correct positive coefficient is now statistically
significant at the ,,. level. The advertising variable whilst being positive as expected. is
not statistically significant and so no longer appean to be an important explanatory
variable. One worrying feature is the wrong positive signed coefficient on the 88C2.
dummy variable which is also statistically significant at the ,., level. Of course the
It. Of ~ the poIIibility of 1MpriceYlri'" beina "11nOUI hM .d1lblln ipand • explained arl.
in 1M.. XL
TABLI: 6.J
OLB and Maximum Likelihood zatimation
of the Probit Model.
Dependent variable, Yt - loq('l'VLe/ ABt - TVLt>
MODEL 6.3E
$1968ql to 1978q4 1979ql to 1985q4
CONS 0.1286 0.1599
(0 .2504) (0.4163)
Pt -0.9146e-03 -0.3427e-03
(0.4508.-03) • (0.9593.-03)
Ae-l 0.1870e-05 0.1230e-04
(0.9954.~05) (0.8561.-05)
~
0.8812e-03 -0.650ge-03
(0.1109.-02) (0.5488.-02)
MYt 0.3403e-03 0.1027e-03
(0.1969.-03) • (0.6620.-03)
DPSTt -0.1619 -0.2127
(0.0423) •• (0.1621)
BBC2 0.0462
(0.0207)·
q1t -0.0339 -0.0260
(0.0357) (0.0502)
q2t -0.0869 -0.0417
(0 .0134)·· (0.0289)
q3t -0.0532 -0.0591
(0.0294) • (0.0272) •
Yt-1 0.9074 0.9290
(0.0237) •• (0.0738)··
NOB 43 28
RSS 0.0306 0.0310
D-h 2.2419+ -1.0849
U2 0.9996 0.9928
LM4 Reject+ Accept
PSET Accept+ Accept
NO~ Reject+ Accept
lIZ'!' Reject+ Accept
Ut - -0.6019Ut_3+ Vt(0.1310)**
$ Re-estimatedby Maximum Likelihoodestimation subject to
autoreqressiveerror specification.
+ Diaqnostic tests from oriqinal OLS estimation.
Standard errors in parentheses.
*. ** denotes sianifi~An~eAt 5' And 1\ resoe~tivelv-
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tranSformed model only accounts for serial correlation problems. Therefore the estimated
parameten in the early period could still be wueliable because the failure of most of the
diagnostic tests in the original equation gave reasons to question this specification over
the earty period.
6.3.4 Preliminary Conclusion.
When the whole sample period 1968 to 1985 is used. the probit model 6.3E.
which includes the lagged dependent variable and the fU'Sl quaner lag of advertising looks
promising. Of all the economic variables included. it is interesting to note that the price
and hire purchase variables behaved .well consistently. 'The lagged dependent variable
tended to dominate the equation results and whilst the magnitude of the coefficient. when
tranSlated in partial adjusUnent terms, did not seem too unreasonable. this is not the sole
interpretation for the lagged dependent variable. Unlike the epidemic model. information
flows are given little prominence and this variable could be picking up the bandwagon or
word of mouth effect. The first quaner lagged advertising variable also appeared
importanl but not once the sample period was restricted to the first 11 years of the
diffusion process, however, this conclusion should be treated cautiously given the poor
statistical performance of the model specification over this restricted period as indicated
by the diagnostic test statistics.
6.4 CONCLUSIONS; THE COLOUR TELEVISION RECEIVER
In comparison to the epidemic model results. the probit model seems more
reievaru in describing the demand diffusion equation for the colour tv receiver in the UK.
The structure looks promising and wonhy of further investigation. The model may not be
worting too well over the early period because it fails to capture the information flow
aspect well enouah and so may need some additional thought given to this period in the
diffusion procesa. when lack of information may be relatively importanL
The epidemic model provided some inlriauing results but the volatility of the
coefficients on the main variables when using different specification hypotheses and
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econometric techniques. did give serious doubts about the applicability of this panicular
diffusion model and especially the confidence attached to the parameter estimates. This
is perhaps not too surprising given that neither price or the hire purchase deposit variables
were included in the model The results from the probit model estimation cenainly
indicated that this could have been a serious omission. Either way. there are some
encouraging results for the colour tv receiver and it would cenainly be wonh pursuing the
role of advenising in the diffusion process further. At the very least. this wort does show
that previous studies which have sought to quantify the magnitude and sipiftcance of
advertising when confined in an epidemic framework. need to be viewed judiciously.
APPENDIXA6
THE VARIABLES AND DATA
BACKGROUND
The introduction of the monochrome receiver has been a story of a very
successful consumer leisure appliance. moving in a relatively shon space of time from
beinl a lUXUryitem to I more or less common article inmost UK households. In 1967.
the propol1ion of the population who owned I black and white tv was estimated to be at
least 86%. Throughout the 1950s and early 19605. only monochrome sets were available
in the UK. But like many products. the life cycle of this durable was cunailed by the
introduction of I technololically superior product, In 1967. the BBC belan colour
uansmission on its second channel. It soon became apparent that the colour tv receiver
was replacinl the older technology as the main set in UK households. In 1985 the
proportion of households owninl a monochrome set only. was down to approximately
13% of the population. Diagram A6.1 clearly shows this substitution process lakinl
place. Like its early predecessor. the colour tv set proved remarkably successful. with
acquisition levels reaching around 60% by the end of the first decade of the products
commercial existence. At the end of 1985. a colour tv receiver could be found in Illeast
80% of UK households. I
The purpose of the empirical model presented in this chapter has been to
explain the spread of ownership of the first set ovenime. Actually. acquisition is
probably a better term to use. since individuals have the choice to purchase or rent this
particular product. 2 This study is not concerned with thil division. althoulh it is
interesting to note that the proportion renting a colour set has been I significant although
decreasing propol1ion (in 1982. MINTEL estimated that the rental sector still accounted
for some 45% of colour sets sold in the UK). The decline in importance of the renw
sector will obviously reflect such factors as the increasinl reliability of the product.
1 Proportion fiptl iJllhiI ........... .,... on lance dI&a UMdjualild b ......
2 In 1M ... " o...wp .ndllCqUililian will be UNd .ynanymDUllJ.
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availability of credit and the falling relative price of purchase. All of which. had been
working in favour of purchase over recent years.
STOCK OF COLOUR TV RECEIVERS (TVL)
In order to estimale the demand diffusion model. information was needed on the
stock of colour sets in existence. Sales data is available but il distorted by the inclusion
of replacement and multiple acquisitions. Multiple acquisition may not be too imponant
over the earty yean but by 198~. market research had estimllCd second colour set
ownership to be approximately 39% of households. Trade est1ma&es put the average life
of a colour tv receiver at about 8 years. However the de~iacion rate is unlikely to be
constant overtime. At its introduction. the reliability of the product wu questionable. Ihi.
has since improved. Similarly. consumer expectations about technoloJical obsolescence
is likely to affect the perceived life of the product and hence the avenae replacement
cycle. Fortunately. these problema can be avoided by using broadcasting receiving
licence data which is collected by the Post Office and published on a reaular basis.
Obtaining an initial colour tv set. places a legal obligation on the acquirer to also purchase
a colour tv licence. Of course there are problems with licence evasion but adjustment for
this factor is probably a lot more reliable.
Data on the number of colour tv licences in force wu collected on a quarterly
basis for the period 1968 quaner I to 19~ quaner 4. Licence evasion will result in a
systematic understatement of the uue silllacion. Provided the measurement error is
random. this problem can be overcome by econometric means. Using U\ alternative
source of data, collected by the trade association BREMA on the number of sets in use ••
comparison between the two data sell wu made and an esWnale of the avcraae
percentage understatement in the tv licence data calculated. This comparison wu made
over the period 1968 to 1982 only in order to avoid the multiple set ownership factor
which was inherent in the BREMA dill. This distonion wu thouJhl to be more
pronounced after 1982. as noted by the trade associadon themselves, who found. SU'Ona
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trend towards colour tv ponable sets in 1983 and a rapid growth inmultiple ownership in
1984. Hence the tv licence data was adjusted to account for an average understatement of
16~.
Having removed the systematic component. any further measurement error
could be trealCd as pwely random. M~ment error in the dependent variable does not
cause any problem to the OLS estimation as it will end up in the disturbance tenn of the
equation. However the stock of colour tv ~iven is used in the fonnation of the
existing ownership variable. included on the RHS of the estimating equation. Potentially
this could cause complications. However early investigation of the data. comparing the
OLS estimaleS with Insuumental Variable estimates. as suUested by Sargan (1958),
indicated chat the extent of the measurement error was not significanL A more fonnal test
for measurement error proposed by Hausman (1978) was also performed and it too
confirmed this conclusion. So the decisim was made to accept that the extent of
measurement error in the estimating equation was minimal and to proceed using OLS
estimation techniques.
Diqram A6.2 shows the proportion of UK households having acquired a colour
tv receiver over the period 1968q1 to 198!5Q4.The S shape so often found in the diffusion
of consumer durables, is undeniably visible. However it is not symmetric, the inflection
pou. occurs before ~ of the population own the new product. Consequently, merely
fitting a logistic growth curve to the data would not be appropriue. Strictly, the potential
population of acquiren for this particular product should account for the limited colour
tranSmission facilities available in the UK. M explained in the main body of this chapter.
there was I gradual extension of this service on both BBC and nv channels over the
period. By the beJiMing of 1973, approximately 9O'It of UK households had the
teehniw capability to receive colour transmission on BBC and rrv channels, if a colour
set was acquired. The number of demographic households was simply weighted by this
~lSinI proportion. The second IJ'apb in diagram A62 shows the proportion of these
adjusted households who hid acquired a colour tv receiver over the period. The wwed S
UK COLOUR TV OWNERSHIP
Proportion of Ul boas.bolds Owning or
R.nting a Colour TV
A5.2
I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 I 1 1 111
168 I 69 110 I 11 112 113114115 116 111118 119 I 80 I 81 I 82 I 83 I 84 I 851
nAI
-Prop
so.re.: Wo.I~ly Dlg •• I
Pro, • TVLt/lll
TVLI • No. 01 Colo., TV Llc •• c••
UK COLOUR TV OWNERSHIP
Proportion of Ul boas.bolds Owning or
R.nting a Co10arTV
(Adlusted for Channel Availability)
p,o,orllol
0.6
0.8
0."
0.2
111111111111111111
168169110 I 11 112 113 114 115 116 111118 119 180 I 81 182 183 184 I 8s1
TlAI
- AProl'
Soare.: WOlllly DI'.'I.tlC.ltA
"P,o, • TVLI/"MI
TVLI • No. 01 Colo.r TV Llc •• c••
UK COLOUR TV 'SALES'
Flrst OiUerenee. In Licence Data
Tlloa.aDCU1000~--------------------------------------------~
:200
800
600
400
-200~~~~+W~~~~W+~~~~~+W~~~~W+~~~
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 111 1 1 1 1 1 I 1
168169 I 70 I 71 I 7:2I 73 I 74 I 75 I 76 I 77 I 78 I 79 I 80 I al I 82 I 83 I a4 I asl
lIAI
-.ale.
Soare.: Woa'l., 01, •• ,
·Sal•• ·.TVLI - TVL'-I
UK COLOUR TELEVISION RECEIVERS
Growtb In Stoet 01 Coloar TV receivers
'.rc.a'a,.
40
60
1 1 111 111 1 111 1 1 I 1 1 1
168169170 I 7117:2I 73 I 74 I 75 I 76 I 77 I 78 I 79 I ao I 81 I 82 I 83 I 84 18S1
nAI
- growtb
Soare.: Woall., DI, •• I
,roWIIi .«TV'" - TVLI-I)/TV"t-J)'.oo
iv
shape is again clearly evident The main diffe~nce between the two graphs in diagram
A6.2 comes. not surprisingly. in the early period. The gradient of the adjuSled household
proportion curve is slightly steeper up to the end of 1971. After that date, the curves are
very similar.
Quarterly additions to the stock of colour tv receivers are shown in diagram
A6.3. Although labelled 'sales'. it should be remembered that this graph actually shows
the number of new acquirers of first secs only in each quarter. The seasonal nature of this
data is unmistakeable. Within the year, sales peak in quarter 4 (the Ouistmas period) and
the lowest quarterly sales occur in April to June. The long run trend in the data reveal
that the number of new acquisitions reached a maximum in 1973 and declined thereafter.
The second graph in diagram A6.3 displays the rate of growth in the stock of colour tv
receivers. Again the seasonality is obvious but so too is the overall downward trend in
the growth rate. After 1977, the growth rate more or less settles at a low constant rate,
becoming almost negligible after 1981.3
ADVERTISING EXPENDITURES (A)
Dala on total advertising expenditure on colour tv receivers by the ~nlal and
retail sector is plotted in diagram A6.4 .. The basic source of dala for nominal
expenditures is MEAL. Ideally the data should have isolated expenditures on colour tv
receivers only. However this level of disaggegation was not feasible. A worbble
assumption had to be made that all the data ~ferred to colour sets only. This is more
likely to be uue over the later period. Although far from perfect. data limitations
enforced such an assumption.
The nominal dala was deflated by a medii cost index constructed by the
Advenising Association. These indices show changes in the price of advertising in TV
3. Th«e it one oddity in the da&a dull needI e~. In 1915q3. thI .1OCk or tv ecQWJy reo.
IUII-rin& that. numbIr or c:wnnl1icence hlDldm eim. did nol rwww thIir or cIiIpoMd of &heir
c:olow tv _. ThiI had alao happened earlier in 1919 bu& .U .. to Ihe tfl'lIC& of • poIUl .&rib Oft Ihe daLa
c:oUeccion mel., .. 8d~ far lhia rector w.m8de. n.n •• no ~ NIIOft for Ihia in t9&5.
C~ dUI ~aIion •• tell wWund.
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vand Press media and alterations in audience size. The deflated advertisinl expenditures
should therefore represent the real volume of expenditures in these respective mediL A
large proportion of advertising expenditures on tv receivers consisted of advertising in the
press in the early 1970's. MEAL ceased publication of this media split from the mid
1970's to 198!5. However when this information was re-introduced. approximately 60%
of all advertising expenditure on tv receivers remained in the press mediL On balance, a
decision was made to deflate the nominal expenditures by the prell index only. The real
volume of advertising expenditures is ploued in diagram A6." and exhibits I slight
upward trend over the later period. The seasonality of the data. with quaner .. being the
peak season is apparent. becoming more extreme in the later years.
RELATIVE PRICE INDEX FOR COLOUR TV (P)
Diagram A6.!5 displays two versions of the relative price term. The bottom
gTlsm shows the relative producer price index of colour and monochrome receivers
(pRP). The producer price index series for monoduome sets was discontinued after
1983. The dala exhibits a strong downward trend. The alternative relative price term, is
the real retail price of colour tv receivers. The colour tv producer price (CPI) series wu
adjusted for the appropriate purchase tax or VAT rile m and retailers mm up on cost
(MU). so CPI(1 + T + MU). This index was deflated by the Retail Price Index for all
items. The appropriate mm up on cost was determined from the retailers gross margin
as a percentage of totallUmover (wages and salaries treaaed as overbead, Holton 19!57)
for the Radio and fJecuical Goods Retailers excluding Hire4. The gross margin data was
obtained from Retailing, initially on an annual basil but latterly on I biannual basis.
Missing quanerty observations were therefore estimated by interpolation.
Since the series is an average measure, chanles in the sales mix of the product
model range will not be distinguishable from an overall change in the price of the
product In other words, no account has been made for the fact that the 'bundle of
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characteristics' represented in models may be significantly changing over time. An
observed higher WlIdjusted relative price may therefore be misleading. if the level of
characteristics of the product has simulWlCOusly increased (for example the inclusion of
remote control or Teletext). However over the years. any significant trend in the products
overall relative price should still show up. TIle alternative relative price series discloses a
more dramatic fall over the period than the relative producer price ratio.
REAL INTEREST RATE (R)
'The nominal 3 month treasury bill yield was the basic source of this series. It
was then adjusted by the rate of inflation to give the real interest rate. The absence of
money illusion is therefore being imposed a priori in the estimation and is consistent with
the approach adopted for the other variables. Diagram A6.6 shows the high positive rate
of interest and its upward trend since 1981. Prior to this date. the real rate of interest was
mostly negative, clearly a result of the high rate of inflation during these periods.
PERSONAL DISPOSABLE INCOME (MY)
The seasonally unadjusted personal disposable income series in constant 1980
prices was divided by the defacto UK population aged over l~ yean. This was done in
order to capture the real expenditure budgets of those individuals directly involved in the
colour tv martel tranSaCtion. This of course neglects the fact that children under this age
may influence the 'decision maker' who aclUally purchases or rents a colour tv set
Strictly, the budget constraint should be household income to be consistent with the
dependent variable being investigated. namely the diifusioo of colour tv receivers
amongst UK households. The data series used was rudUy available on a quanerly basis
and was therefore employed as an approximation. Agure A6.4 shows thai the variable
exhibited an upward trend. except for the recessionary effects of 197~m and 198112.
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A full description of all the variables used in the empirical investigation is given
in the next pages.
viii
DEFINmONS ANDDATA SOURCES
Quarterly observations for the period 1968q I to 1985q4. All data ~ seasonally
unadjusted and constant price data are in 1980 prices. Standard errors are in parenmese.
beneath the coefficient estimates. Natural logarithmic transformation of explanatory
variables are denoted by L(variable name).
Ht Number of households in the UK in thousands. Quarterly observations from
interpolation of growth rate (Census of Population and Social Trends).
AHt Number of UK households ,able to receive colour transmission service on BBC
and ITV (BBC and ITA).
1"YLt Stock of colour tv receivers. Broadcast receiving licences in force for colour tv
in the UK in thousands. Lagged by one month. to capture the delay in between
acquisition of set and obtaining a licence (Bain 1962). Also adjusted for licence
evasion, using BREMA annual estimates of number of colour sets in use. An
average understatement of approximately 16,.. See text for more detail
(Monthly Oigest).
At Real total advertising expenditures on tv receivers. Nominal advertising
expenditures by both retail and rental seeton on tv receivers in thousand pounds
(NAD) deflated by the press media index (Advertising Association, MEAL).
qi Seasonal dummy quarter i
BBC2 Dummy variable taking a value of 1 when colour tranSmission service is
available on BBC channel2 only.
ilt
Rt Real rate of interest Nominal 3 month Treasury Bill yield, average discount
rate expressed as a rate per annum less the rate of infladon as measured by
Retail Price Index all items, RPI, (Economic Trends).
Pt Relative average retail price index of colour tv receivers, that is producer price
index of colour tv sets (CPI) multiplied by the relevant purchase tax or VAT
rate and retailers margin as described in the text (APt> and dcfla&ed by RPI
(pINCCA, retailing, BREMA).
PRPt Ratio of producer price index of colour to monochrome tv receivers (pINCCA).
MY t per capita real disposable income. Real personal disposable income deflated by
defacto UK home population over IS years in thousands pounds (Monthly
Digest).
DPSTt Hire purchase series consisting of minimum legal proportion required u a
deposiL As the maximum mOlUhlyrepaymeru period also moved in line with
the minimum deposit proportion, the variable simply reflected the deposit
proportion (BREMA).
fEEt Price index of colour tv licence fee deflated by RPI (BBC Handbook).
PCMt Net output less wages and salaries as a proportion of total sales for the
electronic consumer goods and other elect. equipment producers SIC 3454
(Census of Production).
NOB Number of observations.
RSS Residual Sum of Squares of the equation.
DW Dwbin-Watson statistic for 1st order serial correlation.
D-h Durbin's h statistic for Ist order serial condition.
LM4
RSET
NORM
HET
CHOW
PRED
x
Lagrange Multiplier test for residual autocorrelation up to order 4.
Ramsey Reset test using the square of the fitted values.
Jarque-Sera test for nonnality.
Heteroscedasticity test based on regression of squared
residuals on squared fined values.
Olow test for stability of the regression coefficients.
Predictive Failure Test. ie, Olow's second test of
adequacy of predictions.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS
At the beginning of this thesis, it was argued that research into the diffusion
process and in particular the diffusion of new consumer durables and the role of
advertising, had been relatively neglected by economists. The aim of this thesis has been
to rectify past deficiencies by explicitly focusing upon the pan played by advertising in
the diffusion of new consumer durables both at a theoretical and empirical level.
To begin with, in Olapter 3, the epidemic diffusion model wu used.
Advertising had been incorporated into such a model already in the thcoreticalliterawre,
but was limited to consideration of the profit maximising time path of advertising for a
monopolist supplier only. Here, following the standard industrial economics approach.
interest focused upon the profit maximising advertising sales ratio both for a monopolist
and oligopolistic industry. Whilst these ratios had been derived in • static (Dorfman-
Steiner) and dynamic (Nerlove·Anow) framework. no explicit consideration had been
given to the possible implications for these ratios in a world of product innovations.
The essential feature of the two period epidemic model presented in Chapter 3,
was the spread of infonnation about the new generic consumer durable by existing
owners. This had • positive effect on future flow demand. However, given the
assumption that individuals purchased one unit only, the population of potential buyers
was fmite. Consequently, increasing the number of existing owners in period 1 would
reduce the number of remaining potential buyers in period 2. Both of these dynamic
aspects were encompassed in the dynamic owner extemality term and ill sign wu crucial
to the first period profit maximising decision. It became apparent that in. world of new
consumer durables and addressing the role of advertisina. the ~s and N·A advertising
sales ratios were not sufficient for profit maximisation. In the epidemic model, the
advertising sales ratio could be larKer or smaller than the standard rIliot dependina upon
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the sian of the dynamic owner externality. I Ultimately, the sian of the dynamic owner
externality rested upon the relative magnitude of the social contact coefficient and the
intenemporal effectiveness of the external channel of information ie. advertising.
1be monopolist supplier usumption wu relaxed to see whether the special
features of the epidemic model impinFd upon the resulting profit maximising industry
advertising sales ratio as the number of supplien (n) changed. Intuitively, an industry
advertising sales ratio decreasing in n was expected. This was due to the oligopolist's
difficulty in securing all of the positive information extemality in future periods. Unlike a
monopolist. an individual finn in an oligopolistic industry would have to incur an
additional cost to secure a share of the dynamic benefit. namely second period advertising
expenditure. 1be signing of the derivative of the advertising sales ratio with respect to
the changing number of firms was complex and 80 various cues were explored. 1be
intuitive result (advertising sales ratio decreasing in n) did emerae as. special case, under
the assumptions of a constant unitary advertising demand elasticity and • relatively tarae
discounted positive dynamic owner extemality. However the formal result had to be
treated with caution given the extemality term was in fact endogenous.
Most of the formal analysis in Chapter 3 was based upon the assumption that
each symmetric firm adopted zero conjectural variations behaviour. The effect of
relaxing this assumption and the likelihood of collusion was informally considered. On
the whole, in the epidemic framewort, the prospects for collusive behaviour looked low,
except when the number of suppliers in the industry was very small and the information
flow generic in nature. Recognising the threat of entry also had implicalions for the
advertising decision. Unlike the standard view, advertisina wu seen as an invitation to
cnuy and not • barrier, however this conclusion depended upon the crucial assumption
that the information uansmiucd wu generic in natun:. In this case, the du'cal of entry in
future periods would tend to lower the monopoly advertisina sales rado. In an
1. AlIa wilh die IddiIionIl c:ondibon Ih.a& 1M JDOdwill daprecillioa r .... noc '\00 hiP' .. laIl". 10 !he
tUM diIcounl fKl« onge .1IOCk of JDOdwill •• included
192
oligopolistic industry, the effect was ambiguous. More rivals in future periods would
tend to reduce the industry advenising ratio because of the difficulty in securing all of the
infonnation externality. However the negative early extraction effect (due to the finite
nature of the population of potential ooyers) would now be bome by more finns in the
future and this would have a positive effect on advenising intensity. It was therefore not
clear which effect would dominate. However, if the infonnation transmiaed was not
generic in nature but finn specific instead, such that there existed loyalty effects in a
firm '5 market share, this would provide a positive incentive for oligopolists to undertake
first period advertising, once future entry was recognised.
The epidemic demand diffusion model did not possess an economic decision
base. Consequently previous authors had turned attention towards the use of an
alternative probit based diffusion model. However no consideration had been given to the
role of advertising in such a framework. In Chapter 4 advertising was incorporated into
the probil model through the individual's profitability condition. Thus the detennination
of the critical value became dependent upon total industry advenising expenditures and so
total advertising entered into the stock demand function. At any point in time, current
flow demand would depend not only upon CUJ'1"eIll decision variables but also on the
existing level of ownership.2
The essential feature of the probit model was the finite population of potential
buyers and so the diffusion rate was likened to the rate of extraction of a non renewable
mineral resource. Given consumers holding myopic price expecwions. a monopolist
producer could exploit the opportunities in this model for intenemporal price
discrimination. The result being a larger first period price cost margin as compared to a
mooopolist who ignored the dynamic implications of his decisions.
1bc neSaUve early extraction effect and the price discrimination possibilities of
the probil model also impinged upon the profit maximisinlldvettisln, We8 rano in the
2, P.. 8dveniaina expcndilUnll would 1110en. direclly. if l,oodwillllOCk of IdvIl1ilin& ooncepl W.
UMd.
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first period. 1be net effect of these two additional tenns was not unambiguous and rested
upon the ratio of the responsiveness of current flow demand with respect to current
decision variables relative to the ratio of the responsiveness of current flow demand with
respect to the lagged decision variables. When an additional dynamic effect of
advertising through a stock of goodwill was also included, then this positive dynamic
effect could poteNially reduce the negative early extraction factor. However unlike the
N-A condition. the goodwill sales ratio in this probit model would still need to account
for the intenemporal price discrimination possibilities inherent in the model. So once
again the D-S and N-A expressions were not sufficient for profit maximisation once
attention was turned to the explicit consideration of the diffusion of new consumer
durables. The effect of a changing nwnber of suppliers on the industry advertising sales
ratio could not be rigorously shown. However. at an intuitive levd. the price cost margin
was expected to be lower and the advenising intensity higher. This result was likely
given the finite nature of the population and that the opportunity cost of earty extraction
would be borne by all the finns in the next period. This was likely to provide an
incentive to race to extract consumers in earlier periods and unlike the epidemic model.
there was no offsetting infonnation externality to oonsider.
Having looked at some of the theoretical implications or incorporating
advenising into each of the competing demand diffusion equations and including a supply
side. attention was turned to the empirical stage or the investigation. No previous
empirical examination of advertising in the diffusion process existed in the economics
literature (other dwl an investigation of the oofJee and tea market). However a few
studies had been undertaken by marketing researchers. Generally their objective was to
forecast future sales of the new product and little attention was given to testing the
econometric specification hypothesised. From an economist'. point of view, it is the
effects of variables such as advertising which are imponanL The magnitude and
significance of the coefficiert on the explanatory variables are of interest within their own
righL Unfortunately. these estimated paralDCterswill be unreliable unlea the model has
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been correctly specified. Thus it is imperative to apply the econometricians diagnostic
tools.
Two products were chosen for the empirical investigation, the video cassette
recorder and colour television receiver. Estimation commenced with the epidemic model
to see whether the dala accepted this particular specification. It was argued that the
application of the epidemic model was likely to be of limited use only, whereas the probit
model could be more generally applied. Using data on the VCR in Chapter ~, some
interesting results were produced using the epidemic specification. Both the existing
ownership and current advenising variables had a positive and statistically significant
effect on the diffusion proca&. It was found that advertising entering indirectly through
the social contact coefficient proved superior to an epidemic structure in which
advertising entered directly into the equation. The choice of the particular route for
advertising was crucial, since the estimaled parameter on the existing ownership variable
was particularly sensitive to the stnlcture adopted. Adding additional goodwill effects for
advertising did not appear necessary. although liven that advertising already had a lagged
effect in the epidemic model (indirectly via the exiting number of ownen, it would be
expecting I lot of the dall to distinguish these dynamic facton.
The alternative probit model did not perform too well, with the magnitude and
statistical significance of the estimaled coefficients on the economic variables being
particularly sensitive to the precise equation specification. Only the lagged dependent
variable (showing the number of owners to non ownen) seemed to be of any significance
and this variable could have been picking up the imponance of existing ownen in
uansmining information about the product. Overall these results highlighted the role of
the information variables. ie. existing ownen and advertising in the diffusion of the VCR
in the UK. However. the estimation of the models did not take account of supply side
radOn and in particular the possible endogenity of the Idvertisinl variable.
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In Chapter 6. the colour tv receiver was investigated. The epidemic model
when using the whole sample period 1968 to 1985. raised doubts about the adequacy of
this framework for this particular product 1bc data was unable to distinguish whether
advenising entered direcdy into the equation or indirectly through the social contact
coefficient Again this ambiguity was serious. as the estimated coefficient on the existing
ownership variable was particularly sensitive to the Specification adopted.
As the extent of information about the new product would be of more
significance during the early period, the sample period was arbitrarily restricted to the
first 11 years of the diffusion process. Re-estimation on this shortened sample, raised
funner questions about the suitability of the epidemic hypothesis. In the whole period.
the first quarter lag of advertising was the preferred advertising variable. However in the
restricted sample. the current variable performed better, Funner. once the possibility of
simultaneous equation bias was accounted for by using TSLS estimation, then the
statistical performance of the advenising variable was more debatable. Overall the
epidemic model did not appear to be an adequate representation of the demand diffusion
equation for the colour tv receiver in the UK. Given the sensitivity of the statistical
significance and magnitude of the estimated parameten to the ecoeomemc estimation
method used, any conclusions on the role of advertising in this particular framework must
be viewed with caution.
In conttaSt to the VCR, the probit model performed bener relative to the
epidemic one usinl data on the colour tv receiver. Although the lagged dependent
variable was again the dominating explanatory factor. other economic variables especially
relative price and hire purchase resttictions were influential in the diffusion process.
Current advertising was not found to be a relevant explanatory variable, but the first
quanef lag of the advertising variable had I positive and statistically significant effect.
consequendy the demand diffusion equation would form part of I recunive system,
henCe there was no problem with simultaneous equation btu. Again the sample period
was resuia.c:d to the first 11 yean. In the shoner period. the probit model showed Signs
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of mis-specification and advertising was no longer significant in explaining the diffusion
process. It is possible that the probit model during the early period fails 10 capture the
information transmission process adequately and this is more likely to be of consequence
at the beginning of the diffusion process. Nonetheless. the probit framework did show the
imponance of economic variables such as price and hire purchase restrictions in the
diffusion process and the exclusion of such variables (as in the epidemic framewoli()
could be a serious omission.
It is interesting 10 note that both of the information variables (advertising and
existing ownership) were panicu1arly imponant in the diffusion of the VCR as indicated
by the relatively better performance of the epidemic model. The coefficient on the
existing ownership variable was generally larger in magnitude and swistical significance
than for the colour tv epidemic equation. It is feasible that being a radically new good,
lack of information could be a considerable restraining factor on the diffusion process.
Further. as the data suggested that advertising entered indirectly through the social
contact coefficient. this would seem to support the view that individuals wiU need
additional information from an unbiased source. before becoming fully convinced of the
advertiser's claims. Again this would seem especially reasonable for a radically new
product. However later on. the omitted ec:onomic variables may take precedence. thus
explaining why the epidemic model's predictive ability was not too good. In contrast. the
colour tv receiver was a technically superior product to the existing monochrome
receiver. Consequently. even in the early period. the majority of the population would
have some information about the television set in general. Therefore the information
variables may not be as importanl as the eoonomic variables such as relative price or hire
purchase restrictions. which may be why the probit model performed relatively better.
It does seem that the significance of advertising in the diffusion process may
depend upon the nature of the product being investigated. Therefore previous studies
which have found I positive and significant effect of advertisinl in III epidemic
framewort need to Irea&cd widl some caution. especially since the level of diagnostic
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testin& of the hypothesised model was minimal. The inclusion of other economic
variables should not be overlooked. The probit model appears to be a better starting point
and further research should concentrate upon incorporating the infonnalion variables in a
more satisfying manner, although as indicated earlier in this thesis, the researcher will be
limited in this respect by the availability of an approprille data set. Finally, the
competing demand diffusion models could also be applied to a horizontally differentiated
good (eg. microwave oven) to sec whether the probit based model is in fact more
generally applicable as expected.
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